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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past thirty-five years, presidents and courts have 
pushed administrative law and the regulatory process towards 
what a number of prominent commenters have called a “cost-
benefit state.” 1   Under the cost-benefit state, administrative 
agencies advance regulation only after considering the costs and 
benefits of potential policy options, and select a solution in which 
the benefits justify the costs.  By using cost-benefit analysis—
the systematic evaluation and, where possible, quantification of 
all of the costs and benefits of an agency’s action—agencies are 
able to make more informed and rational decisions, 
transparently weigh tradeoffs, and provide the public with 
relevant information regarding what to expect from regulation. 
The move towards a cost-benefit state has accelerated in 
recent years.  The use of cost-benefit analysis to inform 
regulatory decisions has primarily been  advanced by the 
executive branch, reaffirmed and institutionalized by presidents 
of both political parties over multiple decades. 2   These 
requirements were initially met with some skepticism in the 
courts.3  However, the courts have more recently embraced the 
consideration and weighing of costs and benefits as an integral 
part of agency decision making.4  And while federal agencies 
 
1  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY 
PROTECTION (2002).  See also John D. Graham & Paul R. Noe, A Paradigm Shift in the 
Cost-Benefit State, REG. REV. (April 26, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/04/ 
26/graham-noe-shift-in-the-cost-benefit-state/ [https://perma.cc/YUU4-YAW4]. 
2 See Exec. Order No. 12,291 §§ 2(b), 3, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,192, 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981); Exec. 
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sep. 30, 1993); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
CIRCULAR A-4:  REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003) [hereinafter CIRCULAR A-4]; Exec. Order 
No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
3 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 470–71 (2001) (holding 
that, absent a “clear” direction to do so, the provisions of the Clean Air Act require EPA 
to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards without consideration of costs); 
Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (“When Congress has 
intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such 
intent on the face of the statute.”). 
4 Se, Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, 
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575, 585–87, 609–17 (2015) (discussing recent Supreme Court 
cases permitting cost-benefit analysis and thirty-eight appellate court cases that 
reviewed agency use of cost-benefit analysis).  See also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 
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under President Trump appear less committed to a vision of 
regulation where action is taken based on rigorous analysis of 
costs and benefits,5 the courts have continued to reinforce the 
importance of cost-benefit analysis.6 
Most independent agencies have not yet embraced the cost-
benefit state.  The executive orders that have spurred executive 
branch agencies to analyze the costs and benefits of proposed 
regulations have explicitly left out independent agencies,7 and 
few use cost-benefit analysis voluntarily. 8   One such 
independent regulatory agency is the nation’s primary energy 
regulator, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”).  FERC is a five-member independent regulatory 
agency with two primary responsibilities:  (1) the economic 
regulation of the wholesale sales of electricity and natural gas, 
and of the interstate transportation of that electricity and gas 
through transmission lines and pipelines; and (2) the permitting 
of certain types of energy projects—interstate natural gas 
pipelines and hydroelectric dams—that FERC determines are in 
 
2706–07 (2015) (holding unlawful an EPA finding that regulating hazardous air 
pollution from power plants was “appropriate and necessary” because EPA made that 
finding without considering the costs of regulation); Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 829 
F.3d 710, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (considering the costs of a 
repeal “is common sense and settled law”). 
5 See Richard Revesz, E.O. 12866—25th Anniversary Remarks, GEO. WASH. REG. STUD. 
CTR. (Oct. 9, 2018), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/eo-12866-25th-
anniversary-remarks [https://perma.cc/WHD5-CD4E].  See also Dan Farber, The End of 
the Cost-Benefit State?, LEGAL PLANET (Feb. 27, 2017), http://legal-
planet.org/2017/02/27/the-end-of-the-cost-benefit-state/ [https://perma.cc/GW2L-LD7U].  
6 E.g., California v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 277 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(vacating a delay of a regulation limiting waste of natural gas produced on federal lands 
because, in part, the agency had arbitrarily failed to consider the forgone benefits of the 
rule). 
7 Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 1(d), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13193 (Feb. 7, 1981); Exec. Order 
No. 12,866 § 3(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sep. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 7(a), 76 
Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
8  Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of Regulations at 
Independent Regulatory Commissions, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 215 (2011) (finding that 
analysis supporting regulatory action conducted by independent agencies is limited to 
“the minimum required by statute”); Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the 
Structure of the Administrative State:  The Case of Financial services Regulation, 34 YALE 
J. REG. 545, 560–61 (2017) (discussing the failure of independent agencies to conduct 
adequate cost-benefit analysis). 
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the public interest.9  FERC does not generally use cost-benefit 
analysis as a tool for fulfilling these responsibilities.10 
FERC has not always been so hostile to its use, however.  
During the last time of major transition in the energy system, 
FERC recognized the importance of weighing broad categories of 
costs and benefits when fulfilling its responsibilities.  Under the 
traditional model in place from the 1930s, when Congress passed 
the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) and Federal Power Act (“FPA”), 
until the 1990s, FERC set the rates and conditions for sales of 
electricity, natural gas, and associated transmission service 
between monopoly utilities.  However, thirty years ago, changes 
in technology and regulatory philosophy led FERC to refashion 
its role to become a regulator of competitive markets, 
responsible for crafting rules that rely on market forces to 
reliably provide service at efficient prices, enable competition 
among diverse suppliers, limit market power, and place risk 
(and reward) with investors rather than captive customers.  For 
electricity, FERC also encouraged the formation of independent 
grid operators, called regional transmission organizations 
(“RTOs”), 11  which integrate and manage both the physical 
operation of the bulk electric system and the organized markets 
that determine which generators will supply electric demand (or 
“load”) in a given interval.  At the start of this transition, FERC 
turned to cost-benefit analysis to help inform its decision 
making.  FERC’s single most important electricity sector 
regulation—Order 888, which helped restructure the electricity 
system—included a robust cost-benefit analysis.12  As did its 
order encouraging the formation of RTOs,13 and its evaluation of 
 
9  LAWRENCE R. GREENFIELD, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY 
COMMISSION AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 3–4, 10 (2018). 
10 See Part II(b), infra. 
11  FERC has established two models for central management of the electric grid:  
independent system operators (ISOs) and RTOs.  The legal and practical distinctions 
between ISOs and RTOs are minor and not relevant for the purposes of the issues 
discussed herein.  Therefore, for simplicity, I refer generally to central grid operators as 
RTOs. 
12  Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, FERC Stas. & Regs., ¶ 31,036, 
at 31,860 (1996) [hereinafter Order No. 888]. 
13 Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285, at P 3 (Dec. 
20, 1999) [hereinafter Order No. 2000]. 
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specific RTO proposals.14  But FERC has not followed that up 
with the consistent use of cost-benefit analysis, even as FERC’s 
most important actions shifted from approving specific financial 
contracts among market participants to setting the rules of the 
game.15 
In 1999, FERC issued a Policy Statement clarifying its role in 
the approval of pipeline projects.16  This Policy Statement was 
spurred by FERC’s recognition that changes in the gas industry 
brought about by its deregulatory efforts described above would 
result in expanded demand for natural gas infrastructure.  And, 
in light of those changes, FERC included language suggesting it 
would fulfill its responsibility of permitting natural gas 
infrastructure by weighing costs and benefits imposed on 
market participants and the general public. 17   But despite 
paying lip service to the language of cost-benefit analysis, FERC 
has, over time, moved further away from its commitment to 
weigh costs and benefits—instead relying on limited evidence 
such as contractual commitments to purchase natural gas as 
evidence of the desirability of projects. 18   And FERC has 
generally ignored one of the most important costs of natural gas 
infrastructure:  climate change.19 
This Article argues that now is an apt time for FERC to shift 
course and embrace the cost-benefit revolution.  The energy 
system is again in a time of profound transition.20  Technological 
advances have substantially reduced the cost of new energy 
production resources, which have different benefits and limits as 
compared to legacy options.  For example, wind turbines and 
 
14 See JOSEPH H. ETO & DOUGLAS R. HALE, A REVIEW OF RECENT RTO BENEFIT-COST 
STUDIES:  TOWARD MORE COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENTS OF FERC ELECTRICITY 
RESTRUCTURING POLICIES (2005), [hereinafter RTO CBA REPORT] (discussing limited 
use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the formation of RTOs). 
15 As discussed more infra, FERC sets the rules of the game using both rulemakings that 
apply industry-wide and adjudication that approve or direct changes for individual 
RTOs. 
16 Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227 
(1999) [hereafter 1999 Policy Statement]. 
17  Id. at 61,737 (describing FERC’s evaluation of pipeline certificate applications as 
weighing benefits and costs). 
18 National Fuel Supply Corp., 158 FERC ¶ 61,145, at P 3 (2017) (Bay, Comm’r, separate 
statement). 
19 See Richard Glick & Matthew Christiansen, FERC and Climate Change, 40 ENERGY 
L.J. 1, 42 (2019). 
20 Id. at 7–14 (outlining evidence and implications of the energy transition). 
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solar panels are now cost-competitive with coal and natural 
gas.21  These sources produce power at zero marginal cost but 
only intermittently,  necessitating changes to electricity market 
design.22  Battery electric storage, which has seen costs fall 85% 
from 2010 to 2018, 23  can provide new grid services such as 
matching intermittent generation with the needs of the system, 
but rules will have to change to fully enable their participation 
in electricity markets. 24   Demand response aggregations—
enabled by smart meters and internet-connected appliances—
allow consumers to seamlessly reduce usage at times of peak 
demand, thereby lowering system costs. 25   Meanwhile, as a 
result of the growing recognition of the critical importance of 
decarbonizing the energy sector in order to meet the threat of 
climate change, consumers are demanding access to these clean 
energy options26 and states are passing policies to retain existing 
zero-emitting generation while accelerating deployment of new 
clean energy even beyond what the market would demand on its 
own. 27   At the same time, new production technologies have 
substantially reduced the cost of natural gas, creating demand 
for new natural gas power plants, as well as the pipeline and 
export infrastructure needed to supply them. 28   These power 
 
21 Renewable Electricity Levelized Cost of Energy Already Cheaper Than Fossil Fuels, and 




22 DEP’T OF ENERGY, TRANSFORMING THE NATION’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM:  THE SECOND 
INSTALLMENT OF THE QER at 4–40 (2017) [hereafter QER 2]. 
23 Veronika Henze, Energy Storage Investments Boom as Battery Costs Halve in the Next 
Decade, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. (July 31, 2019), https://about.bnef.com/ 
blog/energy-storage-investments-boom-battery-costs-halve-next-decade/ 
[https://perma.cc/4FQS-4BGZ]. 
24 Eric Gimon, How Market Rules are Holding Back Energy Storage, GREENTECH MEDIA 
(Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/energy-storage-
wholesale-market-rules [https://perma.cc/WF6C-AQT3]. 
25 QER 2, supra note 22, at 1–26. 
26 David Roberts, Utilities Have a Problem:  The Public Wants 100% Renewable Energy, 
and Quick, VOX (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/ 
9/14/17853884/utilities-renewable-energy-100-percent-public-opinion 
[https://perma.cc/5EFP-DUK7]. 
27 Farah Benahmed & Lindsey Walter, Clean Energy Targets Are Trending, THIRD WAY 
(Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.thirdway.org/graphic/clean-energy-targets-are-trending 
[https://perma.cc/5E39-E53A]. 
28  Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas:  U.S. 
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 999–1000 (2015) (discussing the growth 
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plants often displace higher-emitting alternative sources of 
electricity and so reduce greenhouse gas emissions;29 however, 
the natural gas infrastructure may make further 
decarbonization harder to achieve.30 
As a result, energy regulators have begun to take a broader 
view of their responsibilities to develop an energy system that 
works not just for investors and customers, but also for the 
broader public interest.31  This change has the potential to affect 
both FERC’s role as an electricity market regulator and as a 
permitter of energy infrastructure.32  FERC is faced with high-
profile and contentious proceedings in which different 
stakeholders have asked for market changes that have the 
potential to retain uncompetitive inflexible coal-fired power 
plants or, alternatively, to facilitate integration of new low- and 
zero-emitting technologies such as wind, solar, demand 
response, and storage.33  FERC is also currently in the process 
of reevaluating its natural gas certificate policy and has 
requested comment on whether its policy should use economic 
tools to calculate and balance a broader array of costs and 
 
of U.S. natural gas production caused by technological changes); SUSAN TIERNEY, 
ANALYSIS GROUP, NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CERTIFICATION:  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
A CHANGING INDUSTRY 23–24 (2017), (showing increasing usage of gas in the electric 
power sector); Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities, 163 FERC ¶ 
61,042, at P 21 (2018) [hereafter Policy Statement NOI] (describing the increase in 
pipeline certificate applications since 2010). 
29  Perry Lindstrom, EIA Expects U.S. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions to Decrease 
Annually Through 2021, EIA: TODAY IN ENERGY (Jan. 17, 2020), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42515 [https://perma.cc/5GNR-4Q32]. 
30 Michael O’Boyle, Utility Investors Risk Billions in Rush to Natural Gas:  Is It A Bridge 
to Climate Breakdown?, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
energyinnovation/2020/03/04/utility-investors-risk-billions-in-rush-to-natural-gas-is-it-
a-bridge-to-climate-breakdown/#f14624a50af7 [https://perma.cc/V8AA-HJGA]. 
31  See generally Glick & Christiansen, supra note 19, at 7–14; Jody Freeman, The 
Uncomfortable Convergence of Energy and Environmental Law, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
339 (2017). 
32 Glick & Christiansen, supra note 19, at 14–16 (discussing FERC’s role in the energy 
transition). 
33 Grid Resiliency Price Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940 (proposed Oct. 10, 2017) [hereinafter 
DOE NOPR] (Department of Energy-initiated notice of proposed rulemaking to 
compensate coal and nuclear power plants for fuel security value); Calpine Corp., v. PJM 
Interconnection, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2018) (initiating a proceeding to consider 
reform of PJM capacity market in order to mitigate effect of state carbon policies); NEW 
YORK ISO, IPPTF CARBON PRICING PROPOSAL (Dec. 7, 2018), (draft proposal to 
incorporate a price on carbon dioxide emissions directly into FERC-jurisdictional 
wholesale market). 
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benefits of a gas infrastructure projects.34  In both cases, FERC 
must balance competing interests in the brighter spotlight of the 
public, Congress, and the courts. 
In managing this transition, a successful FERC will balance 
competing interests, explain its choices clearly to the public and 
its congressional overseers, and, ultimately, act in ways that 
make the American people better off.  To do so, FERC would 
adopt, accept, or require rule changes and approve 
infrastructure projects that reduce emissions, maintain system 
reliability, and ensure affordable access to energy.  Cost-benefit 
analysis can help FERC meet each of these objectives.  Doing so 
will also help satisfy FERC’s obligation to act in ways that are 
not arbitrary and capricious, 35  and that are in service of its 
mandate to promote the public interest; 36  accordingly, cost-
benefit analysis can serve as an analytical tool that will shield it 
from legal risk. 
Use of cost-benefit analysis would not be appropriate in all 
circumstances.  FERC issues over a thousand orders a year and 
requiring a formal quantification of costs and benefits for each 
would be impractical.37   But drawing on best-practices from 
other agencies,38 FERC can establish relevant thresholds and 
criteria to use the tool for its most significant actions, including 
industry-wide rulemakings, major changes to individual RTO 
market rules, and approval of large infrastructure projects.  A 
proactive decision to use cost-benefit analysis for FERC’s most 
significant actions would be an important next step in enhancing 
 
34 Policy Statement NOI, supra note 28, at P 54 (“In determining whether there is a 
public need for a proposed project, what benefits should the Commission consider”); id. 
at 57 (“should the Commission consider changing how it balances the potential use of 
eminent domain against the showing of need for the project”); id. at 58 (“should the 
Commission consider changing how it weighs a proposed project’s adverse environmental 
impacts against favorable economic benefits to determine whether the proposed project 
is required by the public convenience and necessity”). 
35 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983). 
36 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2018) (“It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling 
electric energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest”); 
15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (2018) (“it is declared that the business of transporting and selling 
natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest”). 
37 Letter from Norman C. Bay, Chairman, FERC, to President Donald J. Trump 2 (Jan. 
26, 2017), available at https://www.ferc.gov/media/headlines/2017/2017-1/01-26-17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X683-32KW] [hereinafter Norman C. Bay Letter]. 
38 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
ZEVIN-MACRO-042820 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2020  7:55 PM 
428 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 45:2 
the rigor, transparency, and accountability of its actions at this 
critical time of transition. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II begins by defining 
cost-benefit analysis as it is applied by federal agencies, and 
then explains why FERC should move away from its general 
refusal to employ cost-benefit analysis and embrace it as a 
means of evaluating the consequences of its potential decisions.  
Part II also provides normative reasons why FERC should 
deploy cost-benefit decision making, identifies limits on the use 
of cost-benefit analysis, and discusses the institutional 
capabilities that make cost-benefit a good fit for FERC.  Parts II 
and III more deeply evaluate how cost-benefit analysis can 
better inform the two most important areas of FERC’s decision 
making responsibility.  Part III covers FERC’s regulation of the 
electric system under the FPA, with a focus on FERC’s approval 
of proposed market rule changes offered by RTOs under Section 
205 and its ability to mandate changes under Section 206.  Part 
III also briefly identifies additional areas of FERC electric 
system regulation that would benefit from the use of cost-benefit 
analysis:  the establishment of minimum reliability standards 
and the establishment of incentives for the construction of 
certain types of interstate electric transmission.  Part IV covers 
FERC regulation of the construction and operation of natural 
gas infrastructure projects.  Each of these parts discusses 
FERC’s current approach to decision making, analyzes FERC’s 
legal authority to rely on cost-benefit analysis, and identifies 
tools that FERC can use to conduct cost-benefit analyses.  
Finally, Part V offers some concluding thoughts. 
II. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE FEDERAL ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMMISSION 
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis as Applied by Federal Agencies 
Cost-benefit analysis is both a method for evaluating the 
expected consequences of an action under consideration and a 
method of decision making for choosing among potential 
actions.39  As a method of evaluation, cost-benefit analysis puts 
 
39 Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis:  Definition, Justification, and Comment on 
Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1153–54 (2000) (discussing the definition of 
cost-benefit analysis along two axes:  as an evaluative tool and as a decision tool). 
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particular emphasis on the formalized use of science and 
economics to identify the expected effects—both good and bad—
of a particular action.  Those effects can then be compared on 
equal terms—generally “monetized” as dollars and cents. 40  
Cost-benefit analysis as a method of decision making generally 
involves comparing the costs and benefits of a number of 
alternative actions, and picking an option where the benefits 
exceed the costs by the largest amount. 
The specific contours of how agencies perform and use cost-
benefit analysis is informed largely by a series of executive 
orders and guidance documents dating back to the early 1980s.  
President Reagan’s 1981 Executive Order 12,291 implemented a 
shift toward the systematic and coordinated use of cost-benefit 
analysis by federal agencies. 41   A little over ten years later, 
President Clinton issued a new executive order, Order 12,866, 
which established a set of requirements that reaffirmed the 
broad goals and approach of the prior executive order, though 
with some changes in detail and emphasis.  Order 12,866 has 
been embraced by Presidents George W. Bush,42 Obama,43 and 
Trump,44 and continues to serve as the governing document for 
executive branch agency evaluation of regulations. 
Under Executive Order 12,866, executive branch agencies—
that is, agencies other than independent regulatory agencies 
 
40 Monetizing costs and benefits, particularly for non-market effects such as species loss, 
can be difficult or impossible.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of 
Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1370–80 (2014) (discussing challenges of 
quantifying non-market goods and potential solutions).  See also FRANK ACKERMAN & 
LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS (2004) (generally discussing criticisms of cost-benefit 
analysis).  However, most of the immediate consequences of FERC’s decisions, are 
amenable to monetization.  See Part II(c)(1).  Moreover, monetization, combined with 
qualitative analysis, can help inform agency decision-making even when not all 
consequences can be monetized. 
41 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. pt. 127 (1981).  For a more complete history of 
centralized regulatory review, see Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, H.R. 3010, 
112th Cong. (2011). 
42  Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007) (making only minor 
amendments to Executive Order 12,866). 
43 Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (reaffirming Executive 
Order 12,866 and supplementing it with additional requirements such as retrospective 
review of existing regulations). 
44 Exec. Order No. 13,777 § 2(a)(ii), 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Mar. 1, 2017) (directing agencies 
implement regulatory reform initiatives and policies including Executive Order 12,866). 
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and commissions 45 —are required to identify the costs and 
benefits of “significant” regulations—generally, those with an 
estimated economic impact greater than $100 million per year.46  
When possible, agencies must find that the benefits of regulation 
justify the costs.47 
In 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), 
within the Executive Office of the President, issued Circular A-
4, a guidance document that provides significant detail on best 
practices for agency cost-benefit analyses. 48   Circular A-4 
explains that agency cost-benefit analyses should use economic 
tools to translate the effects of their actions in the common 
metric of dollars so that disparate effects can be compared to 
each other.49  But Circular A-4 also recognizes that not all costs 
and benefits are quantifiable or monetizable using accepted 
methodologies and available data. 50   When existing data or 
valuation methodologies are insufficient, costs and benefits can 
be evaluated and discussed qualitatively.51  The agency can use 
its professional judgment to evaluate the relative importance of 
those non-quantified costs and benefits and act accordingly.52  
Such judgment can be aided by the use of an approach called 
“threshold analysis” or “break even analysis,” in which the 
agency calculates the minimum value that the non-quantified 
benefits (or costs) must have to yield positive (or negative) net 
benefits, and evaluates whether that level of benefit (or cost) is 
likely.53 
 
45 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (exempting agencies 
listed in 44 U.S.C. § 3502); 44 U.S.C. § 3502 (listing agencies that meet the definition of 
“independent regulatory agency”). 
46 Exec. Order No. 12,866 supra note 45, at § 1(b)(6). 
47 Id. 
48 See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2. 
49 Id. at 10. 
50 Id. at 27. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 2. 
53 Id.  While CIRCULAR A-4 mentions break-even analysis only briefly, Cass Sunstein, 
who served as the Administrator of OIRA during the Obama Administration, has 
described how agencies can perform high-quality break-even analysis.  See Sunstein 
supra note 40.  Richard Revesz compellingly argues that break-even analysis is a useful 
methodology but is not a panacea and agencies should invest in new quantification 
method, see Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1424 
(2014). 
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Circular A-4 also provides agencies with guidance on the scope 
of costs and benefits that should be included in a cost-benefit 
analysis.  Circular A-4 directs agencies to consider “all the 
important benefits and costs.”54  This includes both the direct 
benefits and costs—that is, those costs and benefits that are the 
primary purpose and consequence of the rule—as well as 
important costs and benefits that are secondary or unrelated to 
the statutory purpose of the action (also called “ancillary,” 
“indirect,” or “co-” benefits and costs).55 
While Executive Order 12,866 and Circular A-4 apply to 
agency regulations, federal agencies such as the Department of 
Transportation, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the 
Department of Interior Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
use many of the same approaches contained in these documents 
to inform their evaluation and decision making regarding the 
approval of infrastructure projects and other non-regulatory 
actions.56  Cost-benefit analyses of infrastructure projects are 
often prepared in concert with a project’s environmental impact 
statement (“EIS”) and regulations issued by the White House 
Council on Environmental Quality regarding implementation of 
the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) which direct 
agencies to incorporate any cost-benefit analysis conducted to 
evaluate a project into its EIS.57 
 
54 CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 15. 
55 Id. at 26. 
56 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OPERATIONS BENEFIT/COST ANALYSIS DESK REFERENCE (2012), 
https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop12028/fhwahop12028.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9X4L-7B8B] (providing guidance on use of cost-benefit analysis in evaluating 
transportation infrastructure projects); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ANALYTICAL 
METHODS AND APPROACHES FOR WATER RESOURCES PROJECT PLANNING 48–72 (2004) 
(describing Army Corps of Engineers use of cost-benefit analysis in project development 
and evaluation); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY FOR THE 2017-2022 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 
OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM (2016), https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/oil-and-
gas-energy-program/Leasing/Five-Year-Program/2017-2022/Economic-Analysis-
Methodology.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYS6-XDPQ] (describing cost-benefit analysis 
methodology used by Department of Interior for evaluating offshore oil and gas lease 
sale program). 
57 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (2020). 
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B. FERC Should Shift Course and Embrace Cost-Benefit 
Analysis 
As an independent agency, FERC is not required by existing 
executive order to develop a cost-benefit analysis when issuing 
regulations.58  And FERC has generally not elected to do so on 
its own accord.59  Nor is FERC clearly required by any executive 
order or statute to use cost-benefit analysis in non-regulatory 
decision making such as issuance of orders or certificates.  And, 
as with regulations, FERC has not elected to do so, except in very 
limited circumstances.  FERC considerations of RTO market 
rule changes are exercises of its ratemaking authority.60  As Part 
III explores in detail, FERC does not generally conduct or 
require a cost-benefit analysis for these types of actions. 61  
Further, as explored in Part IV, FERC does not engage in a 
systematic accounting or transparent balancing of costs or 
benefits when evaluating natural gas infrastructure and, in fact, 
has recently explicitly disclaimed the use of monetized cost-
benefit analysis. 62   Nor does FERC require a cost-benefit 
 
58 Exec. Order No. 12,866 supra note 45, at § 3(b) (exempting agencies listed in 44 U.S.C. 
§ 3502 (2018)); 44 U.S.C. § 3502 (2018) (including Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission in definition of “independent regulatory agency”). 
59  Agencies, including independent agencies, are required to submit rules to the 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), which maintains a database of those rules.  
Database of Rules, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/legal/other-
legal-work/congressional-review-act [https://perma.cc/J5W7-BVX9] (last visited Mar. 3, 
2020).  According to the GAO’s database, since 1996, FERC estimated costs or benefits 
other than paperwork reporting obligations in only one rule.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., OGC-00-17, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, FEDERAL ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMMISSION: REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION (2000), 
https://www.gao.gov/products/OGC-00-17.  In part, this reflects the fact that FERC, with 
consultation from OIRA, determined that only nine regulations were “major” rules.  See 
Database Search of FERC Major Rules, Congressional Review Act, U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://bit.ly/30bgL03 [https://perma.cc/6ZAK-4APB] (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2019). See e.g., also, Data Collection for Analytics and Surveillance and Market-
Based Rate Purposes, 168 FERC ¶ 61,039, at P 7 (July 18, 2019) (Glick, Comm’r, 
dissenting in part) (“[T]he Commission makes only a conclusory statement based on an 
unspecified burden to industry.  It makes no effort to explain why that burden outweighs 
the benefits that Connected Entities Information would provide to the Commission’s 
ability to carry out its enforcement responsibilities.”). 
60 Order No. 2000, supra note 13, at 31,043–044 (explaining that FERC approves of and 
sets RTO market rules through its ratemaking authority under FPA sections 205 and 
206). 
61 See infra Part III. 
62 See infra Part IV; see also Florida Southeast Connection, LLC, 162 FERC ¶ 61,233, at 
PP 39–44 (Mar. 14, 2018) [hereafter SMP Project Remand Order] (explaining that FERC 
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analysis in support of its issuance of mandatory reliability 
standards for the bulk power system. 63   And FERC rejected 
requests that it use cost-benefit analysis to justify its approval 
of economic incentives intended to facilitate the development of 
certain transmission infrastructure.64 
Yet despite what appears to be a general indifference, and 
even sometimes hostility, to cost-benefit analysis, FERC has not 
wholly rejected the importance of evaluating and comparing the 
costs and benefits of its actions.  As discussed in Part III, FERC 
used cost-benefit analysis to inform its regulatory actions during 
the last electric system transformation.65  And during the last 
natural gas infrastructure buildout, FERC framed its inquiry 
into whether to approve natural gas pipelines as a balancing of 
costs and benefits. 66   In two areas, FERC has consistently 
required and applied a systematic and quantitative evaluation 
of cost and benefits.  FERC has interpreted its authority to issue 
licenses for hydroelectric projects to include a requirement that 
it consider certain limited quantified costs and benefits .67  And, 
due to unfavorable court decisions, FERC now requires a cost-
benefit analysis to justify the allocation of transmission 
 
“do[es] not monetize benefits or monetize adverse economic effects” of proposed pipeline 
projects). 
63 North American Electric Reliability Corp., 117 FERC ¶ 61,126, at P 97 (Oct. 30, 2006) 
(“EPAct 2005 does not mandate a case-by-case cost-benefit analysis and we are not 
prepared to mandate that the Reliability Standard development process include an 
analysis of what the cost and benefit implications might be”). 
64 Promoting Transmission Investment Through Pricing Reform, 116 FERC ¶ 61,057, at 
P 65 (July 20, 2006) (“We reaffirm the NOPR’s determination not to require applicants 
for incentive-based rate treatments to provide cost-benefit analyses.”). 
65 See infra Part III(A)(3). 
66 1999 Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 61,737. 
67 See Mead Corporation, 72 FERC ¶ 61,027, 61,068–69 (July 13, 1995) (describing FERC 
interpretation of FPA section 10(a)(1) obligation to consider all aspects of the public 
interest when evaluating hydropower licenses to include an economic analysis 
requirement).  See also U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR 
HYDROPOWER PROJECT RELICENSING:  GUIDANCE AND ALTERNATIVE METHODS at 3–1 to 
3–21 (1998), https://www.fws.gov/policy/hydroindex.htm [https://perma.cc/2JAC-LET5] 
[hereinafter U.S FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE] (describing FERC monetization of certain 
costs and benefits under its traditional hydroelectric licensing process); KURT 
STEPHENSON & LEONARD SHABMAN, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, ECOSYSTEM 
VALUATION AND HYDROPOWER LICENSING DECISIONS: LESSONS FROM FERC EXPERIENCE 
16–20 (2018), http://www.rff.org/files/document/file/RFF-WP%20Shabman 
-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/876A-GPTL] (describing monetization of environmental 
mitigation costs and electric power costs and benefits in Alternative Licensing Process 
and Integrated Licensing Process proceedings). 
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development costs to specific beneficiaries.68  As a result, FERC 
developed some practices and institutional capacity to conduct 
and evaluate cost-benefit analyses both in the context of electric 
ratemaking and infrastructure approvals. 
FERC should build upon its practice during the last energy-
system transition and the limited areas of continued application 
to embrace cost-benefit analysis as a more widely applied 
method of evaluating its actions and as a decision-making 
criterion when choosing among actions.  To that end, it is useful 
to specify what “using” cost-benefit analysis would, and would 
not, mean. 
Consistent with the conception of cost-benefit analysis in 
Executive Order 12,866 and Circular A-4, FERC should follow 
these five criteria: 
1. FERC would identify, quantify, and monetize the expected 
costs and benefits of a particular action to the greatest degree 
feasible.  Where possible, FERC would quantify and monetize 
those costs and benefits using available scientific, economic, and 
modeling tools.  Where quantification is not possible, costs and 
benefits would be qualitatively described. 
2. FERC would look at as broad a scope of costs and benefits as 
is permissible under its particular statutory frameworks.  As a 
regulator entrusted with advancing the public interest,69 FERC 
should look at the broad swath of consequences of its actions, 
including ancillary costs and benefits, rather than narrowly 
consider only the consequences that implicate the core purposes 
of the particular statutory scheme, unless Congress has 
explicitly limited FERC’s authority to do so.  As explained in 
Parts III and IV, the FPA and NGA provide flexible enough 
statutory frameworks to support consideration of relevant 
ancillary benefits and costs, including the environmental and 
resilience consequences of FERC’s decision making.70 
 
68  See Gabe Maser, It’s Electric, But FERC’s Cost-Causation Boogie-Woogie Fails to 
Justify Socialized Costs for Renewable Transmission, 100 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1836–37 (2012) 
(identifying court decisions that require FERC to allocate transmission costs to 
beneficiaries using an individualized cost-benefit analysis). 
69 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (2018) (“Federal regulation in matters relating to the transportation 
of natural gas and the sale thereof in interstate and foreign commerce is necessary in 
the public interest”); 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2018) (“Federal regulation of matters relating 
to . . . the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such 
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce is necessary in the public interest”).  
70 See infra Part III(B), IV(B). 
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3. FERC would use the results of the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis to inform its decisions.  In general, action 
would be taken only when the Commission determines, based on 
the analysis conducted, that the expected benefits are likely to 
exceed expected costs. 
On the other hand, there are also important limits on what 
“using” cost-benefit analysis should mean. 
4. FERC would not apply cost-benefit analysis to all of its 
decisions.  FERC annually issues well over one thousand 
orders.71  Many of these are ministerial orders that have been 
delegated to staff, and do not require a vote of the Commission.72  
Others involve approving individual wholesale transactions and 
small gas pipeline upgrades or abandonments.  Adopting a cost-
benefit analysis requirement for these actions would be 
impractical.  But, the volume of FERC’s work is not a reason to 
forgo using cost-benefit analysis in those cases for which it would 
be helpful.  To that end, FERC can adopt the same long-standing 
monetary threshold for cost-benefit analysis that is specified in 
Executive Order 12,866:  only those orders that are expected to 
have an annual economic impact of $100 million or more would 
carry a cost-benefit requirement. 73   Such a threshold would 
likely limit cost-benefit analysis requirements to industry-wide 
rulemakings,74 major changes in individual wholesale organized 
electric markets,75 large pipeline projects,76 and other actions of 
similar scale. 
 
71 See Norman C. Bay Letter, supra note 37. 
72 See FERC General Rules on Delegations, 18 C.F.R. § 375.301 (delegating authority to 
staff to act in uncontested proceedings without a vote of the Commission). 
73 Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 3(f)(1), 6(a)(3)(C), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
74  See, e.g., ROBBIE ORVIS ET AL., ENERGY INNOVATION POLICY & TECH., THE 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S GRID RESILIENCE PRICING PROPOSAL: A COST ANALYSIS 7 
(2017), https://energyinnovation.org/resources/our-publications/ [https://perma.cc/ 
YM28-4YKQ] (finding proposed rule would increase costs by at least $311 million 
annually). 
75 See, e.g., Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM at attach. B, 7, PJM 
Interconnection, LLC, Docket No. EL19-58 (May 15, 2019) (estimating proposed market 
rule change to the mechanism for procuring operating reserves would increase energy 
revenues $369.4 million per year and reserve revenues $130.8 million per year). 
76 See ICF INT’L, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE 5 (2015), 
https://www.abralliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Economic_Impacts-
ACP_ICFI_study_for_Dominion_2-9-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZNQ3-BMXY] (finding 
pipeline will result in expected annual net energy savings of $377 million between 2019 
and 2038). 
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5. Using cost-benefit analysis would not result in a requirement 
that FERC subject its orders to interagency review.  Executive 
Order 12,866 requires agencies to submit their proposed and 
final rules to the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”), which manages a 
process of White House and interagency review. 77  
Commentators are split on whether such review would be 
appropriate or desirable for independent agencies. 78   This 
Article takes no position on the question, nor does it need to.  A 
voluntary decision by FERC to adopt cost-benefit analysis would 
not also require it to subject its rules to OIRA review. 
C. The Case for Cost-Benefit Analysis at FERC 
Cost-benefit analysis will allow FERC to balance competing 
interests, explain its choices clearly to the public and its 
congressional overseers, and, ultimately, act in ways that make 
the American people better off.  Particularly given the growing 
demand from the courts and the executive branch that agencies 
fully consider the costs and benefits of their actions, now is the 
time for FERC to embrace cost-benefit analysis.  This section 
develops a number of these reasons for adopting cost-benefit 
analysis. 
1. Improving Social Welfare 
Cost-benefit analysis provides a formal accounting that 
enables agencies such as FERC to act in ways that improve 
overall wellbeing—or social welfare. 79   Government action 
improves social welfare when its benefits exceed its costs—that 
is, when the action produces net benefits.  When choosing among 
a set of alternatives, the social welfare maximizing option is the 
alternative with the greatest net benefits. 
The formalized process of cost-benefit analysis allows decision 
makers to more confidently and clearly evaluate those net 
 
77 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
78 See Revesz, supra note 8, at 588–89 (advocating for regulatory review of independent 
agency actions); Emily Hammond, Keeping the Independent Agencies Independent, 
CPRBLOG (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm? 
idBlog=BFDB1B7B-CA35-04BF-2ABAD93CE4D33D89 [https://perma.cc/LUU6-Z85Z]. 
79 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE 
L.J. 165, 196 (1999). 
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benefits than they would be able to do with an intuitive 
balancing.  It does so by “focus[ing] attention directly on the 
human consequences” of government actions,80 and by explicitly 
identifying the tradeoffs inherent in choosing a particular 
alternative.  By placing the costs and benefits of an action into 
equivalent metrics, such as dollars, Commissioners can 
undertake a more rigorous evaluation of the tradeoffs.81 
For example, in a series of recent orders, FERC directed RTOs 
to make changes to their capacity markets—markets intended 
to ensure there is sufficient generation available to meet future 
peak load—in order to counteract the effects of state programs 
that support clean energy resources and address climate 
change.82  FERC has justified the need for these changes by 
appealing to abstract principles such as “investor confidence” or 
“market integrity.”  But in doing so, FERC made no attempt to 
quantitatively measure the likely costs of these actions or the 
tradeoffs presented.83  As a result, individual Commissioners 
were left to subjectively determine whether these changes would 
truly improve the markets.  Cost-benefit analysis could have 
played a disciplining role by testing each Commissioner’s 
intuition. 
This is not to say that FERC should look only at costs and 
benefits that can be monetized.  Some consequences of an action 
affect welfare but may not be easily monetizable. 84   In such 
cases, FERC should evaluate non-monetizable costs and benefits 
qualitatively and consider use of tools such as break-even 
analysis. 
Another key feature of cost-benefit analysis that facilitates 
maximizing social welfare is that it demands the inclusion of a 
broad scope of costs and benefits, including ancillary costs and 
benefits.  As Professor Cass Sunstein has put it, “by broadening 
the viewscreen, cost-benefit analysis helps to overcome some of 
 
80 Cass R. Sunstein, Cost Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2017). 
81 Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, 43 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S1, S10 (2014). 
82 See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection LLC, 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (Dec. 19, 2019); 
ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Mar. 9, 2018). 
83 See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, at P 57(Glick, comm’r, dissenting). 
84 Sunstein, supra note 80, at 9–10. 
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the unfortunate effects of selective attention.”85  For example, 
climate change and public health costs are a significant 
consequence of energy transportation and use.  Even if limiting 
these consequences is not the core purpose of FERC’s actions 
under the FPA and NGA, these ancillary consequences can 
significantly influence the extent to which a project or market 
rule will improve social welfare.  Yet, FERC generally does not 
quantify those co-benefits and co-costs in the context of electric 
market rules and natural gas pipeline approvals.  In effect, 
FERC treats both those costs and benefits as worthless.86  As a 
result, FERC may regularly fail to take actions that maximize 
social welfare.  Cost-benefit analysis can help prevent that 
failure—particularly when a specific component of that analysis 
is consideration of ancillary costs and benefits.87 
Again, the recent capacity market orders provide a useful 
example.  In one such order, FERC determined that state 
policies were undermining “the integrity of competition in the 
wholesale capacity market against unreasonable price 
distortions and cost shifts” and so required correction.88  But 
FERC’s conclusion was the result of its failure to consider the 
efficiency improvements that at least some state policies made 
by reducing climate damages imposed by fossil generators.89  
Had FERC used cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the market 
rule changes it was proposing—including consideration of the 
climate consequences of the market design—FERC would have 
had to more clearly confront the error in its reasoning and could 
have mandated changes that corrected for distortionary state 
 
85 Id. at 10. 
86 See Gulf LNG Liquefaction Co., 168 FERC ¶ 61,020, at P 9 (July 16, 2009) (Glick, 
Comm’r, dissenting) [hereinafter Gulf LNG]. 
87 See Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis:  
Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1763, 1823–34 (2002). 
88 Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at P 150 (June 29, 
2018). 
89 See SYLWIA BIALEK & BURCIN UNEL, CAPACITY MARKETS AND EXTERNALITIES (2018), 
http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Capacity_Markets_and_Externalities_Repor
t.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWG7-V6X7]. 
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policies without targeting policies that improve market 
efficiency and social welfare.90 
Of course, when taking a particular action, FERC will be 
limited to considering only those factors Congress permits it to 
consider under a particular statutory scheme. 91   If certain 
consequences cannot be considered, those consequences would 
not usefully be included in a cost-benefit analysis, even if those 
effects would have some influence on social welfare.  However, 
courts have been skeptical of attempts to read general statutory 
phrases as implying Congressional intent to have agencies 
ignore the costs or benefits of their actions. 92   This includes 
consideration of co-benefits.93 As explained in Parts III and IV, 
both the FPA and NGA can be reasonably interpreted to include 
a broad range of costs and benefits, including, in many 
instances, the costs to the public that have not been internalized 
by market participants such as the climate change costs of 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
2. Transparency and Accountability 
Cost-benefit analysis can also enhance the transparency of 
FERC’s decision making by more clearly establishing the stakes 
of a particular action and the good and bad consequences of that 
action.  Individually identifying and quantifying costs and 
benefits can clarify the trade-offs among different interests and 
alternatives. 
Transparency is particularly important for the types of highly 
technical yet consequential decisions often at stake in FERC 
 
90 See Reply Comments of the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University 
School of Law at 22–24, Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection LLC, Docket No. EL16-
49-000 (Nov. 6, 2018), https://policyintegrity.org/documents/Policy_Integrity_ 
Reply_Docket_EL18-178_FOR_FILING.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HQ8-Q5QE]. 
91 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. at 42–43.  See also NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 
425 U.S. 662 (1976). 
92 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015). 
93 Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental 
Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1250 (2014) (describing D.C. Circuit consideration 
in Am. Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1051–52 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1193–1203 
(9th Cir. 2008) (reversing agency decision for consideration of ancillary costs but not 
ancillary benefits). 
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proceedings. 94   Well-funded stakeholders, such as public 
utilities, can afford to conduct their own analysis of potential 
FERC action that directly affect their interests.  Public interest 
organizations are often unable to do the same.95  Without an 
independent and publicly available analysis, self-interested 
stakeholders can use their own analyses to influence the 
Commission at the expense of the public. 96   And industry 
analyses may leave out important categories of costs and 
benefits, such as the environmental consequences of a market 
rule change, which are often not in their interests to include.97  
Analyses by the Commission’s expert staff can reduce reliance 
on analyses produced by self-interested and well-funded 
stakeholders and provide Commissioners with a neutral, 
independent, look at the consequences of the actions under 
consideration.  Moreover, by alerting the public to costs and 
benefits that affect different constituencies and interests, cost-
benefit analysis can help resource-constrained stakeholders 
prioritize engagement and identify flaws in the assumptions 
underlying the analysis.98  This is particularly valuable in the 
context of proceedings before FERC and in stakeholder 
processes before RTOs that address complex but consequential 
electric market rules, where members of the public rarely 
participate. 99   This disadvantages stakeholders who are not 
direct market participants and therefore do not have the 
financial resources or tools available to fully model and 
 
94 RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY:  HOW COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 13 (2008) 
(“[B]ecause of the technical nature of many regulatory decisions, bureaucrats and 
experts deep in the bowels of the federal government wield substantial power over our 
lives.  Cost-benefit analysis can be used to ensure that their decisions are based on 
reasoned analysis”). 
95 CHRISTINA SIMEONE, KLEINMAN CTR. FOR ENERGY POLICY, PJM GOVERNANCE: CAN 
REFORMS IMPROVE OUTCOMES 39 (2017), https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/sites/ 
default/files/proceedingsreports/PJM%20Governance%20Reforms.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MB26-BJVP] (discussing resource burden on participation in RTO 
stakeholder processes, including analytical requirements, particularly for small 
entities). 
96 Sunstein, supra note *, at 27–28. 
97 ARI PESKOE & KATE KONSCHNIK, CLIMATE IMPLICATIONS OF FERC PROCEEDINGS 10 
(2017), http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Climate-and-FERC-Proceedings 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/46AA-2BER]. 
98 Adler & Posner, supra note 79 at 175. 
99 See PESKOE & KONSCHNIK, supra note 97. 
ZEVIN-MACRO-042820 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2020  7:55 PM 
2020] Regulating the Energy Transition 441 
understand the implications of a given rule change. 100  
Stakeholders—such as environmental NGOs, consumer 
advocates, and states—face substantial participation barriers in 
the RTO process and before FERC.101  Cost-benefit analysis can 
make the consequences of proposed market rule changes more 
transparent to these stakeholders which can facilitate more 
informed participation.102 
Transparency and enhanced engagement can in turn, improve 
the democratic legitimacy and accountability of FERC 
decisions. 103   As Professors Richard Revesz and Michael 
Livermore have written, “[b]y providing a more accurate 
assessment of the real costs and benefits of a decision, 
formalized cost-benefit analysis reveals the distortions of 
politics—the back-room deals and special-interest politics—for 
what they are.”104  Similarly, Cass Sunstein has explained, “by 
promoting a focus on actual consequences” cost-benefit analysis 
can “quiet the noise generated by influential interest groups.”105  
The need for accountability is particularly acute in the case of 
RTO-proposed market rule changes.  While nominally 
independent, RTO’s are generally governed by a stakeholder 
process that, in practice, allows private interests to exert 
substantial influence on the RTO’s actions.106  Moreover, FERC 
has historically taken a deferential approach to evaluating RTO 
filings.107  As a result, RTOs act as policymakers that are not 
 
100 See Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the 
Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission 
Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 584 (2007). 
101 Id. 
102 TRAVIS KAVULLA, PROBLEMS IN ELECTRICITY MARKET GOVERNANCE:  AN ASSESSMENT, 
R Street Policy Study No. 180 at 11–12 (Aug. 2019), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/FINAL-RSTREET180.pdf [https://perma.cc/L92T-4S47]. 
103 Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
and Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 13 (2013) (“Cost-benefit analysis helps 
alleviate . . . concerns [about legitimacy and democratic accountability] by making 
agency decisionmaking more transparent to the public and to elected officials who can 
exercise control over the agencies”). 
104 REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 94, at 12. 
105 Sunstein, supra note 80, at 10. 
106 See Dworkin & Aslin Goldwasser, supra note 100, at 582–83.   SIMEONE, supra note 
95, at 37–39  (“[A] wide range of interests note the theoretical potential for incumbent 
interests to dominate RTO/ISO stakeholder processes, to the detriment of competition 
and efficient outcomes.”). 
107 KAVULLA, supra note 102, at 4.  This was recently exacerbated by a D.C. Circuit 
decision that restricts FERC to approving or denying RTO-proposed market rule changes 
ZEVIN-MACRO-042820 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2020  7:55 PM 
442 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 45:2 
subject to the same level of oversight and accountability to act 
in the public interest as regulatory agencies.108  By requiring 
RTO market rule changes to be justified with a cost-benefit 
analysis, FERC can more effectively ensure that RTOs fulfill 
their purpose of promoting economic efficiency.109 
For FERC, the potential for influence comes not only from 
incumbent market actors, but also from the Department of 
Energy (“DOE”).  FERC is an agency that Congress has imbued 
with significant independence from the executive branch, even 
as compared to other independent regulatory commissions.110  
Yet, DOE possesses unique authority to put issues onto FERC’s 
agenda.  Under Section 403 of the Department of Energy 
Organization Act, DOE can issue proposed rules that would 
govern subjects under the authority of FERC, and FERC is then 
required to either finalize or reject.111  In doing so, DOE can 
attempt to exert political influence on the Commission.  It is 
entirely proper for an executive branch agency—accountable to 
the democratically-elected President—to put specific proposals 
on FERC’s agenda in line with authority granted by Congress to 
do just that.112  But adopting a policy that both proposed and 
final rules require a cost-benefit analysis can help ensure that 
any DOE proposals are rational, well thought-out, and 
supported by the record. 
A recent DOE Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”) 
provides a useful example.  In 2017, DOE issued a NOPR that, 
if adopted, would have required electricity market changes 
intended to ensure the profitability of coal and nuclear plants 
that met certain criteria.113  The NOPR was allegedly intended 
to preserve electricity generators that provided uncompensated 
 
and prohibits FERC from imposing changes or conditions.  NRG Power Mktg. LLC v. 
FERC, 862 F.3d 108, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
108 KAVULLA, supra note 102, at 12–13. 
109 Id. at 14. 
110 Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive 
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 825 (2013) (finding FERC has at least as many 
indicia of independence as any other agency). 
111 42 U.S.C. § 7173 (2018). 
112  Datla & Revesz, supra note 110,  at 842 (disputing the binary view of agency 
independence and arguing for the legitimacy of presidential control over agencies within 
the bounds set by Congress). 
113 Grid Resiliency Price Rule, 82 Fed. Reg.  at 46,942 (proposed Oct. 10, 2017). 
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“resilience” benefits to the grid.114  However, there is substantial 
evidence that the proposal was, in fact, the result of political 
commitments made by President Trump after lobbying by key 
donors.115  In its NOPR, DOE did not attempt to demonstrate 
that the costs of its proposed program would exceed the benefits; 
indeed then-DOE Secretary Rick Perry argued that the bailout 
was worth any cost.116  Ultimately, FERC dispensed with the 
NOPR, largely due to DOE’s failure to meet even the basic 
requirements for a FERC regulation under the FPA. 117  
However, this example highlights a risk that FERC’s reputation 
for fact-based decision making could be undermined by a more 
diligent DOE.118  A policy that rulemakings must include a cost-
benefit analysis could help reduce the extent to which FERC 
adoption of a regulation after a future DOE NOPR is seen as an 
unjustified political act that undermines the independence and 
credibility of the Commission. 
Moreover, FERC’s failure to use cost-benefit analysis leads it 
to leave important categories of costs and benefits entirely 
absent from its articulated decision making, even when those 
factors may be driving an outcome.  One of the most important 
consequences of FERC’s actions is their effect on climate 
change.119  However, discussion of the climate consequences of 
its actions are largely absent from FERC orders explaining its 
decision making.  This is true even for actions where 
Commissioners have identified climate change as a priority that 
informed their decisions.120  As a result, it appears that FERC is 
 
114 Id. 
115 David Roberts, A Moment of Truth Arrives for Rick Perry’s Widely Hated Coal Bailout, 
VOX (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/12/9/ 
16745084/rick-perry-coal-bailout-ferc [https://perma.cc/S4DM-W3LN].  
116 Richard Valdmanis, Nuclear, Coal Bailout Worth Any Cost ‘To Keep America Free’: 
U.S. Energy Chief, REUTERS (June 28, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gas-
conference-perry-grid/nuclear-coal-bailout-worth-any-cost-to-keep-america-free-u-s-
energy-chief-idUSKBN1JO2JS [https://perma.cc/35EL-3GWN]. 
117 Grid Reliability and Resilience Pricing Grid Resilience in Regional Transmission 
Organizations and Independent System Operators, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 (Jan. 8, 2018) 
[hereinafter Resilience Order]. 
118 Iulia Gheorghiu, LaFleur Cautions on Administrative Interference as She Exits FERC, 
UTIL. DIVE (July 29, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/lafleur-cautions-on-
administrative-interference-as-she-exits-ferc/559551/ [https://perma.cc/3ZM5-LN64]. 
119 See Glick & Christiansen, supra note 19.  
120 Christopher J. Bateman & James T.B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of 
the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 278 (2014); Compare Rod Kuckro, 
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making decisions without fully disclosing its reasoning, limiting 
transparency and accountability. 
3. Anticipating Executive Branch Mandates 
The executive branch may be in the process of deepening the 
reach of the cost-benefit state.121  By proactively adopting cost-
benefit analysis on its own terms now, FERC can build processes 
and expertise in ways that would allow the Commission to better 
defend its decision making before OIRA. 
There is long-standing consensus in the executive branch that 
the President has legal authority to apply regulatory review 
executive orders to independent commissions. 122   Some 
Presidents have decided that picking a political fight to do so 
may not be worth the benefit.123  That may be changing. 
While President Obama continued to exclude independent 
agencies from the requirements of regulatory review when he 
reaffirmed Executive Order 12,866, 124  just months later he 
issued Executive Order 13,579. 125   Titled Regulation and 
Independent Regulatory Agencies, it explained that agency 
decisions “should be made only after consideration of their costs 
and benefits (both quantitative and qualitative)” and encouraged 
independent regulatory agencies to adopt the kind of regulatory 
approach that executive branch agencies have been subject to 
since 1981.126 
 
McNamee, Glick Clash Over Climate, ENERGYWIRE (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2019/07/19/stories/1060757919 
[https://perma.cc/ADG3-7HPT] (quoting FERC Chairman Neil Chatterjee as saying 
Order 841 was justified, in part, on climate grounds) with Electric Storage Participation 
in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System 
Operators, Order No. 841, 162 FERC ¶ 61,127 (Feb. 15, 2018) (no discussion of climate 
change). 
121 But see Daniel A. Farber, Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, 94 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 383 (2019) (raising concerns that the Trump administration is abandoning the 
use of balanced and fact-based cost-benefit analysis in order to further its deregulatory 
agenda). 
122 Datla & Revesz, supra note 110, at 838 nn.387, 388, 390 (identifying long-standing 
executive branch legal opinions). 
123 Id. at 837 & n.379. 
124 Exec. Order. No. 13,563 § 7(a), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan.18, 2011). 
125 Exec. Order. No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 11, 2011). 
126 Id. at § 1(a), (c) (stating that independent regulatory agencies “should comply” with 
the provisions of Executive Order 13,563, which reaffirmed and extended President 
Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866). 
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Pressure since then has only continued to build.  In 2013, the 
Administrative Conference of the United States recommended 
that all independent regulatory agencies adopt a series of 
practices that would encourage and enable the use of cost-benefit 
analysis for rulemaking.127  In 2015, a distinguished group of 
legal scholars submitted a letter in support of applying cost-
benefit analysis (and OIRA review more broadly) to independent 
agencies, and explained that there is a consensus that it is 
within the President’s authority to do so by executive order.128  
In 2016, former OIRA Administrators from the Reagan, Clinton, 
Bush, and Obama administrations embraced a series of 
recommendations to the incoming Trump administration 
regarding regulatory review, including application of the cost-
benefit analysis requirement to independent agencies.129 
Most recently, OMB has taken a half-step towards requiring 
cost-benefit analysis by independent agencies.  The 
Congressional Review Act requires that “major” rules, including 
those from independent agencies, have a delayed effective 
date, 130  and gives OIRA final responsibility for determining 
which rules are major.131  In a 2019 memorandum, acting OMB 
director Russell Vought outlined a new process by which OIRA 
would exercise this responsibility.132  Specifically, OMB clarified 
 
127  ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 2013-2, BENEFIT-COST 
ANALYSIS AT INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES (June 13, 2013). 
128 Letter from Jonathan H. Adler et al. to Ronald H. Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Gov. Aff. & Thomas R. Carper, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Gov. Aff. (June 17, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/2018092417 
2015/https:/www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=221f0cae-
bde3-4312-baa1-ccd754f6b10a. 
129  INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, STRENGTHENING REGULATORY REVIEW:  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FROM FORMER OIRA LEADERS 10–
12 (2016), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/RegulatoryReview_Nov2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5DR7-78ZR]. 
130 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3) (2018). 
131 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2018). 
132  Memorandum from Russell T. Vought to Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies re: Guidance on Compliance with the Congressional Review Act (April 11, 
2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/M-19-14.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/GJ6H-9SSM] [hereinafter Russell T. Vought Memo].  Note that this 
requirement applies to all “rules” as that term is defined by the Congressional Review 
Act (“CRA”) and interpreted by the Government Accountability Office.  Id. at 1.  This 
definition is more expansive than the type of regulations subject to Executive Order 
12,866.  Id. at 3.  While there is some ambiguity, this definition may not include FERC 
orders related to individual RTO market rule filings or infrastructure permitting 
requests.  See 5 U.S.C. § 804(3)(A) (2018) (excluding rules of particular applicability 
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that it will require agencies, including independent agencies, to 
quantify costs and benefits of rules, using methods outlined in 
Circular A-4, before it will sign off on a rule’s designation as 
major.133   Moreover, OMB in effect claimed the authority to 
prohibit independent agencies from promulgating rules without 
sufficient analysis.134 
This history suggests that additional requirements may be 
imposed on FERC by the executive branch over time.  Even now, 
OMB’s memorandum creates some risk that OIRA will delay 
promulgation of FERC rules until FERC can demonstrate to 
OIRA’s satisfaction whether a rule should be classified as 
“major.”  Adopting cost-benefit analysis now will allow FERC to 
further develop the institutional and methodological expertise 
needed to satisfy the demands of executive branch review.  By 
speaking OIRA’s language, FERC will be better prepared to 
avoid delays and defend against attempts to interfere with its 
decision making.135 
4. Limiting Legal Risk 
Proactively working to incorporate cost-benefit analysis into 
FERC’s decision making process can also limit the risk that 
FERC’s decisions will fail judicial review.  The past thirty-five 
years have seen a gradual advancement of the cost-benefit state, 
not only at the executive level, but also in the courts.136  Over 
that time the courts’ views of cost-benefit analysis has shifted 
towards the positive.137  In particular, a series of decisions over 
the past ten years at the United States Supreme Court and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit may signal the increasing importance of agency 
 
including actions that approve future rates, or prices).  However, it would likely cover 
any industry-wide regulations and guidance documents or FERC action applicable to all 
RTOs. 
133 Russel T. Vought Memo, supra note 132, at 5. 
134 Id. (“insufficient or inadequate analysis may delay OIRA's determination and an 
agency’s ability to publish a rule and to make the rule effective”). 
135 See Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 609, 622–25 (2014) (arguing that use of cost-benefit analysis can insulate 
agencies from political interference by regularizing the mechanism of OIRA review). 
136 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION (2018). 
137 See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 581–85. 
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consideration of costs and benefits in order to survive judicial 
review.138 
In 2009, in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, the Supreme Court 
found that EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis as the basis for its 
rule to establish cooling water intake limits for power plants was 
permissible. 139  More recently, the Supreme Court went beyond 
allowing an agency to use cost-benefit analysis as a decision 
making framework and rejected as unreasonable a statutory 
interpretation that costs need not be taken into account in a 
particular regulatory action.  In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme 
Court considered an Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
decision that regulation of mercury from power plants was 
“appropriate and necessary” based only on public health 
concerns and not the economic costs to industry. 140   Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Court, reasoned that while the 
“capaciousness of th[e] phrase” appropriate and necessary 
“leaves agencies with flexibility, an agency may not entirely fail 
to consider an important aspect of the problem when declaring 
whether regulation is appropriate.”141  The Court concluded that 
it is not “rational, never mind ‘appropriate’” to ignore costs or 
benefits 142  and that “no regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does 
significantly more harm than good.”143  Justice Kagan’s dissent 
suggests the embrace of an agency’s obligation to consider costs 
and benefits is widely held.144 
 
138 See Sunstein, supra note 80, at 14–19. 
139 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009). 
140 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705 (2015). 
141 Id. at 2707. 
142 While the issue in Michigan was whether EPA was required to consider costs, the 
majority opinion includes language suggesting a similar approach to benefits.  Id. at 
2702 (“Consideration of cost reflects the understanding that reasonable regulation 
ordinarily requires paying attention to the advantages and the disadvantages of agency 
decisions.”) (emphasis added). 
143 Id. 
144  Id. at 2716–17 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Unless Congress provides otherwise, an 
agency acts unreasonably in establishing ‘a standard-setting process that ignore[s] 
economic considerations.’”).  Justice Kagan’s dissent arrived at a different outcome from 
the majority based on the fact that EPA had considered costs when setting the level of 
standards.  Id. at 2719–21. 
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The Court did not go so far as to require agencies to act based 
on a formal cost-benefit analysis.145  But Professor Sunstein has 
called the Court’s decision in Michigan a “rifle shot” announcing 
the arrival of the cost-benefit state.146  Agencies are on notice 
that, all else being equal, they must substantively “consider” the 
consequences of each action and be able to reasonably claim that 
they believe the benefits of an action are greater than the costs.  
While executive agencies subject to the regulatory review 
executive orders generally do so as a matter of course, those that 
do not—namely, independent regulatory agencies—are at some 
legal risk if they fail to weigh costs and benefits in a way that 
meets the Court’s expectations.147 
The D.C. Circuit has gone even further in signaling that 
agency decisions may be at legal risk if they fail to sufficiently 
quantify costs and benefits.  In Business Roundtable v. SEC, the 
D.C. Circuit invalidated a requirement that public companies 
provide shareholders information about and an opportunity to 
vote on shareholder-nominated board candidates. 148   In 
promulgating the rule, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) determined that the “‘potential benefits of improved 
board and company performance and shareholder value’ [were] 
sufficient to ‘justify [its] potential costs.’”149  Nonetheless, the 
court held that the SEC had acted arbitrarily by failing to 
adequately quantify and weigh costs and benefits. 150   This 
 
145 Id. at 2711 (“We need not and do not hold that the law unambiguously required the 
Agency, when making this preliminary estimate, to conduct a formal cost-benefit 
analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is assigned a monetary value.”). 
146 Cass R. Sunstein, Thank, Justice Scalia, for the Cost-Benefit State, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(July 7, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-07-07/thanks-justice-
scalia-for-the-cost-benefit-state [https://perma.cc/5LXT-DJS7].  There remains 
disagreement about the extent to which the Supreme Court’s opinion in Michigan signals 
a substantial change in favor of cost-benefit analysis.  See Amy Sinden, A “Cost-Benefit 
State”:  Reports of Its Birth Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10,933 (2016); Andrew M. Grossman, Michigan v. EPA:  A Mandate for 
Agencies to Consider Costs, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 281 (2015). 
147  See Grossman, supra note 146, at 298–99 (discussing impact of Michigan on 
independent regulatory agencies). 
148 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
149 Id. at 1148. 
150 Id. at 1148–49 (“the Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the 
costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain 
why those costs could not be quantified”). 
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decision “create[s] a warning for any agency that fails to compare 
costs and benefits—at least if authorized to do so.”151 
Of course, a Commission’s exposure to legal risk may depend 
on the particular statutory provisions under which it acts.  Even 
a general presumption in favor of cost-benefit analysis may be 
overcome by congressional directives that limit its application.152  
But, as explained in Parts III and IV, FERC regularly acts under 
the authority of broadly-worded and capacious statutes—electric 
market rules must be “just and reasonable,”153 pipeline projects 
must be “required by the present or future public convenience 
and necessity”154—similar to the statutory requirement at issue 
in Michigan that regulation be “necessary and appropriate.”  
Additionally, FERC generally has the tools to quantify and 
balance the consequences of its actions.  As a result, if the cost-
benefit state continues to deepen, FERC risks that its decisions 
will be invalidated for failure to adequately consider costs and 
benefits.155  The Commission can insulate its actions from the 
risk of judicial skepticism by adopting cost-benefit analysis as a 
tool in its toolkit. 
D. FERC’s Decisions Are Amenable to Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Academic literature has identified a number of reasons why 
certain regulatory agencies may not be prepared to use cost-
benefit analysis, including the prevalence of effects that are not 
amenable to quantification or monetization and the lack of 
institutional capacity to perform rigorous cost-benefit 
 
151 Sunstein, supra note 80, at 18–19. 
152 See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (finding 
Congress prohibited Department of Labor from balancing costs and benefits when 
promulgating certain occupational safety and health standards); Sunstein, supra note 
80, at 19–20. 
153 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2018). 
154 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (2018). 
155 The recent judicial record on FERC’s obligations to quantify the consequences of its 
actions has been mixed.  See Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(faulting FERC for failing to quantify greenhouse gas emissions in a pipeline certificate 
decision); NextEra v. FERC, 898 F.3d 14, 23–24 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (rejecting challenge that 
FERC relied on economic theory rather than quantified economic impacts when 
approving new market rules).  FERC is currently facing a challenge to a rulemaking that 
may provide the D.C. Circuit the opportunity to clarify FERC’s obligations.  See Br. of 
Intervenor Transmission Access Policy Group, at 11–16, Am. Pub. Power Ass’n v. FERC, 
No. 19-1147 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 6, 2019). 
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analysis.156  However, these factors do not apply to FERC, which 
regulates a sector of the economy that is amenable to 
quantitative analysis and which has the institutional capacity to 
conduct or review such analysis. 
First, the consequences that result from FERC actions are 
often of the type that can be readily incorporated into a 
monetized cost-benefit analysis.  Many of the costs and benefits 
at issue in FERC decisions are market goods that are already 
valued in economic terms and are relatively straightforward to 
use in a cost-benefit analysis.157   This includes the economic 
value of wholesale electricity, as represented by its price, the 
economic value of additional natural gas supply, the costs of 
transmission construction, and the consumer costs of paying for 
more generation capacity. 
Analysis of some consequences of FERC regulation may 
require non-market valuation techniques.  While this is more 
complex than the use of market data, much of the guidance on 
agency cost-benefit analysis is dedicated to techniques for 
calculating the value of non-market costs and benefits.158  Take, 
for example, the value that consumers place on the continuation 
of electric service in the face of disruptions—often called the 
value of lost load (“VOLL”).  Because electricity prices for 
consumers are generally regulated, electricity market price data 
does not establish the value consumers place on reliability—that 
is, the value they place on avoiding outages.  Economists have 
developed methodologies for estimating VOLL for different 
customer classes and outage lengths. 159   While there is no 
universally accepted single measure of VOLL, 160  FERC can 
 
156 Revesz, supra note 8, at 554–56 (identifying and responding to concerns with use of 
cost-benefit analysis for regulation with substantial macroeconomic effects); id. at 560 
(discussing need to develop new methodological tools to evaluate costs and benefits for 
some regulatory consequences).  See generally id. at 560–93 (discussing institutional 
shortcomings and recommendations for overcoming them). 
157 See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 19 (“Market prices provide rich data for estimating 
benefits and costs based on willingness-to-pay if the goods and services affected by the 
regulation are traded in well-functioning competitive markets”). 
158 Id. at 19, 21–25. 
159 See, e.g., MARK BURLINGAME & PATTY WALTON, NARUC AND MDPSC COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS ELECTRIC RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS FROM THE END 
USERS’ PERSPECTIVE 13–62 (2013). 
160  See LONDON ECONOMICS INT’L, ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF LOST LOAD 51 (2013), 
https://hepg.hks.harvard.edu/files/hepg/files/06_18_13_ercot_voll_literature_review_an
d_macroeconomic_analysis_0613.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RH3-DMFZ] (reviewing VOLL 
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exercise its expert judgment and use economic tools such as 
sensitivity analysis to incorporate VOLL into cost-benefit 
analyses of electric market regulation or new reliability-
enhancing energy infrastructure. 
FERC decisions also produce significant non-market 
environmental consequences.  Electric market rules and energy 
infrastructure can influence the amount of electricity produced 
by fossil fuel-fired generators, which produce air pollution 
including greenhouse gases.  Infrastructure development also 
produces direct environmental consequences in the form of 
direct emissions of air pollutants, species habitat disruption, and 
changes in ecosystem services. 161   Methodologies are readily 
available to quantify and monetize these environmental 
consequences.  EPA publishes extensive guidance for the 
valuation of a wide variety of environmental consequences, 
including the public health effects of air and water pollution.162  
In 1998, the Fish and Wildlife Service commissioned a study 
evaluating how FERC could use existing tools to monetize 
ecosystem changes caused by infrastructure project 
permitting;163 and substantial progress has been made in these 
areas in the decades since.164 
Another type of difficult-to-model effect is the macroeconomic 
effect of an agency’s actions.  However, FERC actions generally 
produce consequences that can be evaluated using 
microeconomic tools rather than more controversial 
macroeconomic modeling.  Unlike financial regulation,165 FERC 
regulation largely sidesteps questions about the feasibility of 
determining costs and benefits based on macroeconomic 
 
studies and finding a wide distribution of estimates based on location, customer profile, 
and methodology). 
161 See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note 67, at 3-16 to 3-20. 
162  EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 7-6–7-44 (2014), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-08/documents/ee-0568-50.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LJJ9-936E]. 
163 See generally U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note 67. 
164 See Revesz, supra note 53, at 1442–44 (describing the state of economic valuation of 
ecosystem services). 
165 See Revesz, supra note 8, at 554–55 (framing academic dispute regarding importance 
and feasibility of using macroeconomics in cost-benefit analysis of financial sector 
regulation and citing sources). 
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effects.166  That is because the main effects of energy system 
regulation will be borne by energy system participants and, to 
some extent, third parties. 
Another weakness that scholars have identified that may 
make effective cost-benefit analysis difficult for agencies—and 
in particular for independent agencies—is the lack of 
institutional capacity to perform such analyses.167  As Professor 
Richard Revesz explores, the establishment of an agency office 
dedicated to performing economic analyses, staffed with PhD 
economists and other experts, could significantly enhance an 
agency’s ability to conduct adequate cost-benefit analyses.168  
While FERC’s institutional capability is not as robust as 
agencies such as EPA, it does have expert staff that could be 
tapped to perform or evaluate cost-benefit analysis.  In addition 
to FERC’s offices dedicated to reviewing project applications and 
regulating rates, the Division of Economic and Technical 
Analysis within the Office of Energy Policy and Innovation 
employs twenty-five economists, engineers, and other technical 
experts 169  to “conduct[] economic, engineering and technical 
analysis in support of the Commission’s review of industry 
proposals, which includes quantitative analysis of electricity and 
natural gas market data.”170  Of course, FERC’s institutional 
capabilities can be strengthened.  FERC could benefit from a 
partnership with OIRA,171 or could embark on a process similar 
 
166 Of course, because energy is a fundamental input to most economic activity, FERC 
actions that change energy prices can have significant macroeconomic consequences.  
Agencies are developing tools such as computable general equilibrium (“CGE”) modeling 
to estimate and incorporate macroeconomic consequences into their cost-benefit 
analyses.  Id. at 556–59.  As these tools gain more widespread acceptance, they can be 
incorporated into FERC decision making.  However, the primary costs and benefits of 
FERC regulation will be measurable through microeconomic modeling. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 569–70. 
169 See Committee on Energy and Commerce Witness Disclosure Statement of J. Arnold 
Quinn at 2 (June 1, 2015), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF03/20150603/ 
103551/HHRG-114-IF03-TTF-QuinnJ-20150603.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZSJ-WS62]. 
170 FERC, Division of Economic and Technical Analysis (last visited April 19, 2020), 
https://www.ferc.gov/about/offices/oepi.asp [https://perma.cc/7YWL-C2NZ]. 
171 See Office of Info. and Reg. Affairs & U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
Memorandum of Understanding (May 9, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/regpol/oira_cftc_mou_2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7EPM-B4Q4] (providing for OIRA technical assistance without 
triggering regulatory review requirements). 
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to that taken by EPA as it developed cost-benefit expertise.172  
Nonetheless, FERC already benefits from substantial in-house 
economic and technical expertise that could be deployed to 
develop or review cost-benefit analyses of its significant actions. 
Cost-benefit analysis is a powerful tool to inform agency 
decision making.  While FERC is not currently subject to clear 
obligations to use cost-benefit analysis in most circumstances—
and it has not yet voluntarily adopted such a practice—doing so 
would significantly improve the quality and transparency of 
FERC’s decision making, and will reduce both the legal and 
political risk that its decisions will be delayed or overturned.  
Particularly in light of the importance and political controversy 
surrounding FERC’s role in the energy transition, now is the 
right time to embrace cost-benefit analysis as a decision making 
tool for significant decisions.  In the next two Parts, this Article 
evaluates two types of decisions—electric market regulation and 
natural gas pipeline certificates—and concludes that cost-
benefit analysis would be legally and practically feasible. 
III. WHOLESALE ELECTRIC MARKET RULES 
One of the most important tasks that FERC will undertake as 
it guides the transition of the energy system is to approve and, 
when needed, direct changes to the rules that govern the 
operation of the wholesale electric markets.  This Part considers 
the prospect for cost-benefit analysis to serve as a tool to 
evaluate potential electric market rules in order to balance 
competing interests between electricity producers and 
consumers and to approve those rules that enhance the 
efficiency of the markets and maximize social welfare, including, 
critically, by taking into account the ancillary consequences that 
market rules will have on climate change. 
A. FERC’s Role and Current Approach 
This section provides an overview of FERC’s role overseeing 
the wholesale electric markets and its past use of cost-benefit 
analysis to support its transformation of those markets.  It then 
 
172 Revesz, supra note 8, at 592–93. 
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discusses FERC’s current approach to evaluating and directing 
proposed changes to the rules that govern those markets. 
1. FERC’s Initial Transformation of the Electric System 
Since 1935, the FPA has provided FERC (or its predecessor, 
the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”)) with the responsibility 
of regulating the wholesale sale of electricity.173  Starting thirty 
years ago, FERC reinterpreted its traditional statutory 
authority to substantially restructure the electric industry in 
response to changes in technology, economy theory, and the 
law.174  This transformation involved two interrelated changes. 
First, FERC reconceptualized its mandate under the FPA to 
ensure that the rates and terms of wholesale sales of electricity 
are “just and reasonable” and “not unduly discriminatory or 
preferential”175 by determining that, so long as markets were 
sufficiently competitive, freely negotiated rates for the sale of 
wholesale electricity between buyers and sellers would be 
presumptively permitted.176  Second, FERC strongly encouraged 
the formation of organized wholesale markets in which the sale 
and dispatch of electric generation and associated energy 
services is centrally managed by an independent entity, called 
an RTO.177  There are now six RTOs that are regulated by FERC, 
which collectively cover a substantial majority of electric 
customers—the California Independent System Operator 
(“CAISO”), Midcontinent Independent System Operator 
(“MISO”), New England Independent System Operator (“ISO-
NE”), the New York Independent System Operator, PJM 
Interconnection (“PJM”), and Southwest Power Pool (“SPP”).178 
Taken together, these changes mean that FERC’s role in this 
new system is focused on establishing and approving generally 
applicable rules by which electric market participants operate, 
 
173 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2018) (providing FERC with jurisdiction over “the transmission of 
electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in 
interstate commerce”) (Emphasis added). 
174 See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 765, 769–70 & n.21 (2008). 
175 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(d), (e) (2018). 
176 See Order No. 888, supra note 12, at 31,643 & n.48 (describing the transition to 
market-based rates and listing early market-based rate cases). 
177 See id. at 31,730–32 (defining characteristics of an ISO); Order No. 2000, supra note 
13, at 31,046 (defining the characteristics of an RTO). 
178 FERC, ENERGY PRIMER 59 (2015). 
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rather than on policing the specific prices charged by and to 
those market participants.179  For most of the country, FERC 
does so by regulating RTO “tariffs” that function as the market 
rules that govern the behavior of generators, load, and other 
market participants.  RTOs may submit changes to their market 
rules under FPA Section 205, which allows utilities to request 
FERC approve any rate, rule, or regulation affecting rates that 
is “just and reasonable” and “not unduly discriminatory or 
preferential.” 180   FERC can also mandate changes to RTO 
market rules by initiating a proceeding under FPA Section 206, 
which requires FERC to hold unlawful any rate or rule affecting 
rates it deems to be unjust, unreasonable, or unduly 
discriminatory and authorizes FERC to fix a just and reasonable 
replacement.181 
FERC generally exercises this authority on an individual 
RTO-by-RTO basis.  However, FERC also imposes industry-wide 
requirements by implementing regulations after a notice of 
proposed rulemaking, that, pursuant to FPA Section 206, directs 
all RTOs to take actions to cure their unjust, unreasonable, or 
unduly discriminatory market rules.182 
2. Cost Benefit Analysis in a Supporting Role 
In managing the initial transition to competitive wholesale 
markets, FERC benefited from the use of cost-benefit analysis.  
Centralized operation of wholesale electric markets jumpstarted 
in 1996, when FERC issued its landmark Order 888, which 
required transmission owners to offer non-discriminatory 
provision of transmission service through the filing of “open 
access transmission tariffs.”183  Order 888 included a mechanism 
for the formation of independent entities that would operate the 
 
179  Alco Finance Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F. 3d 82, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2017) (“RTOs and ISOs 
administer a number of competitive wholesale auctions.  FERC extensively regulates the 
structure and rules of such auctions, in order to ensure that they produce just and 
reasonable results.”). 
180 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a), (b) (2018). 
181 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018). 
182 Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC (TAPS), 225 F. 3d 667, 687–88, 703 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding Section 206 provides FERC with authority to cure unjust, 
unreasonable, or unduly discriminatory rates through a rulemaking that applies across 
the power sector).  
183 See generally Order No. 888, supra note 12. 
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electric system under principles of economic competition. 184  
FERC used a cost-benefit analysis embedded in a final 
environmental impact statement (“FEIS”) as a critical part of its 
justification for Order 888.185  FERC took the unusual step of 
preparing an FEIS,186 as a response to concerns that the market 
liberalization enabled by Order 888 would result in a significant 
increase in the operation of coal-fired power plants and, 
therefore, a significant increase in air pollution.187  As a result, 
FERC “prepared an FEIS based upon computer modeling 
simulations of power generation patterns and [nitrous oxide] 
emissions likely to occur as a result of the Rule.”188  FERC’s 
modeling took into account uncertainty and analyzed a number 
of alternative regulatory approaches.  FERC acknowledged that 
preparation of the FEIS involved “a number of judgments as to 
the type and the scope of studies necessary to analyze the 
proposals sufficiently.” 189   Ultimately, FERC concluded that 
Order 888 would not substantially affect the overall emission 
trends.190  But FERC’s FEIS was not limited to an analysis of 
the environmental consequences of Order 888.  It also included 
an analysis of the economic effects of the rule.  This included 
$3.8 to $5.4 billion of expected consumer benefits that would 
result from increased competition in the electric industry.191  
This information was useful for FERC’s evaluation of the 
desirability of its proposed approach.192   It enabled FERC to 
address concerns raised by a number of commenters and other 
federal agencies in a systematic and transparent fashion.  FERC 
also acknowledged that the analysis it performed was useful in 
informing regulatory alternatives for other agencies, including 
the EPA.193 
 
184 Id. at 31,730–32. 
185 Order No. 888, supra note 12, at 31,860. 
186 See 18 C.F.R. § 380.4(a)(15) (2020) (generally exempting ratemaking decisions from 
NEPA requirements). 
187 Order No. 888, supra note 12, at 31,860. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 31,861. 
190 Id. at 31,862. 
191 Id. at 31,873. 
192 Id. at 31,865 (“Our FEIS clearly demonstrates that this Rule is not the appropriate 
vehicle for resolving” the issue of NOx emissions, but “we believe that our study makes 
a significant contribution nonetheless.”). 
193 Id. 
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In 2000, FERC furthered restructuring when it issued Order 
2000.194  Order 2000 strongly encouraged the formation of RTOs, 
and defined minimum features of an RTO.195  FERC also used a 
cost-benefit analysis to support Order 2000. 196   Costs and 
benefits of RTO formation were analyzed in an Environmental 
Assessment (“EA”) that FERC conducted pursuant to NEPA.197  
The Order 2000 EA focused on an evaluation of the 
environmental consequences of the rulemaking, such as the 
effect of RTO market rules on emission of air pollutants. 198  
However, the analysis also included monetized estimates of a 
subset of the benefits that the Commission expected would be 
produced by the rule.199  This included average annual consumer 
savings of $2.4 to $5.1 billion per year between 2000 and 2015.200  
FERC used these monetized benefits as the basis for its 
evaluation of the desirability of the rule.201 
In order to develop estimated costs and benefits of Order 2000, 
FERC evaluated “a broad range of potential economic changes 
that could result from the Rule” including “changes in the mix of 
electric generating plants built in the future, shifts in the 
utilization of existing plants, and increases in interregional 
transmission.” 202   FERC developed a set of assumptions, 
informed by its expert judgment, regarding how various RTO 
market rules would affect the costs and physical properties of 
the electricity system. 203   FERC then used sophisticated 
computer models to simulate the resulting investment decisions 
 
194 See Order No. 2000, supra note 13. 
195 Id. at 30. 
196 See id. 
197 Id. at 39–40. 
198 Id. at 285–86 (discussing impacts on SO2, NOx, CO2, and mercury emissions). 
199 Id. at 39–40. 
200 Id. at 40.  FERC acknowledged that the modeling it conducted for the purposes of the 
EA did not capture a range of benefit categories such as reduction of market power, 
improved intra-regional congestion management.  Id.  The modeling also did not 
estimate important categories of costs, such as the cost of RTO formation, and the costs 
associated with incentives provided for the formation of RTOs.  Id.  However, FERC did 
discuss third-party studies of the costs of forming regional grid operators and concluded 
that these costs would be unlikely to outweigh the consumer savings benefits.  Id. 
201 Id. at 282 (“the modeling and analysis conducted for the EA are the basis for the 
economic discussion contained in the Final Rule”); id. at 39–40. 
202 Id. at 281. 
203 Id. at 283. 
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and regional electric system operation.204  FERC recognized that 
its analysis was subject to significant uncertainty, but 
nonetheless “present[ed] a systematic view of possible future 
market changes and assesse[d] a range of possible responses to 
market changes.”205 
In Order 2000, FERC did not require individualized cost-
benefit analyses as a condition of the formation of new RTOs.206  
However, as the politically contentious process progressed in 
regions of the country without RTOs, stakeholders increasingly 
called on FERC to require or conduct cost-benefit analyses of 
individual RTOs.207  FERC eventually agreed to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis of RTO formation.208  FERC commissioned ICF 
International to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of RTO 
expansion (“RTO Study”).209   Unlike the Order 888 EIS and 
Order 2000 EA, the RTO Study analyzed only the private costs 
and benefits of RTO design and did not include an analysis of 
social costs and benefits such as damages from air pollution.210  
Nonetheless, the RTO Study found that the net benefits of RTO 
expansion were significant—$40 billion from 2002–2021 under 
the scenario deemed most likely to occur.211  Based on the results 
of the analysis, FERC ultimately issued its “Standard Market 
Design” notice of proposed rulemaking which proposed to 
 
204 Id. (“Computer modeling capable of simulating regional electric utility dispatch and 
capacity expansion over time was used to characterize electric power markets in the base 
case and rule scenarios.”). 
205 Id. at 281. 
206 Id. at 31,017, 31,036. 
207 See Avista Corp., 95 FERC ¶ 61,114, at 61,324 (Apr. 26, 2001) (RTO West Declaratory 
Order); Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 101 FERC ¶ 61,033, at P 222 (Oct. 10, 2002) (WestConnect 
RTO Declaratory Order). 
208 Electricity Market Design and Structure, Order Providing Guidance on Continued 
Processing of RTO Filings, 97 FERC ¶ 61,146 (Nov. 7, 2001).  Nonetheless, FERC 
continued to approve RTOs without cost-benefit analyses.  See Southwest Power Pool, 
109 FERC ¶ 61,010, at P 12 (Oct. 1, 2004).  See also Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 101 FERC ¶ 
61,033, at P 222 (Oct. 10, 2002). 
209 See ICF INT’L, ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF RTO POLICY (Feb. 26, 2002) [hereinafter 
RTO STUDY]. 
210 The RTO Study’s estimate of private costs and benefits has been subject to substantial 
criticism, including that the assessment assumes that RTOs will cause significant 
improvement in the efficiency of electric generation but does not conduct an analysis that 
evaluates whether that assumption is likely.  See Thomas M. Lenard, FERC’s Flawed 
Assessment of the Benefits and Costs of Regional Transmission Organizations, THE 
ELECTRICITY J., May 2002, at 74. 
211 RTO STUDY, supra note 209, at 77. 
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require the formation of RTOs for all utilities that had yet to join 
an RTO and to more prescriptively define the design of wholesale 
electric market rules across existing and new RTOs. 212   The 
proceeding was ultimately closed without taking final action as 
a result of the substantial political backlash that the proposal 
engendered.213  The backlash that ended the Standard Market 
Design rulemaking also ended FERC’s systematic use of cost-
benefit analysis in the context of RTOs. 
3. FERC’s Current Approach to Policing Electric Market 
Rules 
While FERC used cost-benefit analysis in support of the prior 
transformation of the electric system, it has not continued its use 
when evaluating new changes to wholesale electric market 
rules.214  FERC does not regularly conduct cost-benefit analyses 
to evaluate market rule changes that it has proposed through 
rulemaking or when evaluating replacement rates after finding 
an individual RTO tariff to be unjust and unreasonable under 
Section 206.  Nor does FERC generally require RTOs to submit 
cost-benefit analyses to justify market rule changes submitted 
pursuant to Section 205.  FERC has repeatedly ignored or 
rejected requests by stakeholders that it require a cost-benefit 
 
212 Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and 
Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452 (proposed Aug. 29, 2002), FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,563 (July 31, 2002). 
213 Order Terminating Proceeding, 112 FERC ¶ 61,073 (July 19, 2005). 
214 There is one identified exception.  In 2004, FERC ordered MISO to provide further 
evidence regarding the expected net-benefits of a tariff revision.  Midwest Indep. 
Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc, 107 FERC ¶ 61,191, at P 73 (May 26, 2004).  In 
response, MISO utilized production cost and power flow modeling to conduct its economic 
analysis, which found that implementing proposed tariff changes would result in $128.4 
million in net benefits to direct market participants.  Midwest Independent 
Transmission System Operator, Inc. Compliance Filing at 3, Docket No. ER04-691-000 
(June 25, 2004), https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat. 
asp?fileID=10176978.  FERC relied on MISO’s quantitative cost-benefit analysis, as well 
as a qualitative assertion of the “broader range of economic and reliability benefits that 
the Midwest ISO’s market is designed to achieve” when approving MISO’s tariff.  
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc, 111 FERC ¶ 61,042, at P 175 (Apr. 15, 
2005).  FERC also exercised its own judgment, informed by MISO’s economic analysis, 
to adopt changes to MISO’s tariff filing.  Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, 
Inc, 108 FERC ¶ 61,236, at PP 99–100 (Sept. 16, 2004). 
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analysis to justify selection of particular market design 
changes.215 
In fact, beyond specific narrow precedent, FERC does not use 
any consistent procedure or criteria to analyze and decide 
whether a particular market rule change is “just and 
reasonable.”  Its evaluation of whether a potential market rule 
change will be judged “just and reasonable” is often opaque.  At 
times, FERC announces policy “principles” or “criteria” by which 
it will evaluate particular kinds of market rule changes.  For 
example, in 2017, FERC approved a tariff filing by ISO-NE to 
revise its capacity market.216  As part of that proceeding, FERC 
announced a new set of policy principles by which it would 
evaluate future changes to capacity markets, including that 
such markets should “produce a level of investor confidence that 
is sufficient to ensure resource adequacy at just and reasonable 
rates.”217  But just a few months later, FERC rejected a filing by 
PJM Interconnection to change its capacity market that had 
been justified on the very principles FERC had enunciated in 
approving the changes to the ISO-NE market. 218   As 
Commissioner Richard Glick noted in dissent, “just three 
months later, the Commission appears to have settled on a new 
standard, the ‘integrity’ of the market.”219  As another example, 
 
215 See Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Mkts., Order No. 719-
A, 128 FERC ¶ 61,059, at PP 89, 93 (Jul. 16, 2009) (rejecting request to require a cost-
benefit analysis to justify selection among potential shortage pricing approaches).  In the 
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking initiating that proceeding, FERC solicited 
public input on ways to improve organized markets.  Wholesale Competition in Regions 
with Organized Electric Markets, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,276 (proposed July 2, 2007).  A number 
of commenters suggested that FERC adopt cost-benefit analysis as a decision making 
framework.  See Comments of the Transmission Access Policy Study Group at 49, Docket 
Nos. RM07-19-000 and AD07-7-000 (Sept. 14, 2007) (“the Commission should require 
RTOs to assess the cost/benefits of new initiatives or major rule changes before 
undertaking them, taking into account both RTO costs and costs to market 
participants”); Comments of the Large Public Power Council at 20–22, Docket Nos. 
RM07-19-000 and AD07-7-000 (Sept. 14, 2007) (“With respect to significant tariff 
changes, cost-benefit analyses should be submitted with the RTO/ISO section 205 
filings”).  FERC ultimately ignored these requests.  See also N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, 
Inc., 103 FERC ¶ 61,201, at PP 35–36 (2003) (rejecting commenters' argument that 
“detailed supporting analyses or a cost-benefit study are necessary in order to support a 
finding that the Demand Curve is just and reasonable”). 
216 ISO New England, Inc, 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Mar. 19, 2018). 
217 Id. at P 21. 
218 Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (June 29, 2018). 
219 Id. at P 50 n.312 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting). 
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in Order 719, another order to improve competition in the 
wholesale market, FERC required RTOs to adopt market rule 
reforms to better account for the value of energy during periods 
when demand exceeds supply (termed “shortage pricing”) and 
provided RTOs with four options to select from in designing their 
particular market rules to implement shortage pricing.  FERC 
established six criteria by which it would evaluate each RTO’s 
selection among the four options, with no clear standard 
regarding how it would balance these six criteria.220  In another 
case, FERC determined whether a market rule is just and 
reasonable based on whether the rule “produce[s] prices that 
accurately reflect the value of energy.”221 
FERC has not delineated how it uses the principles or criteria 
to balance competing interests in any of these cases.  Rather, 
FERC uses quantitative information,222 qualitative descriptions 
of costs and benefits it considers to be relevant,223 or economic 
theory,224 to explain its decisions on what appears to be an ad 
hoc basis.  Even when FERC qualitatively describes costs and 
benefits of particular rules, it does not present or evaluate those 
costs and benefits in a systematic framework by which it can 
clearly balance competing interests.  In fact, at times FERC has 
been actively hostile regarding cost-benefit analysis.  FERC has 
considered economic analyses that were developed and 
submitted by stakeholders as part of its evaluation of whether a 
rule is just and reasonable.225  But this approach relies on often 
resource-constrained or self-interested stakeholders. 
 
220 Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 
125 FERC ¶ 61,071, at P 247 (Oct. 17, 2008). 
221 Id. at P 192. 
222 See generally Order No. 888, supra note 12. 
223 E. Ky. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 489 F.3d 1299, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing a 
FERC order that identified qualitative benefits of RTOs). 
224 TAPS, 225 F.3d at 688 (upholding use of economic theory to support FERC action 
under Section 206). 
225 See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 155 FERC ¶ 61157, at P 4 (May 10, 2016) (relying on 
an estimate of benefits of a particular capacity market design included in a formal cost-
benefit analysis submitted by a stakeholder). 
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B. FERC Should Adopt an Expanded Cost Benefit 
Requirement 
The electric system is undergoing another transition as a 
result of changes in technology and greater focus on climate 
change, and FERC should return to its brief practice when 
regulating the last energy system transition.  The current 
transition will not require wholesale restructuring of the electric 
sector, but rather a series of rule changes to allow participation 
of new clean energy technologies.  FERC should use cost-benefit 
analysis in not only foundational orders but also any major 
industry-wide rulemaking or RTO tariff filing that would 
substantially change the rules of the game.  And, in light of the 
factors motivating the current industry transition—the need to 
tackle climate change coupled with concerns about maintaining 
the reliability and resilience of the electric system—any cost-
benefit analysis that FERC requires or conducts should include 
not only costs and benefits to producers and consumers but also 
ancillary costs and co-benefits that accrue to society as a whole.  
FERC can do so by formalizing a requirement that it will conduct 
a cost-benefit analysis as part of each Commission-initiated 
Section 206 proceeding to significantly change RTO market 
rules and by requiring RTOs to conduct and submit cost-benefit 
analyses as part of any Section 205 filing to significantly change 
electric market rules.  While FERC’s general approach can be 
the same, Sections 205 and 206 contain somewhat distinct 
procedural requirements that will influence the manner in 
which FERC uses cost-benefit analysis. 
Cost-benefit analysis would be a valuable tool to inform FERC 
investigations into whether an existing market rule is “just and 
reasonable” under the procedures mandated by FPA Section 
206.  FERC’s exercise of authority under Section 206 involves a 
two-step process.226  Before ordering a change in market rules, 
FERC must first determine that the existing rules are not just 
and reasonable.227   This step may be taken in response to a 
complaint by market participants, by interested members of the 
public, and in certain circumstances, by the RTO itself.228  FERC 
 
226 Emera Me. v. FERC, 854 F.3d 9, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
227 Id. at 21. 
228 FirstEnergy Serv. Co. v. FERC, 758 F.3d 346, 348–49 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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can also sua sponte find an individual RTO tariff to be unjust 
and unreasonable,229 or, through a rulemaking proceeding, find 
all RTO tariffs to be unjust and unreasonable.230  Only after 
making such a determination, supported by substantial 
evidence, may FERC then order RTOs to implement revised 
market rules.231  Those rules must be just and reasonable.  
Cost-benefit analysis would be consistent with both of the 
steps of a Section 206 proceeding.  FERC could use a cost-benefit 
analysis as the factual basis for finding that the market rules of 
one or more RTOs are unjust and unreasonable.  As it did with 
Orders 888 and 2000, FERC can also use cost-benefit analysis to 
evaluate potential market rule replacements it is considering.  A 
cost-benefit analysis would provide FERC with the information 
it needs to select the option that maximizes social welfare as a 
just and reasonable replacement. 
FERC’s use of cost-benefit analysis in the context of filings 
made under Section 205 of the FPA present some additional 
complications as compared to its use in Section 206 proceedings.  
These complications, however, need not be barriers to the use of 
cost-benefit analysis to inform FERC’s decision to approve or 
deny an RTO’s proposal to change its market rules. 
Under Section 205, an RTO proposes changes to its own 
market rules.  FERC plays “an essentially passive and reactive 
role”232 in which it must accept proposed changes so long as they 
are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory and 
preferential. 233   Utilities are not required to show that the 
existing rate or market rules are unlawful.234  However, FERC 
still must affirmatively decide that an RTO’s proposal is just and 
reasonable.  As explained in the next section, FERC is well 
within its statutory authority to rely on cost-benefit analyses to 
make such a determination.  
 
229 Id. 
230 TAPS, 225 F.3d at 687–88 (holding that under Section 206, FERC has authority to 
require industry-wide changes by rulemaking). 
231 Erma Maine v. FERC, 854 F.3d 9, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
232 City of Winnfield, La. v. FERC, 744 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
233 NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. FERC, 862 F.3d 108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“FERC must 
accept proposed rate changes filed under Section 205 so long as the changes are just and 
reasonable.”). 
234 Ala. Power Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 1557, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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In fact, FERC can rely on its Section 205 authority to require 
submission of a cost-benefit analysis as a condition of approval 
of tariff changes.235  FERC has, on limited occasions, conditioned 
approval of individual RTO filings on submission of a cost-
benefit analysis in the past.236  Adopting a clear and consistent 
presumption that a cost-benefit analysis is a minimum 
requirement of a just and reasonable tariff change filing,237 will 
assist FERC in complying with the restriction on the amount of 
time that FERC is permitted to evaluate an RTO’s proposal.  
Under Section 205, FERC is required to act on tariff filings 
within 60 days, which may be  extended by up to five months in 
order to hold hearings.238  By imposing a clear requirement that 
RTO filings must be accompanied by a cost-benefit analysis, 
FERC can meet its statutory deadlines and still benefit from 
transparent accounting of the costs and benefits of a proposal.  
Imposing such a requirement can also help FERC avoid a 
situation where an RTO’s Section 205 filing goes into effect “by 
operation of law” and not based on the considered judgment of 
the Commission.239  Such a concern is not merely hypothetical.  
Recently, a significant and controversial change to ISO-NE’s 
tariff to provide additional compensation to generators with on-
site fuel went into effect because FERC lacked a quorum to 
disapprove the change, 240  even though FERC staff had 
expressed concern that ISO-NE had failed to sufficiently show 
that the benefits were justified by the costs.241  Adding a formal 
requirement that significant RTO tariff changes include a cost-
benefit analysis can help avoid this circumstance. 
 
235 Me. Pub. Utilities Comm'n v. FERC, 454 F.3d 278, 285 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (permitting 
FERC to impose conditions on RTO changes even though “the right to set rates in the 
first instance is a statutory right of utilities”) (citations and quotations omitted).  
236 See case and text cited supra note 214. 
237  See 18 C.F.R. § 35.13 (establishing minimum filing requirements); id. § 35.5 
(providing authority for FERC to reject a filing that fails to comply with filing 
requirements). 
238 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(d), (e) (2018). 
239 Id. (“If the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made at the expiration of 
such five months, the proposed change of rate, charge, classification, or service shall go 
into effect at the end of such period”).  See also Notice of Filing Taking Effect by Operation of 
Law, ISO New England Inc., Docket No. ER14-1409-000 (Sept. 16, 2014). 
240 See Statement of Commissioner Glick, Docket No. ER19-1428-001 (Aug. 8, 2019). 
241 Letter from Kurt M. Longo, Director, Division of Electric Power Regulation to ISO 
New England Inc. regarding Inventoried Energy Program, Docket No. ER19-1428-001 
(May 8, 2019). 
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By quantifying the expected results of market rule changes 
and by placing those results in a common metric—dollars—
FERC can facilitate the transparent comparison and weighing 
of costs and benefits. But not all costs may be quantifiable.  
Consistent with OMB guidance242 and past FERC practice,243 
RTOs or FERC should present and discuss any non-quantifiable 
and non-monetized costs and benefits as part of its cost-benefit 
analysis.  Presenting quantified and unquantified costs and 
benefits together will facilitate the exercise of FERC’s expert 
judgment to evaluate whether the unmonetized costs and 
benefits are substantial enough to change its decision regarding 
whether a market rule is just and reasonable. 
C. Statutory Authority 
Congress tasked FERC with ensuring that rates for the 
wholesale sale of electricity, and the rules affecting those rates, 
are “just and reasonable” and not “unduly discriminatory or 
preferential.”244  These capacious terms provide FERC with the 
statutory authority—and, under the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Michigan, potentially the obligation—to use cost-benefit 
analysis as its decision making framework, and to approve RTO 
market rule changes based on the information provided in such 
analyses. 
First, this section describes how the just and reasonable 
standard by which FERC evaluates RTO market rules is 
consistent with the use of cost-benefit analysis.  It then 
evaluates the scope of costs and benefits that FERC is permitted 
to consider in a cost-benefit analysis pursuant to its authority 
under the FPA. 
 
242 CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 27 (“If monetization is impossible, explain why and 
present all available quantitative information.”). 
243  Order No. 888, supra note 12, at 31,873 (identifying non-quantifiable benefits 
including “better use of existing assets and institutions, new market mechanism, 
technical innovation, and less rate distortion”); FERC, Promoting Wholesale 
Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services By Public 
Utilities (RM95-8-000) and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and 
Transmitting Utilities (RM94-7-001):  Final Environmental Impact Statement at 5-64 to 
5-75 (1996) (describing and analyzing the qualitative benefits). 
244 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a), (b); 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). 
ZEVIN-MACRO-042820 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2020  7:55 PM 
466 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 45:2 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Just and Reasonable 
Standard 
Courts have held that whether a rate is “just and reasonable” 
is “incapable of precise judicial definition.”245  As a result, courts 
“afford great deference to the Commission in its rate 
decisions.”246  This deference applies to FERC evaluation of RTO 
market rules just as it did to FERC evaluation of cost-of-service 
rates and bilateral contracts.247  In fact, in its landmark decision 
under an analogous provision of the NGA,248 the Supreme Court 
held in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. that 
whether a rate is “just and reasonable” is a function of “the result 
reached, not the method employed.” 249   “Congress clearly 
intended to allow the Commission broad discretion in regard to 
the methodology of testing the reasonableness of rates.” 250  
Given the breadth of FERC’s authority when setting rates and 
rules affecting rates—including RTO market rules—the just and 
reasonable standard provides no barrier to FERC’s use of cost-
benefit analysis. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court has spoken approvingly 
of the Commission’s interpretation that a just and reasonable 
rate should be determined by “balancing of the investor and the 
consumer interests.”251  Cost-benefit analysis is a method that 
facilitates this balancing and, as a result, is consistent with 
 
245 Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., Wash., 
554 U.S. 527, 532 (2008).  Because courts have conceived of just and reasonable rates as 
those within a “zone of reasonableness,” see In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 
U.S. 747, 767 (1968) (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 
(1942), there is no single rate that meets the definition). 
246 Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 532. 
247 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016) (deferring to prescriptive 
RTO market-rule changes on the basis that “[W]e afford great deference to the 
Commission in its rate decisions.” (citing Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 532)). 
248 When evaluating whether a rate is just and reasonable, “judicial interpretations of 
the FPA and the NGA may be followed interchangeably.”  Erma Me., 854 F.3d at 20 
(citing Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 n.7 (1981); City of Anaheim v. FERC, 
558 F.3d 521, 523 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
249 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944). 
250 Am. Pub. Power Ass'n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 522 F.2d 142, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 
(“Congress carefully eschewed tying ‘just and reasonable’ rates to any particular method 
of deriving the rates.  Certainly there is nothing in the [FPA] specifically endorsing 
historic test year ratemaking or any other technique of ratemaking.”). 
251 Hope, 320 U.S. at 603. 
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FERC’s authority to approve or reject RTO market rules as just 
and reasonable. 
In addition to the substantive standard, FERC also has an 
evidentiary burden to make determinations about RTO market 
rules on the basis of a record supported by substantial 
evidence. 252   Substantial evidence can include the use of 
economic models to inform whether a particular rate or rule is 
just and reasonable.253  The use of modeling to anticipate market 
outcomes and calculate expected costs and benefits from changes 
in market rules provides critical information for FERC to 
consider as it evaluates those proposed changes.254  The use of 
tools such as the Value of Lost Load can provide information on 
co-benefits of a rule change.  Together, this information will 
assist FERC in meeting its obligation to act only on the basis of 
substantial evidence.255 
Caselaw reinforces FERC’s legal authority to use cost-benefit 
analysis as a tool to evaluate whether market rules are just and 
reasonable.  In the 2001 case Public Utility District No. 1 of 
Snohomish County v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit recognized that a 
cost-benefit analysis could serve as an important factual basis 
for evaluating potential market rule changes. 256   That case 
considered a challenge to Order 2000 by petitioner Snohomish 
Public Power District.  In Order 2000, FERC had found that, in 
 
252 S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  While the court 
determined that FERC is not required to use “empirical evidence” or “to conduct 
experiments,” id., empirical evidence developed through reasonable modeling can help 
justify FERC’s decision making.  See Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1158 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (“unsupported or abstract allegations of the benefits that will accrue from 
increased competition cannot substitute for ‘a conscientious effort to take into account 
what is known as to past experience and what is reasonably predictable about the 
future.’”) (quoting Am. Pub. Gas Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 567 F.2d 1016, 1037 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977)). 
253 Erma Me., 854 F.3d at 20 (“Because ‘[r]atemaking . . . is not a science,’ however, 
FERC must use models ‘to inform, not rigidly to determine, [its] judgment’” (quoting Bos. 
Edison Co. v. FERC, 885 F.2d 962, 969–70 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
254  See TransCanada Power Mktg. v. FERC, 811 F.3d 1, 11–13 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(“TransCanada points out that, in approving the Program, FERC relied on a record that 
is devoid of any evidence regarding how much of the Program cost was attributable to 
profit and risk mark-up.  TransCanada reasonably contends that, without this 
information, FERC could not properly assess whether the Program's rates were just and 
reasonable.”). 
255 Ameren Servs. Co. v. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 121 FERC ¶ 
61,205, at P 32 (2007). 
256 See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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general, the formation of an RTO would be net-beneficial, but 
did not require potential RTOs to include a specific cost-benefit 
analysis in their compliance filings.  In its petition challenging 
Order 2000, Snohomish argued that without a cost-benefit 
analysis, FERC could not reasonably determine that a proposed 
RTO was just and reasonable as required by FPA Section 205.257  
The D.C. Circuit found that because Order 2000 required only 
the submission of an RTO proposal, and did not require or 
approve the formation of an RTO, Snohomish’s objection to 
Order 2000 was not judiciable at that time. 258   However, in 
reaching its decision that Snohomish was not yet harmed, the 
court relied on the fact that under the FPA, FERC would be 
required to consider any cost-benefit analysis that was 
submitted in the docket before making any final decision 
regarding the RTO. 259   The court also approvingly cited an 
agreement by the prospective RTO to conduct and submit a cost-
benefit analysis in support of its section 205 filing.260  As such, 
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Snohomish would be inconsistent 
with reading the FPA to prohibit FERC’s reliance on a cost-
benefit analysis to evaluate whether market rule changes 
submitted pursuant to Section 205 can be considered just and 
reasonable. 
A more recent case in the D.C. Circuit provides further support 
for reading FERC’s decision-making authority under the just 
and reasonable standard to include use of cost-benefit analysis 
to balance competing interests.  In Advanced Energy 
Management Alliance v. FERC,261 the D.C. Circuit considered 
claims that FERC had failed to adequately consider the costs 
and benefits of a proposal by PJM to revise its capacity market 
rules and so had failed to meet its burden to show that the 
changes were just and reasonable.  The court rejected this 
 
257 Id. at 618. 
258 Id. (“Order 2000 is but a preliminary step . . . . If Snohomish’s general argument stood 
alone we would dismiss its petition for lack of “aggrievement.”). 
259 Id. at 619 (“[T]he Commission must—in order to comply with the [FPA] and the 
Administrative Procedure Act—adequately address Snohomish’s specific cost-benefit 
evidence (if Snohomish presents it) prior to the Commission’s final decision on the RTO 
proposal.”). 
260 Id. (“RTO West is itself undertaking its own cost-benefit analysis of the proposal.  The 
short of the matter is that in the site-specific proceeding, Snohomish may accomplish all 
it set out to accomplish in the rulemaking.”). 
261 See Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. FERC (ÂEMA), 860 F. 3d 656 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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challenge but, in the process, relied on the fact that FERC had 
“balanced the benefits of the revised rules against the increased 
costs and reached a reasoned judgment” that the benefits 
justified the costs.262  Citing to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Michigan, the court suggested that consideration of both costs 
and benefits was required under the FPA. 263   And the court 
approvingly cited to the fact that the Commission had, in fact, 
relied on a formal cost-benefit study submitted by a stakeholder, 
Exelon.264 
2. The Scope of Costs and Benefits FERC May Consider 
That FERC has authority to explicitly consider the monetized 
costs and benefits of an RTO market change does not, itself, 
answer the question of the scope of benefits and costs that FERC 
may consider.  In order to maximize social welfare to the greatest 
degree possible, any quantitative or qualitative analysis that 
FERC requires or conducts should include as broad a scope of 
costs and benefits as FERC is permitted to consider under the 
FPA. 
FERC is clearly obligated to balance the interests of 
consumers and investors when determining if a rate is just and 
reasonable.265  In order to facilitate such balancing, FERC’s cost-
benefit analysis should evaluate costs and benefits to both 
 
262 Id. at 660 (citing Blumenthal v. FERC, 552 F.3d 875, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
263 Id. at 662.  The use of cost-benefit analysis as a tool does not preclude the Commission 
from exercising its judgment to approve or deny a market rule change based on 
unquantified factors.  In AEMA, the D.C. Circuit explained that FERC “does not have to 
find net savings” and that courts will “defer to the Commission's weighing of the various 
considerations and ultimate ‘policy judgment.’”  Id. at 662 (citations omitted).  Therefore, 
a decision to quantify and monetize costs and benefits when feasible does not lock the 
Commission in to acting only based on quantified and monetized costs and benefits.  
However, to the extent unquantified costs or benefits lead FERC to adopt or reject a 
market rule as just and reasonable, FERC will have to explain why those costs or benefits 
were decisive.  See TransCanada Power Mktg., 811 F.3d at 13 (“when the Commission 
chooses to refer to non-cost factors in ratesetting, it must offer a reasoned explanation of 
how the relevant factors justify the resulting rates.  Here, the Commission did not 
explain what its balancing entailed, or how it applied the non-cost factors.”) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
264 AEMA, 860 F.3d at 662 (“On rehearing the Commission cited a formal cost-benefit 
analysis, the Exelon study, which concluded that the new market rules would have net 
savings of between $900 million and $4.7 billion annually, starting in 2016.” (citing PJM 
Interconnection, L.L.C., 155 FERC ¶ 61,157, at P 34 (2016)). 
265 Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 532 (2008) 
(citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944)). 
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investors and consumers.  However, despite concerns that FERC 
has expressed in a number of contexts, FERC’s ratemaking 
authority allows it to consider a broader scope of costs and 
benefits beyond just those accruing to investors and consumers.  
Put another way, consistent with the direction in Circular A-4, 
FERC can consider certain ancillary costs and benefits—e.g., 
environmental consequences—when establishing and approving 
RTO market rules and, as a result, those ancillary costs and 
benefits should be included in any cost-benefit analysis used to 
support a market rule.266 
As the Supreme Court determined in the 1956 case Federal 
Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., “the purpose of 
the power given the Commission by § 206(a) is the protection of 
the public interest, as distinguished from the private interests 
of the utilities,” and so the requirement that rates be just and 
reasonable must be “read in the light of this purpose.”267  This 
language makes clear that FERC may not look only at the 
interests of utilities, and must also take into account the interest 
of energy consumers.  It also suggests that FERC has authority 
to look to a broad scope of costs and benefits—those bearing on 
the public interest.  Subsequent case law both affirmed and 
narrowed the scope of costs and benefits that permissibly fit 
under the “public interest” rubric.  For example, in 1973, the 
Supreme Court decided, in Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Federal 
Power Commission, that a relevant component of the public 
interest that the Commission can consider when acting under 
Sections 205 and 206 is “the anticompetitive effects of interstate 
regulated utility operations.”268 
Yet, that FERC has authority to consider the public interest 
does not mean its authority is unbounded.  There are likely costs 
and benefits that would fall outside of FERC’s authority to act 
upon and so may not be relevant for a cost-benefit analysis. 
Shortly after the Supreme Court expanded the “public 
interest” in Gulf States, it considered just how far that authority 
ran when acting under Sections 205 and 206, among other 
provisions.  That case, NAACP v. Federal Power Commission, 
involved a question of the Commission’s authority to mandate 
 
266 CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 26. 
267 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956). 
268 Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 411 U.S. 747, 749 (1973). 
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non-discrimination policies within the context of its regulation 
of electric and natural gas utilities. 269   The Court held that 
Congress’s intent that ratemaking be in the public interest did 
not give FERC “a broad license to promote the general public 
welfare.” 270   Rather, the factors that FERC may consider 
extended only to those factors that bear on the specific purposes 
of the acts the Commission administers.  Because the purposes 
of electric utility regulation primarily involves “encourage[ing] 
the orderly development of plentiful supplies of electricity . . . at 
reasonable prices,” 271  the Court held that the Commission 
clearly has authority to regulate non-discrimination policies if it 
finds that discrimination directly affects the rates that a utility 
charges its customers–such as by increasing costs to 
consumers. 272   However, absent such a finding, non-
discrimination was not an independent purpose of the FPA. 
One set of costs and benefits that may be outside of FERC’s 
ratemaking authority concerns those which result from a 
particular use of electricity.  In Hope, the Supreme Court 
explained that the ratemaking authority under an analogous 
provision of the NGA did not permit the Commission to take into 
account the downstream uses of the commodity whose rates the 
Commission was regulating.  The Court explained “we fail to 
find in the power to fix ‘just and reasonable’ rates the power to 
fix rates which will disallow or discourage resales for industrial 
use.”273  If the Commission is not empowered to take into account 
the costs and benefits of how electricity will be used, there would 
be little purpose in evaluating those costs and benefits as part of 
a cost-benefit analysis of RTO market rules. 274   Such a 
restriction may limit the usefulness of a macroeconomic 
evaluation of how a market rule will affect the broader 
economy.275 
 
269 NAACP, 425 U.S. 662. 
270 Id. at 669. 
271 Id. at 669–71. 
272  Id. at 668 (“the Commission clearly has the duty to prevent its regulates from 
charging rates based upon illegal, duplicative, or unnecessary labor costs.”). 
273 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 616–617 (1944). 
274  Cf. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 766 (2004) (finding that 
environmental analysis under NEPA is not required if an agency is not empowered to 
act on the basis of that information). 
275 See Part II(c)(5) for a discussion of microeconomic vs. macroeconomic modeling when 
evaluating costs and benefits. 
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On the other hand, ensuring reliability and resilience are clear 
purposes of FERC regulation of the electric system.  FERC has 
long interpreted its authority under Sections 205 and 206 to 
allow it to consider whether particular market rules will 
enhance or detract from the reliability of the electric system.276  
Recently, FERC affirmed that this authority extended to 
evaluation of market rule changes on the resilience of the 
electric system.277 
One important category of costs and benefits deserves further 
evaluation:  the environmental consequences of electricity 
generation.  In short, despite some suggestions to the contrary, 
FERC has the legal authority to consider environmental 
consequences in its evaluation of RTO market rules.  FERC has 
previously taken the position that environmental concerns are 
not generally relevant for its evaluation of whether wholesale 
electric rates are just and reasonable.  In Monongahela Power 
Co., FERC considered a Natural Resources Defense Council 
(“NRDC”) challenge to a bilateral wholesale sale of electricity 
and capacity from a coal fired power plant.278  NRDC argued that 
FERC had erred in approving the transaction without producing 
an EIS that evaluated how the transaction would influence the 
amount of air pollution emitted by the coal plant. 279   NRDC 
argued that the information produced in the EIS would “assist 
the Commission in deciding whether to approve” the wholesale 
sale.280  FERC determined that such information would not be 
helpful to the Commission’s decision because neither Section 205 
nor 206 provides FERC authority to deny a proposed rate based 
on whether the rate will lead to an increase in air pollution.281  
As a result, FERC concluded that NEPA did not require an EIS 
for ratemaking actions under the FPA.282 
 
276  See Gainesville Util. Dep’t v. Fla. Power Corp., 402 U.S. 515, 529 (1971) (the 
Commission has the “responsibility to the public to assure reliable efficient electric 
service”); ISO New England Inc., 164 FERC ¶ 61,003, at P 49 (2018) (finding ISO-NE 
tariff may be unjust and unreasonable due to concerns about fuel security that pose a 
threat to electric reliability). 
277 Resilience Order, supra note 117, at 13. 
278 Monongahela Power Co., 39 FERC ¶ 61,350, reh’g denied, 40 FERC ¶ 61,256 (1987). 
279 Id. at 62,092. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. at 62,097. 
282 Id. Citing its decision in Monongahela, FERC subsequently codified a “categorical 
exclusion,” which allows it to generally forgo NEPA analysis when issuing decisions 
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FERC’s general view was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in 
Grand Council of Crees v. FERC. 283   That case involved a 
challenge to a FERC order allowing a hydroelectric generator to 
sell at market-based rates.  Petitioners argued that FERC had 
failed to consider the environmental effects of increasing 
hydroelectric generation.  The court held that petitioners lacked 
prudential standing to raise these challenges because 
environmental protection is not an enumerated purpose of the 
FPA for the purpose of evaluating whether a particular energy 
marketer’s rate is “just and reasonable.”284 
At first blush, these cases suggest that environmental 
consequences are not factors that FERC may consider.  
However, there are a number of reasons why FERC may 
nonetheless consider environmental consequences when 
evaluating electric market rules. 
First, while FERC has historically taken a narrow view of the 
environmental analysis it is required to conduct when 
evaluating rates under Sections 205 and 206, the language at 
issue in the FPA related to “just and reasonable rates” is 
ambiguous.  None of the “traditional tools of statutory 
construction” compel a reading that excludes environmental 
considerations.  In fact, the only court decision that has 
considered whether environmental considerations may be 
incorporated into an evaluation of whether a rate or rule is “just 
and reasonable,” Grand Council of Crees, specifically deferred to 
FERC on the basis that the language at issue is ambiguous.285  
As a result, under the familiar Chevron doctrine, FERC could 
change course and adopt an interpretation of “just and 
reasonable” that provides it jurisdiction to consider 
environmental consequences.286  This is true even in the face of 
 
under FPA Sections 205 and 206.  Regulations Implementing National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,897, 47,900 (Dec. 17, 1987) (codified at 18 C.F.R. 
§ 381.4(a)(15)). 
283 Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, (U.S. App. D.C. 2000). 
284 Id. at 956–57. 
285 Id. at 957 (deferring to FERC’s interpretation of “just and reasonable” to exclude 
environmental considerations pursuant to Chevron). 
286  See TAPS, 225 F.3d at 687 (“the deferential standard of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, (1984), governs our review of FERC's 
interpretation of FPA [sections] 205 and 206.”); City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290 
(2013) (holding that agencies are granted Chevron deference regarding their 
determination of their own jurisdiction).  For an extended argument that the ambiguities 
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a seemingly contrary judicial decision in Grand Council of Crees 
because the court in that case merely affirmed FERC’s reading 
and did not claim that the “just and reasonable” language 
“leaves no room for agency discretion.”287 
Second, FERC’s own regulatory precedent suggests that the 
Commission can take into account environmental consequences 
when evaluating whether a potential market rule is just and 
reasonable.  Monongahela and subsequent cases primarily 
concern FERC’s obligations under NEPA.  FERC has 
promulgated regulations that outline a process for overcoming 
the presumption that ratemaking will not have a significant 
environmental effect. 288   FERC has acknowledged that 
ratemaking can have a significant environmental effect that 
would require a NEPA analysis. 289   In Order 888, FERC 
acknowledged that it “ha[s] an obligation under NEPA to take 
the environmental consequences of our actions into account in 
fashioning our decisions” and considered the environmental 
consequences of its Order.290  That is, FERC recognized that it 
has legal authority to evaluate the environmental consequences 
of an action taken pursuant to Sections 205 and 206 and to act 
in ways informed by those consequences.  FERC drew a 
distinction between incorporating the environmental 
consequences of its action into its evaluation of a particular 
market change—which it determined it had authority to do—
and imposition of separate requirements intended to mitigate 
those consequences, such as emission taxes or limits—which it 
determined were outside its statutory authority.291  The D.C. 
Circuit ultimately upheld the reasonableness of FERC’s 
 
in the statutory phrase “just and reasonable” provide FERC the opportunity to 
incorporate environmental costs and benefits into its evaluation of rates under Sections 
205 and 206, see Bateman & Tripp, supra note 120, at 300–311. 
287 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). 
288 18 C.F.R. §380.4(b) (2018). 
289 The Commission has invoked the exception and conducted environmental reviews 
when evidence has been presented that a decision normally subject to a categorical 
exclusion would significantly affect the environment.  See, e.g. S. Cal. Edison Co. & San 
Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 49 FERC ¶ 61,091, 61,357 (Oct. 27, 1989). 
290 Order No. 888, supra note 12, at 31,864. 
291 Id. at 31,887 (“The discretion to consider public policy matters is a far cry from the 
authority, or obligation, to regulate those matters.  We have considered the 
environmental impact of the rule”). 
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environmental analysis. 292   In effect, FERC determined, 
consistent with Circular A-4, that it had authority to consider 
environmental consequences of ancillary costs or benefits, and 
the D.C. Circuit deferred. 
Third, FERC’s authority to incorporate environmental costs 
and benefits into its analysis and to accept or reject filings based 
on those costs and benefits is on particularly firm ground for 
market rule changes implemented by RTOs.  This is because 
Congress specifically enumerated environmental concerns as a 
purpose of a key FPA section used to regulate RTOs:  Section 
202(a). 
Section 202(a) of the FPA provides FERC the authority to 
create voluntary regional districts that coordinate the 
generation and transmission of electricity.  When issuing Order 
2000, encouraging the creation of RTOs, FERC relied on Section 
202(a) (in addition to Sections 205 and 206). 293   The D.C. 
Circuit’s approval of Order 2000 also relied, in part, on FERC’s 
citation to its authority under Section 202(a).294 
Section 202(a) reads, in relevant part: 
 
For the purpose of assuring an abundant supply of electric energy 
throughout the United States with the greatest possible economy 
and with regard to the proper utilization and conservation of 
natural resources, the Commission is empowered and directed to 
divide the country into regional districts for the voluntary 
interconnection and coordination of facilities for the generation, 
transmission, and sale of electric energy.295 
 
To the extent that FERC may consider only those costs and 
benefits of market rule changes that fulfill the purposes of the 
FPA, FERC action under Sections 205 and 206 with regard to 
RTO market rule changes should be read in light of the purposes 
 
292 TAPS, 225 F.3d at 737.  The court explicitly did not “resolve the parties’ debate about 
FERC’s legal authority to order environmental mitigation.”  Id. 
293 Order No. 2000, supra note 13, at 31,044–45. 
294 Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1. of Snohomish Cty. v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607, 612–615 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (relying on the fact that FERC used Section 202(a), which permits FERC to 
approval regional coordination on a voluntary basis, to uphold Order 2000). 
295 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
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of Section 202(a).296  Beyond the promotion of plentiful supplies 
of electricity, Section 202(a) identifies a number of additional 
purposes with respect to voluntary coordination districts like 
RTOs.  One such purpose is ensuring that the supply of 
electricity is made with “the greatest possible economy”—that is, 
that market rule designs should be economically efficient. 297  
Another purpose of coordinated operation is “proper utilization 
of and conservation of natural resources.”298  This purpose can 
reasonably be read to allow FERC to take into account 
environmental considerations when evaluating potential RTO 
market rules.299 
In fact, Commissioners have acknowledged that FERC has 
authority to consider factors beyond the impact on market 
participants in the context of regional entities created pursuant 
to Section 202(a) that may exceed its authority in other 
contexts.300  So too have the courts.301  As such, even under the 
limits imposed by NAACP and subsequent cases, the purposes 
of Section 202(a)—enhancing efficiency of the system and 
 
296 Cent. Iowa Power Coop. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 1156, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“We agree 
with South Dakota that the Commission should consider the policies of the [FPA] [in 
Section 202(a)] in making a determination under [Section 206].”). 
297  For an extended discussion about FERC’s long-standing actions to improve the 
efficiency of markets, and the implications for market rules that efficiently price 
externalities from climate change, see Bethany A. Davis Noll & Burcin Unel, Markets, 
Externalities and the Federal Power Act:  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 
Authority to Price Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 27 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2019). 
298 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (2018). 
299 Note that FERC has not, to date, interpreted Section 202(a) to require it to incorporate 
environmental considerations directly into its evaluation of RTO market rules.  See, e.g., 
Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 93 FERC ¶ 61,001, 61,003 (Oct. 2, 2000) (rejecting a 
rehearing request that FERC failed to fulfill its duty to consider environmental 
consequences of reliability-must-run provisions, citing Monogahela, Crees).  However, 
FERC may be permitted to incorporate environmental consequences into a cost-benefit 
analysis even if it is not required to do so.  Id.  (“In rejecting Petitioner's environmental 
claims in this case, the Commission did not, as Petitioner maintains, conclude that such 
factors were beyond its authority to consider under Sections 203 or 205 of the FPA and 
thereby summarily dismiss them.”). 
300 See S. Cal. Edison Co. & San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 49 FERC ¶ 61091, 61,365 
(Trabandt, Comm’r, dissenting in part) (rejecting inclusion of environmental factors in 
merger decisions made pursuant to Section 203 of the FPA but acknowledging that 
“section 202(a) gives the Commission authority to promote conservation through creating 
co-ordination districts.”). 
301 See e.g., Richmond Power & Light of City of Richmond, Ind. v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610, 
617 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (based on the language in Section 202(a) “one might reason 
that the Commission is empowered to consider overall fuel-supply economics and the 
social consequences of energy shortages”). 
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conserving natural resources—provide FERC authority to 
consider a broader array of costs and benefits, including 
environmental consequences, as it seeks to maximize social 
welfare when approving or ordering changes to electricity 
market rules. 
D. Applying Cost-Benefit Analysis 
A full examination of the economic methods and practical tools 
available to FERC and RTOs in the development of cost-benefit 
analyses is beyond the scope of this Article.  However, this 
Section discusses, at a high level, the categories of costs and 
benefits that FERC should consider when developing or 
evaluating cost-benefit analyses of RTO market rules.  It also 
identifies some of the economic tools that can be used to estimate 
costs and benefits. 
1. Categories of Costs and Benefits 
The goal of an RTO’s cost-benefit analysis should be to assess 
what effect a proposal has on social welfare.  FERC should 
evaluate benefits and costs to “all beneficiaries, consumers, 
producers, and society at large, without regard to circumstances 
or location.”302  As a result, FERC should quantify and monetize 
at least the following categories of costs and benefits and 
incorporate them into a cost-benefit analysis.  Consistent with 
Circular A-4, net benefits can be calculated by summing the net 
present value of each category of costs and benefits as compared 
to a baseline that extends the status quo into the future.303 
a. Efficiency Effects 
Market rule changes primarily affect the incentives for 
investment in and operation of electricity generation.  These 
changes can lead to more or less efficient operation and 
investment that eliminates or increases deadweight loss, and 
improves or reduces the aggregate welfare of consumers and 
producers.304  Economists have developed tools to estimate these 
 
302 RTO CBA REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. 
303 CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing development of a baseline); Id. at 31–
32 (describing the importance of discounting and the calculation of net present value). 
304 See RTO CBA REPORT, supra note 14, at 15. 
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benefits and costs, including benefits and costs produced by 
changing the efficiency of generation dispatch, changing the 
efficiency of unit commitment, changing the incentives to 
maximize the efficient operation and maintenance of individual 
generators, and reducing or increasing the need for generation 
and transmission investment.305 
b. Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
RTO market rules not only improve or detract from the 
efficiency of the wholesale markets, they can also substantially 
affect the distribution of costs and benefits between consumers 
and producers.  Cost-benefit analyses of these rules should, 
when possible, separately characterize the costs and benefits of 
these important groups of market participants. 
As Circular A-4 cautions, it is important for a cost-benefit 
analysis of market rules to distinguish between how a rule 
would change economic efficiency and how the rule would 
change the amount of money consumers pay producers for a 
service.306  The latter constitutes transfer payments that, while 
important for FERC to consider, are different than the change 
in aggregate social welfare.  FERC has not always recognized 
this distinction when evaluating cost-benefit analyses.307 
c. Administrative Costs 
RTO market rule changes can increase or decrease the cost of 
administering the RTO.  Third-party cost-benefit studies often 
 
305 See SUSAN F. TIERNEY & EDWARD KAHN, A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK 
INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR: THE INITIAL YEARS, 10–16 (2007) (discussing 
literature that estimates the different types of costs and benefits of RTO market rule 
changes).  See generally RTO CBA REPORT, supra note14 (reviewing studies of the 
anticipated costs and benefits of RTOs). 
306 CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 14, 38, 46. 
307 In New England Power Pool ISO New England Inc., 111 FERC ¶ 61,064, at P 2 (Apr. 
18, 2005), FERC considered an analysis that included two alternative measures of the 
benefits of the demand response program:  (1) the benefits of reduced prices to consumers 
(called “transfer benefits”), and (2) the change in net social welfare produced by a more 
efficient allocation of supply and load (citing NEENAN ASSOCIATES, LLC, THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF IMPLEMENTING A DAY-AHEAD LOAD RESPONSE PROGRAM (Feb. 1, 2005), 
attached to Compliance Filing of the New England Power Pool Participants Committee 
and ISO New England Inc., Docket No. ER04-1255-001 (Feb. 18, 2005) [hereinafter 
DALRP Compliance Filing].  ISO-NE used the transfer benefits in its filing with FERC.  
Id. at 8. 
ZEVIN-MACRO-042820 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2020  7:55 PM 
2020] Regulating the Energy Transition 479 
include changes in RTO budgets as an important cost 
category.308  These costs are easily determined because RTO’s 
are required to submit an annual accounting of their costs to 
FERC.309 
d. Reliability (and Resilience) 
Because of network effects in the electric system, electric 
system reliability and resilience are public goods.310  As a result, 
the market will underprovide reliability and resilience and 
market rule changes can be designed to improve efficiency by 
enhancing reliability and resilience.  When possible, a cost-
benefit analysis of a market rule should estimate the extent to 
which the rule would reduce the likelihood of grid outages (that 
is, would increase reliability or resilience).  Consistent with 
Circular A-4, the value of avoided grid outages can be monetized 
based on the amount a consumer is willing to pay to avoid an 
outage.311  Economic measures of consumer willingness to pay to 
avoid outages—the VOLL—are available and can be 
incorporated into cost-benefit analyses.312 
e. Environmental Costs and Benefits 
The costs and benefits of RTO market changes are not limited 
to costs and benefits that inure directly to market participants.  
The generation and sale of electricity produces substantial costs 
to the public that are not borne directly by producers or 
consumers of electricity.  Most prominently, this includes 
environmental costs of electricity generation.  By changing the 
incentives of market participants, RTO market rules can have a 
substantial effect on the magnitude of these external costs.  For 
example, recent proposed market rules that would have 
compensated coal-fired generation for alleged resilience 
benefits 313  would increase the amount of greenhouse gases 
 
308 See TIERNEY & KAHN, supra note 305, at 37. 
309 18 C.F.R. § 141.1(b) (2018). 
310  See Noll & Unel, supra note 297, at 36–37 & n.240 (defining public goods and 
explaining how reliability functions as a public good); BURCIN UNEL & AVI ZEVIN, 
TOWARDS RESILIENCE:  DEFINING MEASURING AND MONETIZING RESILIENCE IN THE 
ELECTRICITY SYSTEM 13 ( 2018). 
311 CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 18–20. 
312 See BURLINGAME & WALTON, supra note 159, at 44–60. 
313 See DOE NOPR, supra note 33, at 46,945. 
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emitted by the electric system and cause billions of dollars in 
climate damages. 314   FERC should estimate the value of 
externalities generated by market rule changes into its cost-
benefit analyses of those changes.  This information can help 
inform the Commission and the public regarding the 
consequences of the proposed changes to entities other than 
market participants. 
2. Economic Tools 
There are a number of economic tools available to FERC in 
order to estimate the costs and benefits of market rule changes 
and to monetize those costs and benefits to the greatest extent 
technically feasible. 
a. Electricity Market Modeling 
Several electricity market models are available, which would 
allow FERC to simulate how specific market rules will affect 
investment in and retirement of generation and transmission 
resources, electric system operational changes, and market 
prices.  These models can be used to assess the efficiency effects 
and distributional consequences of market rules. 
Capacity expansion models are used to simulate generation 
and transmission investment given assumptions about future 
energy prices, technology costs, and energy policies. 315  
Production cost models can simulate hourly energy prices, unit 
generation, revenues and fuel consumption, energy market 
prices, external market transactions, transmission flows, losses, 
and congestion prices for a given set of market rules.  These 
include proprietary models such as PROMOD, PROSYM, and 
GE-MAPS, which have been approved as valid analytical models 
by FERC,316 and have been used to conduct cost-benefit analyses 
 
314 DANIEL SHAWHAN & PAUL PICCIANO, RETIREMENT AND FUNERALS:  THE EMISSIONS, 
MORTALITY, AND COAL-MINE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF A TWO-YEAR DELAY IN COAL AND 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT RETIREMENTS, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, RFF WP18-18 (Jul. 
5, 2018). 
315 ERIN BOYD, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OVERVIEW OF POWER SECTOR MODELING 9–11 
(2016), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/02/f29/EPSA_Power_Sector_ 
Modeling_020416.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BWW-FNYJ]. 
316 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 145 FERC ¶ 61,248, 62,377 (Dec. 18, 2013) 
(approving use of PROMOD); Entergy Servs., Inc., 116 FERC ¶ 61,296, at ¶ 66 (2006) 
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of RTO rules. 317   The consulting firm ICF International has 
developed a comprehensive computer simulation model of the 
electric system, the Integrated Planning Model (“IPM”).  IPM is 
an optimization model that allows simulation of both grid 
operations and capacity expansion.  IPM has been used by FERC 
to evaluate costs and benefits of particular RTO-related 
rulemakings, including FERC’s economic analysis of Order 
2000 318  and the economic analysis supporting the Standard 
Market Design rulemaking. 319   Open-source models are also 
available, including the Energy Information Administration’s 
National Energy Modeling System (NEMS), which has been 
used to conduct economic analysis of key FERC rules.320 
b. Air Pollution Damage Modeling 
As outlined above, an important externality associated with 
electricity generation is the public health and environmental 
damage that results from the emission of air pollutants.  The 
electricity market models discussed above can be used to 
simulate how market rule changes will result in the change in 
operation of different electric generating units.  Some models, 
such as IPM and NEMS, incorporate air pollution emissions of 
modeled resources into the available model outputs.321  Using 
these model outputs, the simulated change in the quantity of air 
pollution can then be monetized using publicly available 
modeling tools. 
For conventional air pollutants, a number of modeling tools 
are available to translate a quantity of emissions of sulfur 
 
(approving use of PROSYM); The New PJM Cos., 106 FERC ¶ 63,029, 65,314 (May 12, 
2004) (approving use of GE-MAPS). 
317 RTO CBA REPORT, supra note 14, at 27 (listing models for each RTO market study 
including, PROMOD and GE-MAPS). 
318  FERC, REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS RULEMAKING ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT, DOCKET NO. RM99-2-000 at 25–26 (1999). 
319 RTO STUDY, supra note 209, at 28. 
320  ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AN ANALYSIS OF FERC’S FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT FOR ELECTRICITY OPEN ACCESS AND RECOVERY OF STRANDED COSTS (1996), 
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/archive/1996/oiaf9603.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/26WQ-9R88]. 
321 RTO STUDY, supra note 209, at 28; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THE NATIONAL ENERGY 
MODELING SYSTEM:  AN OVERVIEW 2009 at 43 (2009), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/ 
nems/overview/pdf/0581(2009).pdf [https://perma.cc/VPR8-Y22L]. 
ZEVIN-MACRO-042820 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2020  7:55 PM 
482 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 45:2 
dioxide, nitrous oxides, and particular matter into monetary 
estimates of health and agricultural damages.322 
For greenhouse gases, the Social Cost of Carbon is a widely 
accepted tool developed by the Interagency Working Group on 
the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (“IWG”)323 to estimate the 
net-present value of climate damage caused by the emission of 
carbon dioxide. 324   The IWG’s estimate has been repeatedly 
endorsed by government reviewers, courts, and experts 
including the National Academy of Sciences.325  And while the 
Trump Administration has disbanded the IWG and withdrawn 
the technical support documents,326 the estimates produced by 
the IWG remain the best available estimates of the social cost of 
greenhouse gas emissions.327 
c. Resilience Modeling 
RTOs are currently in the process of evaluating longer-term 
market rule changes to enhance the resilience of the generating 
system.328  Moreover, FERC may take action to address broader 
 
322  See JEFFREY SHRADER, BURCIN UNEL & AVI ZEVIN, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, 
VALUING POLLUTION REDUCTIONS: HOW TO MONETIZE GREENHOUSE GAS AND LOCAL AIR 
POLLUTANT REDUCTIONS FROM DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 22–24 (2018), 
https://policyintegrity.org/publications/detail/valuing-pollution-reductions 
[https://perma.cc/559Y-A7RZ]. 
323 The IWG, a collection of 13 federal agencies and White House offices, first developed 
the Social Cost of Carbon in 2010 and updated the estimate in 2013 and 2015.  See NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASSESSMENT OF APPROACHES TO UPDATING THE SOCIAL COST OF 
CARBON: PHASE 1 REPORT ON A NEAR-TERM UPDATE 6 (2016), 
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/21898/assessment-of-approaches-to-updating-the-social-
cost-of-carbon [https://perma.cc/Q84S-3EUV]. 
324 INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES, TECHNICAL 
SUPPORT DOCUMENT (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ 
files/omb/inforeg/scc_tsd_final_clean_8_26_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/FSH9-FDUM]. 
325 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-663, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS:  
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL COST OF CARBON ESTIMATES 12–19 (2014), 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-663 [https://perma.cc/23TH-Y7MF]; Zero Zone, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 677–79 (7th Cir. 2016); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
VALUING CLIMATE DAMAGES: UPDATING ESTIMATION OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 
DIOXIDE 3 (2017); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASSESSMENT OF APPROACHES TO UPDATING 
THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON:  PHASE 1 REPORT ON A NEAR-TERM UPDATE 6 (2016). 
326 Exec. Order No. 13,783 § 5, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095–96 (Mar. 28, 2017). 
327 Richard L. Revesz et al., Best Cost Estimate of Greenhouse Gases, 357 SCIENCE 655, 
655 (2017). 
328 See PJM, FUEL SECURITY:  ANALYZING FUEL SUPPLY RESILIENCE IN THE PJM REGION 
7 (2018), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mrc/20181101-
fuel-security/20181101-pjm-fuel-security-summary.ashx [https://perma.cc/XB5B-6CYS] 
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resilience concerns.329  To the extent an RTO or FERC acts to 
enhance system resilience it should use quantitative tools in 
order to estimate the costs and benefits of market rule changes 
aimed at enhancing resilience. 330   Probabilistic models of 
extreme events, combined with the production cost and capacity 
expansion models outlined above can be used to estimate the 
extent to which resilience focused market rule changes will 
reduce the expected number of hours of customer outages.  The 
economic value of reduced outages can then be monetized using 
the Value of Lost Load or other metrics.  DOE is currently 
developing an electric system model that will be able to assist in 
analyzing the expected reliability and resilience consequences of 
market rule changes, including for the purpose of cost-benefit 
analysis.331 
E. Additional Examples of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Electric 
System Regulation 
This section has explored the potential for cost-benefit 
analysis to inform one particularly significant area of FERC 
responsibility over the electric sector that is relevant to the 
energy transition:  RTO market rules.  However, this is not the 
only area of FERC responsibility over the bulk electric system 
that would benefit from a more systematic, transparent, and 
holistic approach to decision making.  For the reasons explored 
in Part II, cost-benefit analysis would also be a useful tool for 
other significant regulatory actions relevant to the transition of 
the electric system, including industry-wide rulemakings 
establishing requirements, 332  requirements to identify and 
 
(describing “next steps” including the initiation of a stakeholder process to develop 
market rule changes); FERC, Motion for Extension of Time of ISO New England Inc. at 
3–5, Docket No. EL18-182-000 (Jan. 18, 2019) (describing efforts to develop market rule 
changes to address resilience to fuel disruption). 
329 See Gavin Bade, Glick Predicts Return to Resilience Debate as McNamee Prepares to 
Take FERC Seat, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/glick-
predicts-return-to-resilience-debate-as-mcnamee-prepares-to-take-ferc/544042/ 
[https://perma.cc/J3HT-QHEL]. 
330  See UNEL & ZEVIN, supra note 310, at 13–20 (describing a cost-benefit analysis 
framework for assessing resilience interventions). 
331  See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NORTH AMERICAN RESILIENCE MODEL (2019), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/07/f65/NAERM_Report_public_version_07
2219_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PUL-39KB]. 
332 Glick & Christiansen, supra note 19, at 22–23. 
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approve regional and interregional transmission lines within 
and outside of RTO markets,333 or implement the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 to facilitate deployment of small 
and renewable energy facilities. 334   Two additional types of 
FERC decisions are worth discussing briefly:  the establishment 
of minimum reliability standards and the establishment of 
incentives for the construction of certain types of interstate 
electric transmission. 
Recently there has been substantial public attention on 
whether the energy system transition will facilitate or hinder 
electric reliability and resilience.335  Concerns about reliability 
may continue in the face of increasing extreme weather events 
due to climate change.336  Cost-benefit analysis can provide a 
neutral framework for evaluating whether certain 
improvements to electric reliability are warranted. 
In 2005, Congress provided FERC with additional authority to 
manage the reliability of the bulk power system.337  Under this 
authority, Congress directed FERC to name an electric 
reliability organization (“ERO”) that would be responsible for 
developing mandatory standards for transmission, generation, 
and independent grid operators. 338   FERC may approve any 
proposed standards developed by the ERO that are “just, 
reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the 
public interest.”339  In 2006, FERC chose the North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation as the ERO and issued 
regulations establishing a process for the development and 
 
333  See Glick & Christiansen, supra note 19, at 37–38 (discussing importance of 
transmission planning to energy system transition and addressing climate change); see 
AARON BLOOM, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., INTERCONNECTION SEAMS STUDY 101–
03 (2019), https://cleanenergygrid.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NREL-seams-
transgridx-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/K68A-A366] (finding substantial benefits to 
transmission expansion that connects Eastern and Western interconnections). 
334 See Glick & Christiansen, supra note 19, at 38–39. 
335 See, e.g., Grid Resiliency Pricing, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940 (proposed Oct. 10, 2017) (to be 
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 
61,236 (June 29, 2018). 
336 See JUSTIN GUNDLACH & ROMANY WEBB, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, 
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE BULK POWER SYSTEM: ASSESSING VULNERABILITIES 
AND PLANNING FOR RESILIENCE iii—ii (2018). 
337 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2018). 
338 Id. at §§ 824o(c), (d). 
339 Id. at § 824o(d)(2). 
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approval of new reliability standards.340  FERC rejected the use 
of cost-benefit analysis as the appropriate decision making 
criterion for new reliability standards.341 
FERC should reconsider that approach.  Reliability standards 
necessarily impose costs on electric market participants (and 
ultimately consumers) by requiring capital investments, 
operational changes, and other actions.  These changes are 
intended to produce benefits in the form of continued operation 
of the system in times of high stress.  Cost-benefit analysis can 
provide a useful framework for transparently balancing these 
factors and associated costs.  Because FERC’s statutory 
authority over reliability standards uses language similar to 
what FERC has relied on to regulate RTOs—standards must be 
“just and reasonable” and “in the public interest”—FERC’s 
authority to use cost-benefit analysis rests on the same legal 
foundation as discussed above. 
Another area of FERC responsibility that would benefit from 
the use of cost-benefit analysis is FERC’s award of incentives to 
certain transmission projects.  As demand for renewable 
resources increases—due to cost declines, state climate policies, 
and consumer interest—so too will the need to build additional 
transmission.  Unlike for wholesale electricity sales, FERC’s 
approach to transmission regulation continues to primarily rely 
on traditional cost-of-service ratemaking principles.  The rate 
charged for transmission service would be based on the costs of 
providing that service plus a return on equity.  However, in 
2005, concerned that this approach was not yielding sufficient 
transmission development in the face of a changing electricity 
system, Congress adopted Section 219 of the FPA, which directs 
FERC to provide transmission developers with financial 
incentives such as additional ROE for projects that meet certain 
public policy objectives. 342   Congress required transmission 
incentives be used in certain circumstances, such as for 
 
340 N. Am, Elec. Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ¶ 61,062 (July 20, 2006); Rules Concerning 
Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the 
Establishment, Approval and Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, 18 C.F.R. § 
39 (2006). 
341 N. Am. Elec. Reliability, 116 FERC ¶ 61,062 (“EPAct 2005 does not mandate a case-
by-case cost-benefit analysis and we are not prepared to mandate that.”). 
342 16 U.S.C. § 824s. 
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transmission owners that join an RTO,343 but left it to FERC to 
determine what other types of transmission projects warranted 
additional compensation and how much that additional 
compensation should be.  In 2006, FERC issued Order 679, 
which established its incentive policy.344  FERC rejected the use 
of cost-benefit analysis as a tool to determine when a 
transmission project should be provided incentives.345  Recently, 
Commissioners have expressed concern that the existing policy 
has functioned as a giveaway that has overcompensated some 
transmission projects that may have been developed anyway, 
without sufficiently incentivizing the development of beneficial 
new projects.346  As a result, FERC is currently reevaluating its 
transmission incentive policy. 347   FERC should take that 
opportunity to revise the process for evaluating potential 
transmission incentives. It should clarify that it will identify 
and, where possible, quantify the benefits and costs of additional 
proposed incentives, that it will balance those costs and benefits, 
and only adopt incentives where the benefits exceed the costs.  
In that context, cost-benefit analysis can be useful both in 
evaluating which categories of projects are deserving of 
incentives and as a decision making criteria in its evaluation of 
specific transmission incentive applications from developers.  
Section 219 provides sufficient authority for FERC to use cost-
benefit analysis, including a broad consideration of costs and 
benefits, when evaluating and choosing among potential 
transmission incentives.  FERC is directed to incentivize 
facilities that “promote reliable and economically efficient 
transmission and generation of electricity.”348  Improvement of 
efficiency is one of the fundamental principles of cost-benefit 
analysis; the direction to improve the economic efficiency of the 
transmission system leaves a clear opening for balancing costs 
and benefits, including those that accrue to entities other than 
electric system producers and consumers. 
 
343 Id. at § 824s(c). 
344 Promoting Transmission Investment Through Pricing Reform, supra note 64. 
345 Id. at PP 59–65. 
346 See GridLiance West Transco LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,049, at 14 (July 24, 2018) (Glick, 
Comm’r, concurring). 
347 Inquiry Regarding the Commission’s Electric Transmission Incentives Policy, 166 
FERC ¶ 61,208 (Mar. 21, 2019). 
348 16 U.S.C. § 824s(b). 
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IV. NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CERTIFICATE APPROVALS 
Part IV evaluates the prospect for cost-benefit analysis to 
serve as a useful tool as FERC attempts to balance competing 
interests and maximize social welfare when evaluating the 
expected increase in new applications to construct and operate 
interstate natural gas pipelines.349 
A. FERC’s Role and Current Approach 
This section provides an overview of FERC’s role overseeing 
the development of new natural gas infrastructure such as 
pipelines, storage facilities, and export terminals.  It then 
discusses FERC’s current approach to evaluating applications 
for new and expanded and evaluates a recent FERC decision not 
to employ cost-benefit analysis. 
1. FERC’s Role Overseeing Construction and Operation of 
Natural Gas Pipelines 
Under the NGA, Congress gave the FPC (and, subsequently, 
FERC) the responsibility for permitting the construction and 
operation of interstate natural gas facilities. 350   FERC’s 
permitting responsibility extends to interstate pipelines and 
associated facilities such as compressor stations, as well as 
natural gas storage facilities, and liquified natural gas import 
and export terminals.351  As FERC has explained, “[i]t is well 
established law that the NGA preempts state and local agencies 
from regulating the construction and operation of interstate 
pipeline facilities or the siting of those facilities.”352  As a result, 
FERC regulation serves as the primary mechanism for ensuring 
that pipelines will be built in the public interest. 
 
349 See Christopher E. Smith, Near-Term Pipeline Plans Nearly Double, Future Slows, 
OIL & GAS J. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-116/issue-
2/special-report-worldwide-pipeline-construction/near-term-pipeline-plans-nearly-
double-future-slows.html [https://perma.cc/R4XS-ZMN3]. 
350 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2018).  For a history of natural gas infrastructure development and 
regulation see Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 28, at 989–1015. 
351 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2018 (giving FERC authority for the permitting of facilities used in 
the export or import of natural gas). 
352 Millennium Pipeline Company, LLC, 141 FERC ¶ 61,198, at P 68 (2012) (citing Nat’l 
Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 894 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
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FERC exercises its responsibility through the issuance of 
“certificates of public convenience and necessity.” 353   Such 
certificates are required before a company can construct, extend, 
acquire, or operate any facilities for the interstate 
transportation of natural gas.354  A pipeline developer submits a 
certificate application to FERC pursuant to regulations 
outlining the application process. 355   FERC’s role is to then 
determine whether the proposed project “is or will be required 
by the present or future public convenience and necessity.”356  
When evaluating a proposed project, FERC can accept the 
application, reject the application, or accept the application with 
“such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience 
and necessity may require.”357 
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis in a Supporting Rule 
FERC’s approach to evaluating proposed natural gas projects 
has changed over time in response to changes in the industry.358  
The most recent significant revision to FERC’s approach came 
in 1999, with the issuance of what FERC calls the “1999 Policy 
Statement,” 359  spurred by changes in the natural gas 
industry. 360   FERC instituted a process of deregulation and 
restructuring that led to a substantial increase in the supply of 
and demand for natural gas, and a substantial buildout of 
natural gas infrastructure.361  This resulted in growing public 
 
353 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (2018); 18 C.F.R. pt. 157. 
354 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (2018). 
355 Id. at § 717f(d). 
356 Id. at § 717f(e). 
357 Id. at § 717f(e).  FERC may grant conditional certificates that require compliance with 
other obligations such as Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act permitting.  See Del. 
Riverkeeper Network v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 857 F.3d 388, 399 (D.C. Cir. 
2017) (upholding FERC certificate conditioned on Clean Water Act compliance); 
Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1320–21 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (upholding FERC certificate conditioned on Clean Air Act compliance). 
358  See Robert Christin, Paul Korman & Michael Pincus, Considering the Public 
Convenience and Necessity in Pipeline Certificate Cases Under the Natural Gas Act, 38 
ENERGY L.J. 115, 121–31 (2017) (recounting the evolution of FERC’s interpretation of 
“public convenience and necessity” as the natural gas industry evolved). 
359 1999 Policy Statement, supra note 16. 
360 TIERNEY, supra note 28, at 7, 14–36 (“FERC had been exploring issues related to then-
current policies on certification and pricing of pipeline projects in light of changes that 
had taken place in the industry leading up to the late 1990s”). 
361 Christin et al., supra note 358, at 123–25 (describing industry changes). 
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concern that FERC’s approach to pipeline project approvals—
which primarily turned on whether a proposed project had 
contracts or other expressions of interest from customers—was 
serving private developers instead of the public interest. 362  
FERC issued its 1999 Policy Statement to help FERC balance 
“market demand against potential adverse environmental 
impacts and private property rights in weighing whether a 
project is required by the public convenience and necessity.”363  
FERC’s intention, therefore, appeared to be to use tools that 
were becoming more entrenched in the cost-benefit state to make 
better informed decisions.  This is reflected in FERC’s goal of 
“provid[ing] appropriate incentives for the optimal level of 
[pipeline] construction and efficient customer choices.”364 
The 1999 Policy Statement sought to accomplish these goals 
through a three-step process.  First, in order to receive a 
certificate, an existing pipeline must meet a “threshold 
requirement” that it will not rely on cross-subsidization from 
existing customers.365  Second, FERC “balance[es] the evidence 
of public benefits to be achieved against the residual adverse 
effects.”366  FERC will approve a project “only when the benefits 
outweigh the adverse effects on economic interests.”367  FERC 
characterizes this step as the “economic test” or “balancing 
test.”368  The Policy Statement describes a number of potential 
“indicators of public benefit” that FERC will consider when 
evaluating a project.  This includes “meeting unserved demand, 
eliminating bottlenecks, access to new supplies, lower costs to 
consumers, providing new interconnects that improve the 
interstate grid, providing competitive alternatives, increasing 
electric reliability, or advancing clean air objectives.”369   The 
Policy Statement explains that FERC will evaluate the adverse 
consequences of a pipeline project on at least the following 
interests:  “interests of existing customers of the pipeline 
applicant,” interests of existing pipelines that already serve the 
 
362 Id. at 126. 
363 1999 Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 61,737. 
364 Id. at 61,743. 
365 Id. at 61,746. 
366 Id. at 61,745. 
367 Id. 
368 Id. 
369 Id. at 61,748. 
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market,” “and “interests of landowners and surrounding 
communities.”370  Third, for projects that pass the economic test, 
FERC moves to an environmental review. 371   This review 
involves consideration of the environmental consequences of the 
pipeline that are described in an EIS or EA prepared pursuant 
to the requirements of NEPA.372  In practice, in order to facilitate 
a more expeditious FERC decision on a certificate application, 
almost all applicants take advantage of a pre-filing procedure 
that allows FERC to begin its NEPA review before or concurrent 
with its economic test.373  Nonetheless, adverse environmental 
consequences of a project do not factor into the balancing test.374  
FERC has not clearly delineated a methodology for 
incorporating the consequences described in its NEPA review 
into its decision of whether the project is in the public interest 
in light of the benefits and adverse consequences it evaluates in 
the economic test. 
At a time of transition in the natural gas industry, FERC 
issued a Policy Statement that uses the language of cost benefit 
balancing, and suggested it intended to rely on such balancing 
when evaluating new projects.  However, as the next section 
describes, in practice, FERC has not adopted cost benefit 
analysis. 
3. FERC’s Constrained Approach to Approving Natural Gas 
Infrastructure 
As the Policy Statement has been implemented over the last 
twenty years, FERC does not actually apply cost-benefit analysis 
as its decision making framework.375  First, FERC’s approach is 
not generally quantitative.  Recently, FERC has been explicit, 
describing its economic test as “qualitative,” and claiming it does 
“not monetize benefits or monetize adverse economic effects.”376  
 
370 Id. at 61,747–48. 
371 Id. at 61,745. 
372 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. 
373 See Christin et al., supra note 358, at 131. 
374 Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 116 FERC ¶ 61,182, 61,781 (Aug. 25, 2006) (the 
“economic test . . . precedes an environmental analysis.  The Commission . . . thus did 
not err by failing to balance project need and benefits against adverse environmental 
impacts”). 
375 SMP Project Remand Order, supra note 62, at PP 39–44. 
376 Id. at P 43. 
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FERC’s “weighing” of costs and benefits is, therefore, not 
objective but subjective.  And, orders approving pipeline 
certificates do not typically explain why FERC believes a given 
level of benefits are sufficient to justify the types of adverse 
impacts that will result from a project.377 
The costs and benefits that FERC considers in practice are 
also narrower than would be used in a rigorous, sophisticated 
cost-benefit analysis.  In its 1999 Policy Statement, FERC 
committed to moving away from its prior approach of looking 
almost exclusively at whether a project developer had signed 
contracts as a sufficient demonstration of public need for the 
pipeline.378  However, since 1999, FERC has characterized the 
Policy Statement as permitting but not requiring FERC to look 
beyond the existence of contracts between developers and 
customers, 379   and FERC has exercised its discretion to rely 
primarily or exclusively on contracts. 380   FERC’s reliance 
primarily on contracts has garnered substantial criticism among 
 
377  Compare Spire STL Pipeline LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,085, at P 123 (Aug. 3, 2018) 
[hereafter “Spire STL Certificate Order”] (providing cursory and conclusory statement 
regarding why benefits outweigh harms) with id. at 61,527–31 (Glick, Comm’r, 
dissenting) (engaging in a more thorough weighing of costs and benefits). 
378 1999 Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 61,744 (the “amount of capacity under 
contract . . . is not a sufficient indicator by itself” of need). 
379 Spire STL Certificate Order, supra note 377, at P 72 (emphasis added) (characterizing 
contracts to be “substantial and sufficient evidence of need”). 
380 Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 158 FERC ¶ 61,145, 61,955 (Feb. 3, 2017) (Bay, Comm’r, 
separate statement) (“The certificate policy statement, which was issued in 1999, lists a 
litany of factors for the Commission to consider in evaluating need.  Yet, in practice, the 
Commission has largely relied on the extent to which potential shippers have signed 
precedent agreements for capacity on the proposed pipeline”); Mountain Valley Pipeline, 
LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,043, at PP 38–42 (2017) (relying on precedent agreements to 
support a project notwithstanding market studies presented by stakeholders that 
question whether there is sufficient demand for additional transportation service); Spire 
STL Certificate Order, supra note 377, at 61,528 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) (explaining 
that FERC relied on a single precedent agreement despite evidence that the pipeline 
would not increase access to gas in the region); PennEast Pipeline Co., 162 FERC ¶ 
61,053, 2018 WL 487260, at *71 & n.242 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) (FERC 
“relies exclusively on the existence of precedent agreements with shippers to conclude 
that the PennEast Project is needed”). 
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the public. 381   It has also raised litigation risk for project 
approvals.382 
When evaluating costs, the Policy Statement claims to 
consider “all the affected interests” including “the general 
societal interests.” 383   But FERC does not include the 
environmental harms it has cataloged as part of the NEPA 
process in its balancing test.384  Therefore, it is not clear what 
level or type of environmental consequences would tip the scales 
and lead a project to be rejected.  In fact, FERC has never 
rejected a certificate on the basis of the environmental harm that 
will be caused by the pipeline project.385 
In short, while FERC’s description of its decision-making 
process for evaluating pipeline certificates uses the language of 
costs and benefits, FERC has not actually embraced cost-benefit 
analysis in practice. 
B. FERC Should Adopt an Expanded Cost Benefit 
Requirement 
We are again at a time of transition in the natural gas sector.  
Advances in technology—primarily hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal drilling—have enabled a significant increase in the 
 
381 Comments of Public Interest Organizations at 23–41, Certification of New Natural 
Gas Facilities, 163 FERC ¶ 61,138 http://friendsofnelson.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/07/Comments-of-the-Public-Interest-Organizations-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AXA7-WT7G] (explaining that FERC’s reliance on contracts between 
developers and customers is inconsistent with the NGA and the 1999 Policy Statement; 
increases the risk of stranded assets; and incentivizes overbuilding). 
382  See Joint Brief of Petitioners N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Del. and Raritan Canal 
Comm’n, and N.J. Div. of the Rate Counsel at 15–21, Del. River Keeper Network v. 
FERC, (No. 18-1128) (filed Dec. 21, 2018). 
383 1999 Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 61,747. 
384 See ROMANY M. WEBB, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE, FERC, 
AND NATURAL GAS PIPELINES:  THE LEGAL BASIS FOR CONSIDERING GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE NATURAL GAS ACT 25–27 (2019), 
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2019/06/Webb-2019-06-Climate-Change-FERC-
and-Natural-Gas-Pipelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UGZ-2AKQ]. 
385 FERC has rejected only two natural gas infrastructure certificates, neither of which 
were denied on the basis of the project’s environmental harm.  See Jordan Cove Energy 
Project, L.P., 154 FERC ¶ 61,190, at PP 39, 47 (Mar. 11, 2016) (finding limited public 
need and harm to landowners, without considering environmental harms); Turtle Bayou 
Gas Storage Co., 135 FERC ¶ 61,233, at PP 33–35 (2011) (rejecting project because of 
limited benefit compared to adverse impact on a landowner, without reaching 
environmental consequences). 
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domestic production of natural gas at lower costs. 386   This 
technology has unlocked natural gas supplies in geologic shale 
formations that are often located in different areas of the U.S. 
from where natural gas extraction has been dominant.387  At the 
same time, as a result of advances in electric generation 
technology and low-cost gas supplies, the electric system has 
become a substantial new user of natural gas.388  As a result, the 
changing economics of natural gas extraction and consumption 
have led to a significant increase in demand for new natural gas 
infrastructure to connect new supplies to new and existing 
markets.389  FERC is under substantial pressure from politicians 
and industry to approve the construction of new natural gas 
infrastructure; 390  while at the same time FERC is under 
substantial pressure from states, community groups, and 
environmental organizations to proceed cautiously in order to 
minimize the disruption to landowners, communities, and the 
environment—in particular climate change. 391   Given this 
transition, and FERC’s competing objectives in helping to 
manage it, now is an apt time to fulfill the promise of the 1999 
Policy Statement and fully embrace cost-benefit analysis as it 
evaluates natural gas infrastructure. 
Recently, when faced with a request that it monetize the 
consequences of greenhouse gas emissions, FERC put forth a 
series of explanations for why it has not embraced cost-benefit 
 
386 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 28, at 999–1000 (discussing the growth of U.S. natural 
gas production caused by technological changes). 
387 Policy Statement NOI, supra note 28, at P 21 (describing changes in natural gas 
production location, including substantial increases in volume in Pennsylvania, West 
Virginia, Ohio, and New York and new development in North Dakota). 
388 TIERNEY, supra note 28, at 23–24 (showing increasing usage of gas in the electric 
power sector). 
389 Policy Statement NOI, supra note 28, at P 21 (describing the increase in pipeline 
certificate applications since 2010). 
390  PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45239, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS 
PIPELINE SITING: FERC POLICY AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 14, 17–19 (2018), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45239/5 [https://perma.cc/R53S-26NU] 
(describing executive orders and proposed legislation intended to streamline and speed 
FERC’s pipeline certificate review process); see, e.g., Tom Johnson, PennEast Wants 
Fast-Track Approval from FERC for $1B Pipeline, NJSPOTLIGHT (Aug. 14, 2017) 
https://www.njspotlight.com/2017/08/17-08-13-penneast-wants-fast-track-approval-
from-ferc-for-its-1b-pipeline/ [https://perma.cc/MYB4-7RUY]. 
391 TIERNEY, supra note 28, at 29–30 (describing increased opposition to natural gas 
pipelines from a diversity of stakeholders). 
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analysis.392  However, none of FERC’s arguments are ultimately 
persuasive. 393 
First, FERC pointed to regulations from the Council on 
Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) that do not require use of cost-
benefit analysis for NEPA reviews.394  However, that CEQ does 
not require FERC to use cost-benefit analysis is not itself a 
justification for FERC failing to use the tool for all of the reasons 
explored in Part II.  CEQ regulations govern agencies’ 
responsibilities for complying with NEPA.395  This justification, 
therefore, does not implicate FERC’s decision regarding how to 
evaluate whether a project is required for the public convenience 
and necessity under the NGA.  Agencies regularly monetize 
costs and benefits in order to make decisions consistent with 
their statutory responsibilities separate from the NEPA analysis 
that is conducted pursuant to CEQ regulations.396 
In fact, FERC has previously used a limited form of cost-
benefit analysis to make certain decisions under the NGA.  In 
1994, FERC evaluated an application for abandonment of a 
certificated liquified natural gas facility through a sale and 
leaseback proposal, pursuant to NGA Section 7(b).397  In order to 
facilitate its evaluation of whether the “present or future public 
convenience or necessity permit such abandonment,”398 FERC 
 
392 SMP Project Remand Order, supra note 62, at PP 39–44.  While the SMP Project 
Remand Order presents FERC’s first detailed justification for its decision not use cost-
benefit analysis, it is not FERC’s first mention of the prospect of using cost-benefit 
analysis in the certificate process.  In a 2003 final EIS, FERC explained that its review 
of socioeconomic impacts as part of its NEPA review does not require a “rigorous cost-
benefit analysis.”  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Final Environmental Impact 
Statement for the Greenbrier Pipeline Project, M–88, (2003). 
393 FERC has also repeated the justifications provided in Florida Southeast Connection 
in a number of subsequent decisions regarding pipeline certificates.  See, e.g., 
Millennium Pipeline Company, LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,039, at PP 25–28 (July 19, 2018); 
DTE Midstream Appalachia, LLC, 162 FERC ¶ 61,238, at P 80 (Mar. 15, 2018). 
394 SMP Project Remand Order, supra note 62, at P 40. 
395 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (2012). 
396  See California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding Department of 
Interior use of cost-benefit analysis when managing offshore oil and gas leasing); The 
Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (proposed Aug. 24, 2018) (using 
cost-benefit analysis to evaluate proposed fuel economy standards for passenger vehicles 
while conducting a separate environmental impact statement to comply with NEPA). 
397 Northern Natural Gas Company and Continental Gas Storage, 66 FERC ¶ 61,092 
(1994) [hereafter Northern Natural Gas Order]. 
398 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (2012). 
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“developed cost-benefit analyses” of the applicant’s proposed 
rate treatment and the traditional cost-of-service model. 399  
Relying on those analyses, FERC found that the proposal would 
result in substantial operation and maintenance cost increases 
without commensurate benefits, as compared to the alternative, 
and so rejected the proposal.400 
Second, FERC argued that it does not use cost-benefit analysis 
“because siting infrastructure necessarily involves making 
qualitative judgments between different resources as to which 
there is no agreed-upon quantitative value.”401  But, the need to 
make qualitative judgments is true for most agencies that 
regularly perform cost-benefit analyses.  Even where benefits 
cannot be quantified, they can still be taken into account.  
Moreover, most of the relevant costs and benefits for evaluating 
whether a project is required for the public convenience and 
necessity—the value of additional natural gas, the reduction in 
consumer prices, the cost to construct a pipeline, the direct 
emission of greenhouse gases—can be readily monetized using 
tools available to FERC. 402   In fact, FERC uses cost-benefit 
analysis when making infrastructure approval decisions in the 
context of hydroelectric dam license applications,403 and has not 
explained why monetization would be appropriate for 
hydroelectric infrastructure projects but not natural gas 
projects. 
Third, FERC reasoned that “Commission staff lacked 
quantified information about all of the costs and benefits of the 
project.”404  As the D.C. Circuit recently concluded, FERC can 
require applicants to provide information needed to more fully 
evaluate the consequences of a project.405  Even if there is not 
sufficient information for all costs and benefits to be monetized, 
that does not foreclose the use of cost-benefit analysis, and the 
use of cost-benefit analysis does not foreclose qualitative 
 
399 Northern Natural Gas Order, supra note 397, at 61,134. 
400 Id. at 61,135.  In this proceeding, FERC primarily looked at the private costs and 
benefits as between the LNG terminal owner and existing customers and so is not as 
comprehensive as the analysis that FERC should conduct when evaluating pipeline 
certificate applications.  
401 SMP Project Remand Order, supra note 62, at P 40. 
402 See Part IV(b), infra. 
403 See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note  67, and accompanying text. 
404 SMP Project Remand Order, supra note 62, at P 40. 
405 Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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consideration of costs and benefits that cannot be monetized.  
For those costs and benefits for which monetization is possible, 
they can be directly included in a cost-benefit analysis.  For those 
that cannot be monetized, FERC can describe the consequences 
qualitatively.  When quantification is not possible, FERC can 
present the issue qualitatively.406  FERC can then exercise its 
expert judgment—potentially with the help of break-even 
analysis—to evaluate the extent to which unmonetized costs and 
benefits are significant enough to change its decision regarding 
whether a project is in the public interest.407  Supplementing 
cost-benefit analysis with qualitative assessments is common 
practice, 408  and can allow FERC to conduct a more holistic 
evaluation of a pipeline certificate.  This type of hybrid analysis 
is consistent with Circular A-4.409 
Fourth, FERC argued that cost-benefit analysis would be 
“misleading” because it would “necessarily be based on multiple 
assumptions.” 410   However, agencies, including executive 
agencies that conduct cost-benefit analyses as required by 
Executive Order 12,866, regularly are required to make 
assumptions regarding uncertain consequences such as future 
market conditions and other inputs when analyzing their 
actions.411  The use of assumptions, so long as they are disclosed 
and supported by evidence, does not make an analysis 
misleading.412  Circular A-4 recommends the use of sensitivity 
 
406 CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 27.  While CIRCULAR A-4 was issued in 2003 to guide 
agency analyses that accompany proposed and final regulations, the principles are 
applicable to review of individual projects.  See Jayni Hein, Federal Lands and Fossil 
Fuels:  Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal Energy Leasing, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
1, 48–49 (2018). 
407 CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing break-even analysis). 
408 See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 306–08 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(upholding the Department of Interior’s use of a combination of cost-benefit analysis and 
qualitative factors to determine which areas to include in an offshore leasing program). 
409 CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 27 (“If monetization is impossible, explain why and 
present all available quantitative information. . . . You should describe the timing and 
likelihood of such effects and avoid double-counting of benefits when estimates of 
monetized and physical effects are mixed in the same analysis.”). 
410 SMP Project Remand Order, supra note 62, at P 41. 
411 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d 189, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“an agency 
must engage in ‘reasonable forecasting and speculation’” as part of its evaluation of 
environmental consequences). 
412 See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 3 (“For transparency’s sake, you should state in 
your report what assumptions were used, such as the time horizon for the analysis and 
the discount rates applied to future benefits and costs”). 
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analysis, which “examine[s] how the results of [an agency’s] 
analysis vary with plausible changes in assumptions, choices of 
input data, and alternative analytical approaches.”413  In fact, 
the countervailing assumption FERC makes by not quantifying 
and monetizing climate damages—that there is no reasonably 
foreseeable consequence—is itself misleading.  For example, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found an 
agency’s failure to monetize the climate damages of vehicle 
emission standards “put a thumb on the scale” of its decision 
because, while there were uncertainties in the calculation of 
climate damages, the value was clearly not zero, yet by failing to 
provide any estimate, the agency treated the decision as if it 
would result in no climate damages.414  FERC’s decision not to 
monetize climate damages is similarly misleading because it 
leads the Commission to disclaim consideration of the costs of 
upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions.415 
Not all Commissioners agreed with FERC’s rejection of cost-
benefit analysis as a useful tool for evaluating pipeline 
certificate applications.  In a partial dissent to the rehearing 
order, Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur acknowledged that the 
Commission’s historic practice has been to not use a monetized 
cost-benefit analysis to evaluate pipeline projects.416  But she did 
not embrace the Commission’s justification for that failure.  
Rather, she attributed the failure to use cost-benefit analysis to 
the fact that “to date, we have not sought to develop the record 
with evidence that would [sic] that support this type of cost-
benefit approach to our pipeline reviews.” 417   Commissioner 
LaFleur advocated for a more comprehensive evaluation of 
monetized costs and benefits in the certificate process.418  She 
 
413 CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 41; id. at 3 (“It is usually necessary to provide a 
sensitivity analysis to reveal whether, and to what extent, the results of the analysis are 
sensitive to plausible changes in the main assumptions and numeric inputs”). 
414 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 
1198–1200 (9th Cir. 2008). 
415 Gulf LNG, supra note 86, at P 4 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting). 
416 SMP Project Remand Order, supra note 62, at *17 (2018 WL 1364645) (LaFleur, 
Comm’r, dissenting in part). 
417 Id. 
418 Id. at *18 (“I believe that the best way to address climate change and the Social Cost 
of Carbon in pipeline dockets would be for the Commission to develop a more complete 
record on costs and benefits of the proposed project, including more information on the 
need for a project, the likely end-uses of the transported gas, and the alternatives.”). 
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reasoned that “increased openness” facilitated by a more 
transparent consideration of costs and benefits will “enhance 
public confidence in the Commission’s natural gas pipeline 
certification decision-making process.”419 
C. Statutory Authority 
FERC would be on firm legal ground if it adopted cost-benefit 
analysis as a framework for evaluating pipeline certificate 
applications. 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Public Convenience and 
Necessity Standard 
FERC’s task under Section 7 of the NGA is to determine if an 
interstate natural gas facility is, “or will be[,] required by the 
present or future public convenience and necessity.”420  The NGA 
does not define “public convenience and necessity.”  However, by 
adopting that standard in 1938, Congress drew on a long history 
of its use in state public utility regulation.421  In a 1979 article, 
William K. Jones explored the history of the certificate of public 
convenience and necessity as a means of regulating public 
service companies.422  Jones found five longstanding rationales 
for the requirement that a company receive a certificate that 
informed states’ decisions for when to issue such certificates.  
One of the key rationales that Jones identified was “the 
protection of the community against social costs.”423  According 
to Jones, states used certificate authority to limit the 
“divergence between social costs and benefits, on the one hand, 
and entrepreneurial costs and benefits, on the other, [which] 
could lead to entrepreneurial decisions at variance with socially 




420 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (2018). 
421  See WEBB, supra note 384, at 8–12 (discussing legislative history of “public 
convenience and necessity” language). 
422 William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity:  
Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426 (1979). 
423 Id. at 428. 
424 Id. at 511. 
425 Id. 
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Consistent with that history, courts have interpreted the 
public convenience and necessity standard under the NGA to 
encompass “all factors bearing on the public interest.”426  This 
capacious authority provides FERC with substantial discretion.  
In a 1961 case considering FERC’s Section 7 authority, the 
Supreme Court held that as “the guardian of the public interest,” 
FERC is entrusted “with a wide range of discretionary 
authority.”427  Given its “wide discretion to balance competing 
equities,”428 FERC can elect to consider certificate applications 
on the basis of whether a project will maximize social welfare as 
measured by comparing the combination of monetized and 
qualitative costs and benefits.429  The text of the NGA does not 
explicitly prohibit FERC from monetizing or quantitatively 
comparing the benefits and costs of a project as its chosen 
method for evaluating the public interest, and statutory silence 
cannot be read as a prohibition.430 
As the Supreme Court described, “the term ‘public convenience 
and necessity’ connotes a flexible balancing process, in the 
course of which all the factors are weighed prior to final 
determination.” 431   A cost-benefit analysis framework would 
involve FERC quantification and monetization of costs and 
benefits when possible.  Tools such as break-even analysis and 
expert judgment can be used to evaluate those costs and benefits 
 
426 Atl. Refining Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959).  See also Mo. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 234 F.3d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that issuing a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity to transport or sell natural gas requires 
the Commission to “evaluate all factors bearing on the public interest.” (quoting Atl. 
Refining Co., 360 U.S. at 391)); Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. FERC, 955 F.2d 1412, 1421 
(10th Cir. 1992) (when evaluating a project, “the Commission must consider all factors 
bearing on the public interest, not simply those immediately relating to the objects of its 
jurisdiction.”). 
427 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp. (Transco), 365 U.S. 1, 7 (1961) 
(quoting United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., 326 U.S. 236, 241 (1945). 
428 Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 750 F.2d 105, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
429 See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 217 (2009) (holding that under 
Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), agency interpretation of its 
obligation to set standards based on the “best technology available” reasonably could be 
read to permit setting standards based on a cost-benefit analysis). 
430 Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 222 (“The inference that respondents and the dissent would 
draw from the silence is, in any event, implausible, as § 1326(b) is silent not only with 
respect to cost-benefit analysis but with respect to all potentially relevant factors.  If 
silence here implies prohibition, then the EPA could not consider any factors in 
implementing § 1326(b)—an obvious logical impossibility.”). 
431 Transco, 365 U.S. at 23. 
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that cannot be readily quantified and monetized.  This is the 
hallmark of a process that is “flexible” while also ensuring that 
“all factors” are “weighed” as part of a pipeline certificate 
decision. 
The use of cost-benefit analysis in order to make decisions that 
maximize social welfare can also help FERC meet its analytical 
obligations under the NGA.  When FERC “articulate[s] the 
critical facts upon which it relies” to review public convenience 
and necessity, “[a] passing reference to relevant factors . . . is not 
sufficient to satisfy the Commission’s obligation to carry out 
‘reasoned’ an ‘principled’ decision making.  [Courts] have 
repeatedly required the Commission to ‘fully articulate the basis 
for its decision.’” 432   Systematic analysis that quantifies and 
monetizes the benefits and costs that FERC considers to be 
relevant, and then weighs those benefits and costs against each 
other will help FERC “fully articulate” its decision and avoid the 
sense that it gave only “passing reference” to some of the factors 
bearing on the public interest. 
2. The Scope of Costs and Benefits FERC May Consider 
By directing FERC to consider “all factors,” court decisions 
interpreting the NGA are consistent with a decision making 
framework that seeks to maximize social welfare by looking 
broadly at the scope of costs and benefits that may be the result 
of a project.  Moreover, in order to consider the public interest, 
FERC must necessarily look beyond the private interests of the 
applicant.433  Cost-benefit analysis allows FERC to consider a 
broad set of social interests that will be affected by new pipeline 
infrastructure and exercise its judgment to approve a project 
only when the benefits outweigh the costs on net. 
Recently, in Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that it would not be rational for EPA to adopt an interpretation 
of “appropriate” in a way that permits the agency to ignore costs 
 
432 Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 234 F.3d 36, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 
433 FERC may not presently be required to evaluate the benefits of pipelines beyond those 
that accrue to market participants.  Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. 
FERC, 762 F.3d 97, 111 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that FERC was not required to 
look beyond the market need reflected by the applicant’s existing contracts with shippers 
to establish a project’s public benefits).  However, nothing prohibits it from doing so and, 
given the opportunity, it should consider the broader benefits of additional natural gas 
supply into a market. 
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because “appropriate” is “the classic broad and all-encompassing 
term that naturally and traditionally includes consideration of 
all the relevant factors.”434  So too would it be irrational for FERC 
to adopt an interpretation that permits the agency to ignore key 
categories of costs (or benefits) when evaluating the public 
convenience and necessity of a natural gas project based on “all 
relevant factors.” 
As in the case of electric sector regulation, FERC has cited to 
NAACP v. FPC to suggest that FERC may be constrained from 
treating the public convenience and necessity test as a question 
of pure welfare maximization.435  But the question at issue in 
NAACP did not involve the proper interpretation of “public 
convenience and necessity.”  Rather, the Court considered 
whether either the term “just and reasonable” as used in the 
ratemaking sections of the FPA and NGA or the term “public 
interest” as used in the general purpose sections of the FPA and 
NGA were sufficient to justify Commission rulemaking 
establishing non-discrimination requirements for public 
utilities. 436   As discussed above, “public convenience and 
necessity” has historically included consideration of a broad 
range of effects on parties beyond just the producers and 
consumers involved in electric and natural gas transactions. 
Moreover, the constraint that FERC should look to the 
purposes of the NGA when evaluating the scope of its obligations 
to advance the public interest need not meaningfully limit 
FERC’s use of cost-benefit analysis as its decision making 
framework.  All relevant costs and benefits, including the 
benefits to consumers of natural gas, the costs of pipeline 
construction, and social costs such as environmental and climate 
consequences of a project all clearly fall within the purposes of 
the NGA.  They are therefore readily available for FERC to 
consider as part of a welfare-maximizing framework. 
 
434 Michigan v. U.S Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (quoting White 
Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 748 F.3d 1222, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (emphasis added). 
435 Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 61,128, at P 43 (2018) [hereinafter New 
Market Rehearing Order] (arguing that NAACP, 425 U.S. 662, supports FERC’s position 
that it need not consider upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions under the 
NGA). 
436 NAACP, 425 U.S. at 666. 
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The ability of new pipeline infrastructure to enable additional 
consumption of natural gas and lower prices for consumers is at 
the heart of the NGA.  As the Supreme Court explained in 
NAACP, the “principal purpose” of the NGA is “to encourage the 
orderly development of plentiful supplies of . . . natural gas at 
reasonable prices.”437  The purposes of the NGA are also broad 
enough to permit FERC to consider, monetize, and weigh a wide 
range of social impacts.438  This includes the benefits and costs 
associated with the downstream use of natural gas, such as the 
effect on gas prices and the environmental effects of gas use. 
In a 1961 case, the Supreme Court tacitly acknowledged that 
the downstream effects of natural gas pipeline construction were 
an important part of the Commission’s public interest 
determination.  In FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. 
(Transco), the Court considered a challenge to a Commission 
decision to deny a proposed pipeline project a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity based on an evaluation of “policy” 
factors such as the pipeline’s effect on downstream conservation 
and end use price of natural gas. 439   The Court held that 
Congress intended the Section 7 language to give the 
Commission broad (though not unlimited) discretion in 
evaluating the public interest and that the Commission acted 
within that authority even when considering how a pipeline 
would affect activity that was not within its jurisdiction.440  This 
included the downstream costs of inefficient use of natural gas 
and increasing retail prices. 441   The Court also adopted 
reasoning that downstream air pollution was a public interest 
factor that the Commission could consider when it accepted the 
Commission’s expert judgment that the pipeline at issue would 
not sufficiently advance clear air objectives to overcome the 
Commission’s concerns about inefficient end use.442 
 
437 Id. at 670. 
438 See Fla. Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 604 F.3d 636, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (FERC’s “section 7 duty to consider the 
public interest is broader than promoting a plentiful supply of cheap gas, as important 
as that policy may be.”). 
439 Transco, 365 U.S. at 23. 
440 Id. at 26, 28. 
441 Id. at 22, 25; id. at 41–42 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
442 Id. at 30; id. at 42 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining 
that on remand the Commission should take a closer look at whether downstream air 
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The Supreme Court’s later decision in NAACP does not 
undermine the decision in Transco that the Commission can 
consider social costs of additional pipeline capacity when 
evaluating whether a project is in the public interest.  As the 
Supreme Court explained in NAACP, the Commission’s primary 
role under the NGA is to “encourage the orderly development of 
plentiful supplies . . . of natural gas at reasonable prices.”443 The 
use of “orderly” suggests reasoned decision making, which 
necessarily entails considering factors that are the consequence 
of a particular action at issue.  In a footnote, the Supreme Court 
also specifically identified “subsidiary purposes” of the NGA that 
“the Commission has authority to consider,” including 
“conservation, environmental, and antitrust questions.”444 
Numerous courts have used these citations to confirm that 
FERC has authority to consider a range of benefits and costs 
implicated by a pipeline project, including environmental costs, 
when evaluating a certificate application.445  And, if there was 
any doubt, in the 2017 case overturning FERC’s approval of the 
Sabal Trail Project, the D.C. Circuit made clear that 
consideration of downstream environmental consequences of 
jurisdictional pipelines facilities is part of FERC’s obligation to 
consider the public interest under Section 7:  “Congress broadly 
instructed the agency to consider the public convenience and 
necessity when evaluating applications to construct and operate 
interstate pipelines.  FERC will balance the public benefits 
against the adverse effects of the project, including adverse 
environmental effects”446  In the face of FERC intransigence, the 
D.C. Circuit recently reaffirmed that position.447 
Therefore, while FERC may not be permitted to include social 
harms such as discrimination into a cost-benefit framework, it 
is well within its statutory mandate to monetize and then weigh 
 
pollution improvements are sufficient to overcome other concerns in order to justify 
approval of the certificate). 
443 NAACP, 425 U.S. at 669–70 (emphasis added). 
444 Id. at 670 n.6. 
445 E.g., Pub. Util. Comm'n of State of Cal. v. FERC, 900 F.2d 269, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1990); 
Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety, 762 F.3d at 101; Myersville Citizens for a 
Rural Cmty, Inc. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Energy, 867 F.3d 189, 202 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
446 Sierra Club v. FERC (Sabal Trail), 867 F.3d 1357, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (emphasis 
added and citations and quotations omitted). 
447 Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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a wide range of economic and environmental benefits and costs 
associated with a proposed interstate natural gas pipeline. 
D. Applying Cost-Benefit Analysis 
This section describes how cost-benefit analysis can be 
incorporated into FERC’s existing economic test, identifies 
economic tools that FERC can use to quantify and monetize 
relevant costs and benefits, and addresses FERC’s arguments 
for why it does not use cost-benefit analysis in pipeline 
certificate proceedings. 
1. Categories of Costs and Benefits to Consider 
FERC’s decision not to monetize the benefits and costs of 
particular pipeline projects has limited its ability to 
transparently and systematically balance the costs and benefits 
of pipeline projects.  FERC’s qualitative approach leaves it to 
make subjective judgments about whether the benefits of a 
project outweigh the costs.  This has reduced the legitimacy of 
FERC’s pipeline certificate approvals.448  On the other hand, by 
putting the benefits and costs of a project into a common metric 
of dollars, FERC can more transparently evaluate whether the 
public benefits of additional natural gas supply outweigh the 
private and social costs caused by new pipeline projects.  This 
can be done by embracing the principles of FERC’s economic test 
while shifting from qualitative and subjective balancing to a 
more quantitative and formalized approach. 
This section describes how FERC can consider the benefits and 
costs of pipeline projects through the lens of cost-benefit 
analysis. 
a. Expanding Availability and Lowering Price of Natural 
Gas 
The primary benefit of new natural gas infrastructure is the 
expanded availability of natural gas.  This includes supply of gas 
to new consumers and the reduction in price of gas in a 
particular market for existing consumers. 
 
448 Spire STL Certificate Order, supra note 377 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) (explaining 
that FERC’s “anemic review . . . lends credence to the critique that [FERC] does not 
meaningfully review section 7 applications.”). 
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Under FERC’s current approach, FERC does not actually 
consider the benefits of additional gas supplies; it instead merely 
relies on precedent agreements as a proxy for the existing of 
benefits.  Cost-benefit analysis can help FERC more 
systematically and transparently account for the benefits of new 
pipelines as compared to FERC’s current approach of using 
precedent agreements. 
The fact that a natural gas-fired electric generator, chemical 
company, or natural gas distribution utility is willing to sign a 
contract for pipeline service provides little information on the 
magnitude of a project’s benefits beyond the fact that they are 
expected to exceed the private costs of constructing and 
operating the project.  Lacking such an estimate for the 
magnitude of benefits, FERC is unable to rationally evaluate 
whether the project’s benefits exceed the total costs of the 
project, including the external costs to parties other than the 
customer.  Without using consistent metrics, FERC may approve 
projects where the total costs exceed the benefits. 
The existence of a contract to ship gas between two private 
entities says little about the magnitude of public benefit that will 
result from a project.449  Contracts may both overestimate and 
underestimate the public benefits of new pipeline infrastructure.  
They overestimate benefits if existing consumers see higher 
transportation costs without seeing the benefits of additional 
gas.  This is at high risk of occurring when the customer is a gas 
distribution company that is an affiliate of the pipeline 
developer.  Contractual agreements between these entities may 
reflect market power or regulatory capture, rather than the 
existence of true private benefits.450  But they will understate 
the benefits by assuming only the parties to the contract see 
benefits.  Pipelines benefit more than just the customers who 
will directly receive natural gas transportation service.  A 
number of areas, particularly in the northeastern United States, 
have pipeline constraints that push the price of natural gas 
 
449 Spire STL Certificate Order, supra note 377, at 72 (characterizing contracts to be 
“substantial and sufficient evidence of need”) (emphasis added). 
450 See SUSAN F. TIERNEY, ANALYSIS GROUP, FERC’S CERTIFICATION OF NEW INTERSTATE 
NATURAL GAS FACILITIES: REVISING THE 1999 POLICY STATEMENT FOR 21ST CENTURY 
CONDITIONS 21–22 (2019), (describing and citing to arguments for giving little weight to 
affiliate precedent agreements). 
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higher than it would be with additional pipeline capacity.451  
Additional pipeline construction can alleviate constraints and 
push natural gas prices down.452  These low prices do not only 
benefit the customers of a newly constructed pipeline but benefit 
all customers in the region. 
By monetizing the public benefits of additional natural gas 
supplied to the market, FERC can more transparently evaluate 
the benefits of a project.  As FERC explained in the 1999 Policy 
Statement, the public benefits of additional transportation 
capacity primarily consist of “meeting unserved demand” and 
“lower costs to consumers.” 453   These two benefits can be 
quantified and monetized.  New pipeline infrastructure benefits 
consumers by providing access to natural gas where none was 
available before.  The economic value of additional natural gas 
that a project brings to market represents these benefits.454  As 
explained infra, tools are available to FERC to analyze the 
extent to which new pipeline infrastructure will bring additional 
gas supplies to market.  FERC can, therefore, calculate the 
monetized economic value of additional natural gas supplies by 
multiplying the expected net change in natural gas supply 
caused by a project by the price of the natural gas.  New pipeline 
 
451 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., HIGH PRICES SHOW STRESSES IN NEW ENGLAND NATURAL 
GAS DELIVERY SYSTEM (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/ 
review/deliverysystem/2013/pdf/newengland_natgas.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2GY-
ZVQR]; U.S. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, DOCKET NO. AD-6-03-000, WINTER 
2018–19 ENERGY MARKET ASSESSMENT 6 (Oct. 18, 2018) (showing expected pipeline 
constraints and high regional natural gas prices for New England for Winter 2018-2019). 
452 See ICF INT’L, NATURAL GAS PIPELINE AND STORAGE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTIONS 
THROUGH 2030 at 43 (2009) https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=10509 
[https://perma.cc/4UW2-QGDQ] (“The term basis refers to natural gas price differentials 
between regions.  Pipeline rates and tolls do not determine basis.  Instead, basis is 
determined by the opportunity costs to move natural gas between locations.  When there 
is significant excess pipeline capacity between markets . . . basis differentials can be 
quite low . . . . Conversely, in a market where there is a deficiency of pipeline 
capacity˜ . . . basis is the market signal that represents the true opportunity cost 
between regions . . . . Incremental supply and pipeline capacity will tend to reduce basis 
between regions.”). 
453 1999 Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 25. 
454 Note that the benefits of the project are limited to the amount of incremental natural 
gas provided by the project and not necessarily the total amount of natural gas that 
FERC expects the pipeline to transport.  This is because some amount of transported gas 
may displace gas that would have been transported by other pipelines.  See Spire STL 
Certificate Order, supra note 377, at P 107 (“We acknowledge that without new demand, 
existing pipelines in the area will likely see a drop in utilization once supplies begin to 
flow on the project”). 
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infrastructure also benefits existing gas consumers by lowering 
natural gas prices.  The change in natural gas prices caused by 
a pipeline, multiplied by the amount of natural gas supplied in 
the region represents these benefits.  As explained infra, 
economic tools are also available to analyze how new gas 
infrastructure will influence regional natural gas prices. 
b. Construction and Operational Costs 
An important set of costs that FERC can easily quantify and 
monetize are the private costs to construct, operate, and 
maintain a proposed project.  Because capital costs are an 
important factor for determining initial cost-of-service rates for 
new projects, FERC regulations already require applicants to 
provide estimated capital costs, 455  and FERC discloses those 
costs in certificate orders.456  Construction and operating costs 
are also often included in a project’s EIS.457  However, while 
these costs are quantified and monetized, FERC’s decision not to 
use cost-benefit analysis limits the extent to which they can be 
combined with other costs and compared to the benefits of a 
project. 
c. Landowner and Community Costs 
When a certificate is issued, pipeline developers are granted 
authority to exercise eminent domain to take lands necessary to 
construct and operate the pipeline.458  Local landowners face a 
cost in the form of lost welfare from the reduced use of, or 
ownership of, their property.  Additionally, whenever a taking 
 
455 18 CFR § 157.14(a)(14) (requiring submission of capital costs). 
456 E.g., Spire STL Certificate Order, supra note 377, at P 130 (providing cost estimates 
of $220,276,167); DTE Midstream Appalachia, LLC, 162 FERC ¶ 61,238, at PP 19–20 
(2018) (discussing costs, including return on equity of Birdsboro Pipeline Project); 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,036, at P 17 (2018) (discussing first-
year cost of service for project); Northwest Pipeline LLC, 164 FERC ¶ 61,038, at P 4 
(2018) (estimating cost of project to be $47,288,729); Fla. Gas Transmission Co., 13 FERC 
¶ 63,048, 65,247 (1980) (discussing cost estimates of four alternative pipeline projects). 
457 See, e.g., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE GREENBRIER PIPELINE 
PROJECT, supra note 392, at 3-177 (describing construction costs); FED. ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMM’N, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR MIDSHIP 
PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC—MIDCONTINENT SUPPLY HEADER INTERSTATE PIPELINE 
PROJECT, DOCKET NO. CP17-458-000, at 4-119 to 4-120 (2018) (estimating pipeline 
construction and operational labor costs). 
458 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). 
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occurs, the pipeline company is required to provide just 
compensation to the landowner, which constitutes a benefit to 
the landowner.459  A cost benefit analysis can include both these 
costs and benefits in order to inform FERC and the public about 
the effect of the infrastructure project on local landowners.  And 
to the extent there is a systematic difference between landowner 
welfare losses and the compensation provided through eminent 
domain, that net cost (or benefit) should be weighed by FERC 
when evaluating the certificate. 
Pipelines also impose costs on communities through which 
they travel.  A new pipeline can lower property values in a 
community, with diminution extending beyond the property 
owner whose land is taken by the pipeline company.460  Those 
landowners would not receive the benefit of just compensation 
that landowners whose property is taken through eminent 
domain receive.  The change in community property values can 
be estimated and incorporated in a cost-benefit analysis. 
In addition, pipelines may pose significant environmental 
justice concerns.461  The construction and operation of pipelines 
can put vulnerable and disadvantaged communities at greater 
risk of air pollution, water pollution, and safety consequences.  
Environmental justice concerns are difficult to monetize and 
incorporate directly into a cost-benefit analysis. 462  However, 
FERC could employ tools such as equity weighting to monetize 
some distributional consequences of proposed pipelines, 463 
consider issues related to “equity, dignity, fairness, and 
distributive impacts” qualitatively within the cost benefit 
 
459 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation”) (emphasis added). 
460  See SPENCER PHILLIPS ET AL., KEY-LOG ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE 
PENNEAST PIPELINE 6–7 (JAN. 2017), https://www.delawareriverkeeper.org/sites/ 
default/files/Public%20Participation%20Undermined%20Attachment%2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3UFT-UC9Q].  But see Louise Wilde et al., A Long-term Study of the 
Effect of a Natural Gas Pipeline on Residential Property Values, 22 J. REAL EST. 
LITERATURE 47 (2014). 
461 See Friends of Buckingham v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., 947 F.3d 68, 87–92 (4th 
Cir. 2020) (vacating air pollution permit for Atlantic Coast Pipeline due to failure to 
account for environmental justice concerns). 
462  See Stephanie H. Jones, Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts: The Integration of 
Environmental Justice Advocacy and Economic Policy Analysis, 26 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
402, 413–16 (2018).  
463 See id. at 421–26. 
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framework, 464  or present and consider environmental justice 
issues as part of a distributional analysis presented alongside a 
cost-benefit analysis.465 
d. Reliability 
Additional pipeline capacity can also improve reliability of 
electric service by reducing the chance that demand spikes 
caused by extreme weather disrupt the availability of natural 
gas for electric generation.466  Improvements to gas and electric 
system reliability may be more difficult to monetize.  As 
explained in Part III, supra, FERC can rely on methodologies to 
assess the likelihood of natural gas fuel disruption and the 
consequences of that disruption.467  FERC can then monetize the 
reduced risk of supply disruption.  However, if a sophisticated 
analysis that monetizes the reliability improvement of 
additional pipeline capacity is not feasible for an individual 
pipeline certificate proceeding, FERC would still benefit from 
additional quantification of the potential reliability benefits of a 
particular pipeline and can use its expert judgment when 
weighing these nonmonetized benefits along with other 
monetized benefits and costs as part of a comprehensive cost-
benefit analysis. 
 
464 See Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(c), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
465 See Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1570 
(2018). 
466  See ISO NEW ENGLAND, OPERATIONAL FUEL-SECURITY ANALYSIS (2018), 
https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2018/01/20180117_operational_fuel-
security_analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5P7-7WYH] (finding that, under certain 
conditions, pipeline constraints when combined with extreme weather and greater than 
expected generator retirements can pose reliability problems).  This may not always be 
true and so FERC should quantify the specific reliability costs and benefits rather than 
assuming general benefits.  See PJM INTERCONNECTION, FUEL SECURITY ANALYSIS:  A 
PJM RESILIENCE INITIATIVE 1, 38 (2018) (showing that pipeline disruptions only 
marginally change expected system reliability as compared to other more important 
factors). 
467  Existing electric system operator analyses have attempted to analyze the 
consequences of pipeline disruptions.  See PJM INTERCONNECTION, supra note 466, at 
38.  These models do not evaluate the probability of their chosen scenarios and so would 
only provide a component to the analysis FERC needs quantify and monetize the 
reliability benefits of additional pipeline infrastructure. 
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e. Environmental Costs and Benefits 
A set of costs and benefits that FERC currently fails to fully 
consider in its balancing test involve environmental 
consequences.  FERC acknowledges that the balancing test is an 
“economic test” that excludes environmental considerations.468  
But FERC asserts that even if it does not directly weigh the 
environmental consequences detailed in its NEPA review, it 
considers them when deciding whether a project would serve the 
public convenience and necessity.  FERC asserts that it will 
reject an application if it “finds a project to be environmentally 
unacceptable.”469  However, FERC does not define what would 
constitute an unacceptable environmental consequence that 
would be sufficient to take such an action.470 
Cost-benefit analysis can provide a framework to more 
rationally evaluate whether a project is “environmentally 
unacceptable.”  By putting environmental consequences into the 
same metric as other costs and benefits—dollars—cost-benefit 
analysis can facilitate the direct weighing of the project’s 
environmental costs against other benefits and costs.471  Directly 
comparing the environmental costs and benefits of a project with 
other costs and benefits would limit the possibility that FERC 
places too much or too little weight on this category of 
consequences.  This is because failing to quantify the effects of 
an action often leads agencies to ignore the consequences 
entirely when making decisions.472 
The prospect that unquantified costs and benefits are at risk 
of being undervalued is supported by FERC’s treatment of the 
 
468  See 1999 Policy Statement, supra note 16, at 61,745, 61,748 (stating that the 
landowner and surrounding community interests that FERC considers in its balancing 
test “are different in character from other environmental issues considered under 
[NEPA]”). 
469 Millennium Pipeline Co., 141 FERC ¶ 61,198, at P 44 (2012). 
470  One approach that FERC has taken is to consider environmental costs to be 
acceptable so long as they are consistent with other state and federal environmental 
requirements such as Clean Air Act permits.  See id. at P 54.  However, this approach 
ignores the fact that a project that complies with environmental permitting 
requirements may nonetheless impose costs on society.  If these residual costs outweigh 
the public benefits, the project would not be rationally justified even if it complied with 
relevant environmental laws. 
471 As explained infra, environmental economics has developed tools that FERC can use 
to monetize environmental costs and incorporate them into its balancing test. 
472 See Revesz, supra note 53, at 1434–35. 
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climate damages caused by pipeline projects.  FERC has refused 
to consider the climate damage that results from the greenhouse 
gases emitted by upstream production and downstream 
combustion of natural gas transported by a pipeline.473  Nor does 
FERC consider the potential environmental benefits of enabling 
additional natural gas consumption displacing higher emitting 
alternatives such as coal.  However, new pipeline infrastructure 
can result in additional emissions that contributes to climate 
change, or it can result in displacement of higher emitting 
alternatives.  For the same reason that increasing the amount 
of natural gas that can be transported from producing regions to 
consumers will produce benefits such as lower consumer prices, 
new transportation capacity results in additional greenhouse 
gas emissions both upstream and downstream of a pipeline.  
Additional natural gas consumption is only a benefit if it is used.  
Any time natural gas is used by combusting it, it will produce 
greenhouse gas emissions,474 and virtually all natural gas use is 
through combustion.475  Moreover, as a basic principle of supply 
and demand, greater demand for natural gas yields increasing 
financial incentives to develop new supplies. 476  Due to leaks 
during the production process, additional production also results 
in fugitive emissions of methane,477 a potent greenhouse gas.478  
However additional transportation of natural gas use can also 
 
473 See Webb, supra note 384, at 28–31. 
474 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
SINKS: 1990–2016, ANNEX 2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA FOR ESTIMATING CO2 EMISSIONS 
FROM FOSSIL FUEL COMBUSTION, A32, A74–A76, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/ 
files/2018-01/documents/2018_annex_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/SCP8-V2KQ] (describing 
EPA’s methodology for determining the carbon content of pipeline gas that will be 
released to the atmosphere when combusted).  See also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 
CENTER FOR CORPORATE CLIMATE LEADERSHIP, EMISSION FACTORS FOR GREENHOUSE 
GAS INVENTORIES (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-03/docu 
ments/emission-factors_mar_2018_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C5P-TN3Z] (providing 
emission factors for CO2, CH4, and N2O that results from natural gas combustion). 
475  See JAYNI HEIN ET AL., INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, PIPELINE APPROVALS AND 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 25 (2019) (finding that 97% of natural gas is combusted). 
476 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 74–78, 80–81 (5th ed. 2008). 
477 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LABORATORY, LIFE CYCLE ANALYSIS 
OF NATURAL GAS EXTRACTION AND POWER GENERATION, DOE/NETL-2015/1714 at 13–
23, 37 (Aug. 30, 2016) (discussing causes of emissions and estimating emission rates from 
natural gas extraction and processing). 
478 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL LEVEL U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY 
1990-2016: FAST FACTS 3 (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-
04/documents/9509_fastfacts_20180410v2_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T7L-8KJ5]. 
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be an environmental benefit.  Additional gas enables 
construction of new natural gas fired power generators and 
lower natural gas prices can increase the utilization of existing 
natural gas-fired power generators.  Depending on the region, 
electricity mix, and relative costs, this, in turn, can displace 
high-emitting coal, or oil-fired generation, and reduce overall 
emissions. 
The climate consequences of additional upstream and 
downstream natural gas are often substantial.  For example, in 
a 2017 Order granting a certificate for the NEXUS Project, an 
interstate pipeline system to bring natural gas from the 
Appalachian Basin to consumers in northern Ohio, southeastern 
Michigan, and Ontario, Canada, FERC estimated that if the full 
capacity of the pipeline were utilized during a year and 
combusted—what FERC has called a “full burn analysis”479—the 
project could result in up to 22.3 million metric tons per year of 
carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions.480  Each year of emissions 
from the project could cause over $900 million worth of climate 
damages.481  But after a series of orders where FERC quantified 
these emissions,482 in 2018 FERC established a policy that it will 
evaluate upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions 
in only limited circumstances.483  Because FERC only looks at 
 
479 SMP Project Remand Order, supra note 62, at P 24. 
480  See NEXUS Gas Transmission, LLC, 160 FERC ¶ 61,022, at PP 172–73 (2017) 
(estimating 0.8 million metric tons per year (“tpy”) of carbon dioxide-equivalent (“CO2-
e”) emissions from operation, 1.2 million metric typ CO2-e from extraction of natural gas, 
2.4 million metric tpy CO2-e from gas processing, and 17.9 million metric tpy CO2-e from 
end-use combustion).  Notably, these may not all be additional emissions.  FERC’s 
analysis assumed full utilization of the NEXUS Pipeline System and that transported 
gas would all be additional.  See id. at P 173.  In fact, the pipeline is not likely to be used 
at full capacity at all times and natural gas transported by the NEXUS system may 
displace gas transported in other pipeline systems or other fossil fuels that have higher 
emission rates.  Id.; SMP Project Remand Order, supra note 62, at P 24.  A more accurate 
estimate of the net emissions associated with the system would require a more 
sophisticated analysis of the type described infra. 
481 The federal Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases has 
provided a “central value” of $42 per ton of greenhouse gases emitted in 2020 in year 
2007 dollars.  See Interagency Working Group, supra note 324, at 4.  As explained supra, 
this value captures that future stream of climate damages and discounts future damages 
back at a 3% discount rate.  22.3 million tons multiplied by $42 per ton equals $936.6 
million. 
482 See New Market Rehearing Order, supra note 435, at PP 1 n.3, 3 n.6. (LaFleur, 
Comm’r, dissenting) (listing FERC orders that calculated upstream and downstream 
emissions). 
483 See id. at P 44. 
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environmental impacts included in its NEPA review when 
evaluating whether a project supports the public convenience 
and necessity, FERC also fails to consider these impacts under 
the NGA.484 
FERC has argued that it is not able to evaluate upstream and 
downstream greenhouse gas emissions because there is no well-
accepted metric for determining whether a given level of 
emissions is significant.485  Monetization, however, provides just 
such a tool.  By using a common metric, FERC can weigh the 
climate consequences (positive or negative) against the benefits 
of a project and approve a pipeline application when doing so 
maximizes social welfare—that is, when the benefits exceed the 
costs. 
Monetization of the climate consequences of a proposed project 
and alternatives would allow FERC to better assess the tradeoffs 
between approving or denying a project, or between competing 
alternatives.486   FERC can then distinguish between projects 
that have substantial climate consequences and limited public 
benefits and those that have substantial public benefits with 
limited or positive climate consequences.  Even those projects 
that have significant consequences may be in the public interest 
if the public benefit of additional natural gas capacity is 
substantial.  But FERC cannot rationally make such a decision 
without actually weighing the full suite of readily discernible 
consequences against the discernible benefits of a project. 
Climate damages are not the only environmental consequence 
that can be factored into a cost-benefit analysis.  Pipeline 
development may impose ecological harm by disturbing 
 
484 Id. at P 43 (“We are not aware of any basis that indicates the Commission is required 
to consider environmental effects that are outside of our NEPA analysis of the proposed 
action in our determination of whether a project required for the public convenience and 
necessity under section 7(c).”); but see id. at ¶ 61,706–07 (LaFleur, Comm’r, dissenting 
in part) (“NEPA does not circumscribe the public interest standard under the NGA.  Even 
assuming that the majority is correctly interpreting the Commission’s NEPA 
responsibilities, I believe the Commission has broad discretion in considering factors 
bearing on our public interest determination.”). 
485  Id. at P 67 (“Without an accepted methodology, the Commission cannot make a 
finding whether a particular quantity of greenhouse gas emissions poses a significant 
impact on the environment, whether directly or cumulatively with other sources, and 
how that impact would contribute to climate change.”). 
486 The evaluation of competing alternatives can play a large role in FERC’s collaborative 
pre-filing review option.  See 18 C.F.R. § 157.21.  Almost all projects elect to take 
advantage of this process.  See Christin et al., supra note 358, at 130–31. 
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undeveloped or otherwise preserved terrain,487 or by disturbing 
critical habitat needed by an endangered or threated species.488  
The economic value of these harms can be measured using tools 
such as ecosystem services.489 
2. Economic Tools 
Economic tools are available that would allow FERC to 
evaluate the economic and social consequences of proposed 
pipeline projects and to put those consequences in monetized 
terms so that they can be transparently balanced in a cost-
benefit framework. 
In order to quantify and monetize the benefits and costs of a 
natural gas project, FERC must estimate how the project will 
influence upstream production and downstream consumption of 
natural gas, and whether the natural gas supplied by a pipeline 
will displace consumption of other resources.  This type of 
analysis is enabled by sophisticated but available models of the 
natural gas system.  Using these models, FERC can estimate the 
extent to which a pipeline will alleviate bottlenecks, increase 
supplies to a market, and change regional prices of natural gas 
that are available to existing customers.  This information will 
enable FERC to calculate the benefits of a new pipeline project, 
including the economic benefits of additional natural gas 
consumption and the reduction in prices for existing consumers. 
A variety of modeling tools are available to FERC.  ICF 
International has produced the Gas Market Model, which can 
quantify changes in regional natural gas prices caused by 
changes in gas infrastructure.490  This model was originally used 
to simulate gas market changes that would result from the 
completion of a new pipeline connecting Alberta, Canada and 
Chicago and subsequently has been used to complete “[a]nalyses 
 
487 See Sharon Buccino & Gillian Giannetti, A Walk in the Woods:  Pipelines and the 
Appalachian Trail, NRDC.ORG (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/gillian-
giannetti/walk-woods-pipelines-and-appalachian-trail [https://perma.cc/WRT6-9S4U] 
(describing potential disruption to National Park Service managed land from gas 
pipeline development). 
488 See Robert Walton, 4th Circuit Court Vacates Permits for Dominion’s Atlantic Coast 
Pipeline, UTIL. DIVE (July 29, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/4th-circuit-court-
vacates-permits-for-dominions-atlantic-coast-pipeline/559692/ [https://perma.cc/WPG5-
KWAY]. 
489 See supra notes 163 and 164 and accompanying text. 
490 ICF INT’L, supra note 452, at 96–100 (describing the Gas Market Model). 
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of different pipeline expansions.”491  The Gas Market Model also 
includes construction and operation cost estimates that FERC 
can use to estimate the private costs of pipeline construction if 
certificate applicants have not provided sufficiently specific 
information.  The Gas Market Model has been used recently by 
a number of agencies to assess the energy market implications 
of infrastructure approvals.492 
DOE’s Energy Information Agency developed the National 
Energy Modeling System (“NEMS”), which is a publicly-
available integrated energy market model.493  NEMS includes a 
number of modules, including a Natural Gas Transmission and 
Distribution Module, which “models the transmission, 
distribution, and pricing of natural gas,” subject to inputs 
provided in other modules of the model such as natural gas 
demand and production.494  This includes “track[ing] the flows of 
natural gas, and determin[ing] the associated capacity 
expansion requirements in an aggregate pipeline network[.]”495  
NEMS is divided into twelve regions and produces regional 
natural gas price estimates. 496   The Surface Transportation 
Board’s use of NEMS to evaluate the economic and 
environmental impact of approving rail lines to transport coal 
resources has been upheld by the Eighth Circuit. 497   These 
models present FERC with the tools it needs to evaluate the 
changes in gas supply and price that can be used to calculate the 
expected benefits of a proposed project.498 
 
491 See id. at 96. 
492  See SURFACE TRANSP. BD., TONGUE RIVER R.R. CO., INC., DRAFT ENVTL. IMPACT 
STATEMENT C.5-26 (2015) [hereinafter TONGUE RIVER], https://www.stb.gov/decisions/ 
readingroom.nsf/UNID/E7DE39D1F6FD4A9A85257E2A0049104D/$file/AppC_CoalPro
duction.pdf (describing use of Gas Market Model, in combination with other ICF 
International modeling tools to assess market impacts of approval of an additional rail 
line to transport coal). 
493 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANN. ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040 
E-1 (2017) [hereinafter EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK], https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ 
aeo/pdf/0383(2016).pdf [https://perma.cc/LF6X-NQDZ] (describing NEMS model). 
494 Id. at E-4 to E-5. 
495 Id. at E-4. 
496 Id. at E-4 to E-5. 
497 Mayo Found. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 472 F.3d 545, 555–56 (8th Cir. 2006). 
498  For a useful comparison of various comparable models, see generally PETER H. 
HOWARD, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT’S 
MODELING CHOICES FOR THE FEDERAL COAL PROGRAMMATIC REVIEW (2016), 
http://policyintegrity.org/publications/detail/BLM-model-choice [https://perma.cc/X3RC-
J72H]. 
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Economic tools are also available to quantify and monetize the 
climate consequences of new pipeline infrastructure.  As 
described in Part III, supra, the Social Cost of Carbon is a 
widely-accepted and available tool that can be used to 
“estimate[] the monetized climate change damage associated 
with an incremental increase in [carbon dioxide] emissions in a 
given year.” 499   FERC need only multiply the quantity of 
greenhouse gas emissions it attributes to a project by the Social 
Cost of Carbon to arrive at a monetized value of climate damages 
that can be directly incorporated into its economic test. 
The more difficult analytical task is to calculate the quantity 
of greenhouse gas emissions that are attributable to a project.  
However, economic tools are available to facilitate this analysis.  
FERC already calculates the direct greenhouse gas emissions 
anticipated from pipeline construction and operation as part of 
the EA or EIS that it issues for a project.500  Models such as ICF’s 
Gas Market Model and EIA’s NEMS can facilitate a more 
sophisticated quantification of greenhouse gas emissions by 
calculating the additional combustion of natural gas caused by 
new pipeline infrastructure.  These models can be integrated 
with models of the electric system,501  which allows FERC to 
calculate how the addition of natural gas in a regional market 
will lead to substitution of other resources such as coal-fired 
power generation or renewable generation.  Evaluating resource 
substitution can enable a more sophisticated analysis of how 
new gas infrastructure will change net greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Those net changes in greenhouse gas emissions can 
then be monetized using the Social Cost of Carbon. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The energy sector is in a period of significant transition, 
spurred by technological changes and growing concern about the 
significant contribution of energy use and production on global 
 
499 PennEast Pipeline Co., 164 FERC ¶ 61,098, at P 122 n.274 (2018). 
500  E.g., Spire STL Certificate Order, supra note 377, at P 246 (discussing direct 
emissions that were disclosed in the project’s EA). 
501 NEMS is an integrated model.  See EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 493, 
at E-1.  ICF’s Gas Market Model can be integrated with its power sector model IPM.  See 
TONGUE RIVER, supra note 492, at C.5-15 (describing the interaction between the Gas 
Market Model and IPM). 
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climate change.  This transition has significantly increased 
public attention on the energy sector and its regulators and, as 
a result, FERC now faces substantial attention and scrutiny 
from the public, press, and lawmakers.502  That attention will 
only increase as FERC embraces its critical role in facilitating, 
rather than merely observing (or obstructing), the energy 
system’s transition to one that is cleaner and more flexible, while 
maintaining the system’s affordability and reliability.503 
In managing that transition, a successful FERC would balance 
competing interests, clearly explain its choices, and act in ways 
that make the American people better off.  Cost-benefit analysis 
can help FERC meet each of these objectives.  Particularly given 
the growing demand from the courts and the executive branch 
that agencies fully consider the costs and benefits of their 
actions, now is the time for FERC to embrace cost-benefit 
analysis. 
This Article has explored the potential for cost-benefit analysis 
to inform two areas of significant FERC responsibility relevant 
to the energy transition:  RTO market rules and natural gas 
pipeline certificates.  FERC is well within its legal authority to 
adopt cost-benefit analysis, including the quantification of a 
broad scope of costs and benefits (including environmental and 
climate consequences), and to use the results of that evaluation 
in deciding how to proceed with the issuance of new regulations, 
approval of RTO market rule changes, and certification of new 
natural gas infrastructure. 
As the energy sector evolves, so too must FERC.  To fulfill its 
role in an efficient, reasoned, and transparent manner, FERC is 
in need of sound analytical tools to balance competing interests 
in an increasingly complex regulatory landscape.  FERC should 
join the cost-benefit state by adopting the analytical and decision 
making tool that has worked well for agencies across the federal 
government. 
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